<center>**Conceptual Schemes After Davidson**</center>

<center>David K. Henderson</center>

I. Introduction:

Philosophers and social scientists have written of people or peoples holding various conceptual schemes. In "The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," Donald Davidson (1984d) argues that such talk is either hyperbole or incoherent. On the one hand, he explains, there is little to be excited about in the differences that can defensibly be alluded to in connection with such formulations. On the other hand, he insists, the radical differences envisioned in much talk of conceptual schemes are incoherent. Much can be learned from careful examinations of Davidson's position. However, I argue that it mistakenly papers over the real possibility of rather deep differences in beliefs, theories, and concepts--the sorts of differences that have interested many proponents of conceptual schemes. I examine the form of interpretive practice (or translation) that can lead us to unproblematically posit such differences. While I agree with Davidson that the disagreements we find in interpretation will rest upon a background of found agreement, this does not preclude the sort of differences that many have thought to differentiate conceptual schemes.

Defending a recognizable notion of conceptual scheme in a way that does not talk past either Davidson's important points or the positions of those who posit such schemes can be ticklish. It is not at all clear that the friends of conceptual schemes have themselves shared the same concept of a conceptual scheme. Nor is it clear that Davidson has managed to criticize the most plausible variants distillable from the writings of proponents. But, it is fairly clear that conceptual schemes, have, on most accounts, certain central characteristics that we should take as a starting point.

First, conceptual schemes are like points of view, whether there is just one or many, <u>if</u> there <u>is</u> one, there <u>could</u> be many.

Second, as the terminology itself suggests, conceptual schemes are associated with concepts. If two people employ the same concepts, they presumably are using the same conceptual scheme. If two people have different conceptual schemes, they are employing a significantly different set of concepts.

Through the association with concepts, conceptual schemes have commonly come to be associated with languages. The notion of a concept is somewhat slippery.[1] Thinking in terms of languages, on the other hand, has seemed to provide something of a safe haven from which we could consider conceptual variation. After all, languages are intimately associated with categorization and conceptualization. In any case, some association of conceptual schemes with languages has been central to friends of schemes as different as Quine and Whorf.

However, in describing this common ground for the friends of schemes, we must be wary. While thinking in terms of languages may promise to clarify our treatment of conceptual schemes, it is not immediately clear how that clarification should be affected. It is readily granted that different languages may express the same conceptual scheme. Davidson proposes that conceptual schemes be identified with sets of intertranslatable languages, and that intranslatability of languages provides a necessary condition for scheme differentiation. However, the matter may not be so straightforward. Important friends of conceptual schemes, such as Quine (1960, pp. 76-77; 1981, pp. 41-2), characterize differentiation of schemes in terms of certain sorts of <u>differences that show up under translation</u>. Further, those whose discussion does suggest that scheme identification and individuation turns on translatability may be employing a defensible notion of translation that is importantly different from Davidson's. Thus, we will need to sort out together two questions: Just how intimate is the connection between the translatability of languages and the identification and individuation of the conceptual schemes purported to be expressed or embedded in those languages? Where the connection is intimate, what notion of translation is employed?

In accommodating Davidson's argument while containing its implications, the above two questions are particularly important. For, his argument proceeds by establishing a lemma to the effect that there is no "criterion of languagehood" that does not "depend on, or entail, translatability into familiar idiom" (1984d, p.192). From this he concludes that there cannot be untranslatable languages, and thus there cannot be alternative conceptual schemes. If this is argument is to succeed, the notion of translatability featured in our criterion of languagehood must be the same notion of translatability that

turns out to be intimately associated with conceptual scheme identification and individuation. In the next section, I argue that different notions typically are featured in these two connections, and thus that Davidson's basic argument will not work as it stands. This result will only provide a first step in coming to terms with Davidson's position.

Davidson also argues that when the agreement turned up in translational efforts is sufficient to satisfy the standards for producing adequate interpretation, there is room for only very limited conceptual differences. If such differences were thought to make for difference in conceptual scheme, the presence of such alternative schemes would be unexciting. To adequately access this point, it will be necessary to delineate a sort of translation that friends of conceptual schemes would think allows us to uncover exciting cases. Just how deep conceptual and theoretical differences can run will be the topic of my third section.

