In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio (1989), a five-member Court majority implicitly overturned its earlier interpretation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971) and held that the burden of proving that a defendant company's employment practice discriminates against a protected group always remains with the plaintiff and does not shift to the defendant. In this act, Congress rejects the Court's holding in Wards Cove and places the burden of proving that its employment practices do not discriminate squarely on the defendant.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as the "Civil Rights Act of 1991."
SEC. 2. FINDINGS
The Congress finds that-
SEC. 3. PURPOSES
The purposes of this Act are-
SEC. 104. DEFINITIONS
Section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsections:
"(l) The term complaining party means the Commission, the Attorney General, or a person who may bring an action or proceeding under this title.
"(m) The term demonstrates means meets the burdens of production and persuasion.
"(n) The term respondent means an employer, employment agency, labor organization, joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining program, including an on-the-job training program, or Federal entity subject to section 717."
SEC. 105. BURDEN OF PROOF IN DISPARATE IMPACT CASES
(a) Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
"(k)(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this title only if-
"(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or
"(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.
"(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice.
"(ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice does not cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity. "(C) The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989 [the date of Wards Cove], with respect to the concept of alternative employment practice."