II. Strict and Reconstructive Translation

Charitable interpretation is as necessary in understanding philosophers, anthropologists, and members of other such exotic tribes in our homelands as it is in understanding more mundane groups at home and abroad. If so, then it should be the case that "as philosophers, we are particularly tolerant of systematic malapropism, and practiced at interpreting the result" (Davidson 1984d, p. 196), for we commonly do find ourselves confronted with linguistic practice that would tempt those of less experience and training into interpretation-vitiating attributions of irrational beliefs. Still, even the most able have been known to crack under the stresses of professional philosophical scholarship. Davidson's reading of the friends of conceptual schemes may be a case in point. He views Whorf's insistence that Hopi and English cannot be "calibrated" as a case of positing untranslatable languages, and as indicating that, for Whorf, such intranslatability is necessary for conceptual scheme differentiation (Davidson 1984d, p. 190). However, this squares poorly with Whorf's own (1956) discussion in which he freely writes of "the character of the phenomena denoted" by certain verbs,[2] seeks to express "the nature of the change" affected by particular modifying particles, and illustrates the relevant shifts in content using examples in which short Hopi phrases are rendered by relatively

sprawling English phrases. The results seem to be what Davidson would recognize as translation. Accordingly, Davidson takes Whorf's own practice to obviously undermine the latter's assertion of intranslatability and insistence that Hopi expresses an alternative conceptual scheme. This is analogous to viewing someone as denying that she is walking even as she is walking. Surely this would be a sort of silliness that is less likely than poor interpretation.

The implication is clear. We may suppose, with Davidson, that the difficulties that Whorf associates with interpretation across conceptual schemes, and that he refers to as difficulties or failures of "calibration," comprise one sort of intranslatability. However, the sort of translatability at issue here can only be taken as of a particularly demanding sort--one that plausibly only obtains between languages expressing the same conceptual scheme. (It will need a more concrete characterization.) Immediately, we should add that there are looser, or less demanding, sorts of translatability. We should charitably seek to delineate, for Whorf and other friends of conceptual schemes, distinct notions of translation: one that might be associated with conceptual scheme individuation and identification, and the other to characterize what they do when they seek to convey to us the content of expressions of alternative conceptual schemes. This looser sense of translatability would seem to be that featured in our (Davidsonian) criterion for languagehood.[3]

Were we to consider Quine or Kuhn, two other writers who Davidson criticizes for talking of conceptual schemes while providing for their exposition under translation, we would be lead to the same conclusion. Far from associating paradigms (as conceptual schemes) with intranslatability, Kuhn (1970, p. 202) insists that the "communication breakdowns" that arise between investigators employing "incommensurable paradigms" can and should provide the occasion for translation. Quine clearly also allows for awkward translation between languages expressing alternative conceptual schemes.

How should we delineate the two notions of translation and translatability? In fairness to Davidson, we need a loose notion of translatability that would plausibly be associated with languagehood and Tarski-style theories, as he has suggested. (But such a notion ultimately must not presuppose an antecedent sharing of concepts within all translatable contexts. It should allow for

extensive enclaves of conceptual variation that make for awkwardness of translation.) In fairness to the friends of schemes, we should seek a tighter notion that would accommodate the common themes sounded earlier by failing to obtain between languages where, "pretheoretically," different schemes are at issue. We should find more and more failures of strict translation as, pretheoretically, schemes become more and more remote.

One hint is provided by Quine (1960, 1970, 1981). While Quine is wary of both posited cultural universals and posited radical differences in conceptual schemes (1960, p. 77; 1970, pp. 9-11), he does think that there can be crude measures of real cultural differences. His basic idea is that once a translation scheme has been rigged that duly makes our informants out to be conveying generally plausible messages (1970, pp. 1-19), the extent to which we have to employ gerrymandered constructions in our home language in translating them provides a measure of linguistic differences:

> If we find a language hard to translate, if we find very little word-by-word isomorphism with genuine and idiomatic English, then we already have right there, in a featureless sort of way, a kind of measure of remoteness (1970, p. 15).

Developing this idea, Quine suggests a "measure of what might be called the remoteness of a conceptual scheme but what might better be called the conceptual difference between languages" (1981, pp. 41-2). This treatment of "conceptual schemes," which has seen a consistent development since (1960), makes the unqualified suggestion that Quine adheres to a notion of such schemes wedded to intranslatability extremely uncharitable. We must look for a way of developing the more guarded suggestion that conceptual scheme differentiation is associated with certain classes of difficulties or awkwardness in translation.

I do believe that the sort of difference in schemes that Whorf talks about, in which two languages somehow globally enshrine differing underlying ontologies, should be among the last sort of difference to come to terms with (if we are to come to terms with it at all beyond the sort of general measure Quine proposes). However, there are other differences that would also show up when applying Quine's measure more locally: there might be deep differences in a theories that would result

in many of the central concepts of the one theory having no ready parallels in the other. Were we to translate the languages expressing the two theories, we would need to resort to a lose sort of translation in which we "coin new words or distort the usage of old ones" (Quine 1960, p. 76). The reason one would need to do so is that one would need to reconstruct, within the expressive resources of the target-language, something of the theory (and central concepts) being translated. Accordingly, I call such translation reconstructive translation.

In setting out a general account of this sort of translational endeavor, a concrete example to which we might recur would be helpful. Early on in Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande, Evans-Pritchard (1937, pp. 8-11) sets out how he proposes to treat Zande terms and notions. He provides a table in which he sets out certain central Zande terms, English phrases that he employs as somewhat uneasy stand-ins (rough translations) for each of these, and short paragraphs providing "condensed" characterization of the notions in question. The translational stand-ins really serve as proxies for the condensed characterizations. Further, Evans-Pritchard remarks that even the "formal and condensed definitions" that he provides here merely facilitate reading his work, forestalling misunderstandings that would otherwise arise from overreliance on the uneasy stand-ins, while a yet more adequate characterization of the Zande notions only emerges in the course of the monograph as a whole. Here is a excerpt from his table (1937, p. 9):

Mangu (1)   WITCHCRAFT SUBSTANCE: a material substance in the bodies of certain persons. It is discovered by autopsy in the dead and is supposed to be diagnosed by oracles in the living.

(2)   WITCHCRAFT: a supposed psychic emanation from witchcraft-substance which is believed to cause injury to health and property.

.

.

<u>Ngua</u> (1) MAGIC: a technique that is supposed to achieve its purpose by the use of medicines. The operation of these medicines is a magic rite and us usually accompanied by a spell.

(2) MEDICINES: any object in which mystical power is supposed to reside and which is used in magic rites. They are usually of vegetable nature.

There is much that is notable here. But let us begin with this: were I to ask someone with a common Western cultural background, and who had not been exposed to this material already, what word we used to express the concept of (<u>mangu</u>) an inherited substance in the bodies of certain persons enabling them to cause injury to others by thinking ill of the harmed person, they would typically be at a loss for an answer. The reason is that Evans-Pritchard's glosses reflects the manner in which the Zande concept of <u>mangu</u> is embedded in a web of "theory,"[4] and <u>we do not antecedently have the relevant theory</u>. A fortiori, <u>we do not antecedently possess</u> either <u>the Zande concept</u> or a word for it. Insofar as we have a concept associated with the word 'witchcraft', it is not the Zande notion set out here.[5] In casting about for a clear parallel to the Zande notion of <u>mangu</u>, Evans-Pritchard finds none; so, in <u>reconstructing the relevant portions of the Zande theory, in reconstructing their concept,</u> he finds it necessary to employ a "warped usage," if he is to have a short word as the translation of the Zande word.[6]

Obviously, thinking of a simple translation employing Evans-Pritchard's stand-ins, without also keeping in mind his longer glosses and his monograph as a whole, could be quite misleading. <u>It is the systematic set of reconstructions</u> that really carry the weight in the interpretations produced here.

Contrast, our satisfaction with 'Snow is white' as a self-contained translation from 'Der Schnee ist weiss'. Due to structural similarities in taxonomies and associations--which we associate with antecedently sharing concepts across languages--we think of such translations as standing on their own. We can take the comparably short gloss provided here as a <u>direct translation</u> of the German sentence, and we take the indicated equivalence at face value. I believe that such <u>direct translation, being</u>

associated with ready parallels and shared concepts, is the sort of translation that might plausibly be associated with conceptual scheme identification and individuation.

In contrast to cases of direct translatability, when we employ Evans-Pritchard's stand-ins to arrive at a "translation" like, 'He is bewitched by his neighbor', we can only know what to make of that stand-in by knowing the longer reconstructive gloss for which it serves as a shorthand. We would caution others that the English word 'bewitched' as used here is not to be understood as expressing our traditional concept of "being acted on by witchcraft"; rather, it points to a Zande notion treated in Evans-Pritchard's reconstruction of an extensive family of concepts and embedding theory. Here, we have a translation in an indirect or extended sense.

To the extent we can give only indirect or extended translation when treating a foreign context, we are dealing with what friends of conceptual schemes would typically recognize as a distinct scheme. It is not that we "cannot say what they say," but that we have no ways antecedently on hand, no direct translations in our language. Thus, we cannot say what they say without first engaging in reconstructive work. What they say is translatable into our language only in an extended sense, that is, only insofar as the reconstructions are expressible in our language.

I should remark on the notion of "concept" to which I have helped myself. Basically, it is that employed when Davidson (1980, pp. 220), writes of concepts arising within "theories with strong constitutive elements." He explains by illustration how common comparative and quantitative concepts in the physical sciences are constituted by central elements of our physical theories. Now, as long as being a constitutive criteria is understood as a matter of centrality to present theory, and what we might key on in teaching, it need not commit us to a suspect notion of analytic truths (Quine 1953, Putnam 1975, Henderson 1993, chapter 4). On this view, concepts are associated with relatively central elements of their home theories--such elements serving as their constitutive criteria. Deep differences in theory constitute different concepts. Insofar as concepts expressed in different languages have dissimilar constitutive criteria, they, as well as their theories, are different.

In cases of direct translation, we match up expressions that are antecedently employed in similar theories to express the same (or very similar) concepts--concepts with the same (or strikingly similar) constitutive criteria. Direct translations such as 'The dog is a mammal' for 'Le chien est un mammifere', stand on their own because they employ expressions for such antecedently shared concepts. While not having a home in a sophisticated portion of theory, the nouns employed in the these particular direct translational equivalents are components of familiar taxonomies. These taxonomies, as entrenched in the two languages, are identical--their central associations and principles are fully shared. (Of course, this is an extreme case due to cultural sharing.) To the extent that there is an isomorphism of constitutive criteria for the concepts and embedding taxonomies, one can begin with a set of simple translational equivalences, and by expressing central associations within one's own taxonomy while employing that translational scheme, one thereby expresses in the other language associations central and familiar to speakers of that language. More generally, to the extent that there is such isomorphism of a theory and interrelated concepts antecedently expressed in two languages, one can begin with a translational scheme employing ready to hand expressions (in effect, the short stand-ins) and, by expressing under translation central elements on one's own theory, one expresses central elements of theory familiar to speakers of the other language. This is why we think of such direct translations as standing on their own. Using knowledge of one's own theory and the direct translational stand-ins, one can generate the parallel constitutive criteria of the theory as expressed in that other language.[7]

To the extent such simple modeling is infeasible, we resort of a sort of reconstruction evinced in Evans-Pritchard's study of Zande witchcraft and magic. In such cases of indirect translation, the matching up of short expressions does essentially nothing of itself; rather, it serves as cryptographic convenience that refers us to the reconstruction of theory and embedded concepts that we do not antecedently share. To say that employing the simple stand-ins by themselves would be misleading is to say that simple modeling would lead us far off from the associations made by those we seek to understand. Without the reconstruction, the only resource would be to simple modeling.

The task of the reconstruction is to create, using antecedently existing expressive resources within the our language (the target-language), a theory that is in relevant respects similar to the concept-embedding theory that we wish to translate and understand (the source-language theory). The reconstruction thus delivers to us a theory that, when combined with the simple stand-ins, allows us to model source-language processing and practice in much the way they are modeled in connection with direct translation.[8] The difference being that we have first had to become acquainted with a foreign theory and set of embedded concepts before proceeding. With this information, we can follow the Zande associations.

In such reconstruction, a short stand-in is typically introduced to serve as a marker for a foreign concept. For example, Evans-Pritchard uses 'witchcraft' as a condensed expression to mark the Zande concept of <u>mangu</u>. That concept, witchcraft^{Zande}, is explicated, not in the single synoptic entry under <u>mangu</u>, but in that and the entries under related notions. That is to say, the concept is explicated only in the holistic reconstruction of a substantial fabric of Zande belief--the Zande theory. We might imagine the results being presented in a table fleshing out the table reproduced above. One entry might start:

<u>Mangu</u> (1) WITCHCRAFT SUBSTANCE: A dark substance to be found in the belly (perhaps what we would call the small intestines) of certain persons. It has or yields to its carrier the power to bring about ill effects (of a typically gradual nature) such as illness in others. These effects are triggered by animosity or grudges on the part of the carrier, and can apparently be so triggered unknowingly. Merely carrying this substance cannot be diagnosed in the living carrier. However, its activity can be revealed by consulting the poison oracle on behalf of a harmed person, provided the particular carrier is singled out in that consultation. It can be discovered by autopsy in the dead, but with only circumstantial implications for it being employed harming a given victim of witchcraft. The substance is inherited, being passed along from fathers to sons and from mothers to daughters. Its ill effects can be combated and avenged by use of Magic^{Zande} and Medicines^{Zande} . . . .

Further entries would then characterize Zande notions of magic, medicines, particularly relevant medicines, oracles generally, the poison oracle in particular, inheritance, moral responsibility, and so on. Obviously, the results of reconstruction can be quite involved, as this is to model a significant bit of theory in a language which antecedently had few strong parallels. With this reconstruction in hand, we should be able to model the constitutive criteria for the Zande concepts as we trace out connections between entries. Further, we can apply the reconstruction to interpret particular information provided by situated Zande informants; the results should provide a basis for modeling particular patterns of interaction between individuals and with the environment.

This schematic account of indirect, or reconstructive, translation can be elaborated so as to emphasize several important points. First, it should be acknowledged that such reconstruction presupposes an important level of agreement. This has significant implications for limitations on the extent of conceptual variation that may be found under translation, and it would seem to put the brakes on relativist tendencies sometimes associated with talk of conceptual schemes. Secondly, the envisioned reconstructive results is the kind of translation that is appropriate to the Davidsonian criterion of languagehood. In particular, it satisfies the concerns leading Davidson to conclude that translatability features in those criteria, while it is not unnecessarily or arbitrarily restrictive. Thus, a range of linguistic behavior might turn out to be reconstructively translatable--and thus language use-- while not being directly translatable. Third, the level of agreement required for reconstructive translation allows for disagreement in theory and concept that would be sufficiently deep and extensive to satisfy the central tenets agreed on by most friends of conceptual schemes. Accordingly, it seems fair to say that what must be handled by extensive reconstruction, as opposed to direct translation, comprises an alternative conceptual scheme, as understood by proponents of the scheme idea. This last point will be reserved for the final section of this paper.

While reconstructive translation allows us to find intelligible significant disagreement, while it makes significantly more room for disagreement than does straight direct translation, nevertheless, it requires that there be, at some level, significant agreement uncovered in translation. To see this,

consider how the reconstructive work of an ethnography might satisfactorily come to an end. Commonly, ethnographers reconstruct the native theory until they arrive at concepts that they share with those who they seek to translate. Where reconstruction then leaves off, we are left with relatively direct translation schemes anchoring the reconstructive scheme. For example, following Evans-Pritchard, in the above partial reconstruction of Azande views, I write of "powers to bring about" certain results, of "ill will or grudges" held by individuals, of "illness," of the "inheritance" of characteristics, of "bellies," "fowls," and so forth. In each case, we either need further reconstruction or we antecedently share concepts and thus will not be led wrong by employing these stand-ins as direct translations of the relevant Zande expressions. Where we rest content with direct translation is, in large measure, a matter of where we find an acceptable level of conceptual and related factual agreement.[9] Thus, while reconstructive translation mitigates the need to find agreement under translation, by allowing for the reconstruction of theories and embedded concepts that differ markedly from our own without thereby sacrificing intelligibility, insofar as reconstruction gives way to a level of direct translatability, we are led to find significant agreement anchoring our interpretation.

Typically, a level of direct translation plays an important role anchoring or bestowing content on the reconstructed interrelations. Reconstructive translation is a matter of reconstructing the theory and embedded concepts of those we seek to understand. In part, this is a matter of being able to model the interrelations between concepts--interrelations that are codified in central theoretical principles that we have termed constitutive criteria. Now, such constitutive criteria do not just express interrelations between concepts that are special to the relevant theory, they also express interrelations involving concepts that presumably are more widely distributed. Such concepts may be fairly common coin between us and those we seek to understand. When they are, they provide an important basis for reconstruction, informing our understanding of the results. To barrow a fitting description from Hollis,[10] they provide a "bridgehead" of agreement on which the further reconstructive work depends.

This bridgehead is commonly crucial to determining the sorts of things with which the system reconstructed has to do. For example, in our example, we find that Zande beliefs regarding mangu and

ngau have (in part at least) to do with explaining what brings about certain misfortunes such as illness. Here we suppose that we share with the Zande a notion of "illness"--at least a very similar concept, as we would presumably identify the great majority of the same cases as cases of illness, and we would agree regarding what symptoms indicated that these were cases of illness.[11] In the reconstruction, we also find that the Zande beliefs constitutive of the concept of mangu include the belief that its ill effects are triggered by animosities, such as grudges. Here it is presumed that, despite differences in the structures of our societies and interpersonal relationships, the Zande share with us such rudimentary notions as "being angry" with someone, "holding a grudge," and so on.

At any point at which reconstruction leaves off, and we are left with apparently direct translation, we might wonder whether we and those we seek to understand really do nearly enough share concepts to allow us to so proceed. Consider: do we and the Azande share a concept of "inheritance" so that we can directly translate them as describing mangu as being inherited from father to son and from mother to daughter (i.e., from same sexed member of that coupling that led to the child). We might worry that our own concept is now so wedded to various strands of theory that it cannot be used in direct translation here. However, reflection on our own usage indicates a central usage which involves certain phenotypical traits being passed along to offspring. This is a general usage that can be said to be shared by those who are ignorant of the genetic mechanisms involved, and even of the familiar Mendelian (ceteris paribus) generalizations. The Azande seem to share this much with us.[12]

In practice, reconstructive translation typically ends with direct translatability at various levels. However, in principle, there need not be such a level of easy direct translation. It is at least conceivable that an ethnographer would proceed with reconstruction reaching only to taxonomies which are automatically and simply applied by the subjects of interpretation, and that seem gerrymandered from the point of view of both our scientific and everyday conceptualizations. In such cases, we will treat their categories by drawing extensionally equivalent categories in our terms, however disjunctive and qualified they seem to us, and by noting that our subjects do not treat their

categories as gerrymandered constructions out of other categories. (Of course, we commonly do encounter this in limited taxonomies. So, in practice, reconstructive translation occasionly leads us to a mixture of [a] shared conceptualization and belief where we can employ direct translation, and [b] fairly divergent and basic taxonomies that have to be reconstructively treated.) Our attitude towards such taxonomies will need to be similar to the guardedly respectful attitude we hold to our own everyday taxonomies. First, we may note that from the point of view of our better scientific theories, the everyday taxa may be nonprojectible. Yet, given the conditions for the application of such terms, the speakers are generally correct in their judgments applying them. For example, when we consider our own everyday taxonomy for clothing, we will note that terms such as 'coat' are typically not projectible. Yet we think the term is correctly applied in most cases. Thus, when the natives judge that there is a such-and-such, we will need to so interpret them as to find them typically correct, even if we think that those terms are not ultimately projectible. The reasons for this lie with the principle of charity in translation. While I do not believe that the principle of charity is as fundamental as Davidson believes, and do not think that it applies across the board in the manner he seems to envision (Henderson 1993, chpts. 2-3), I do believe that it has sufficient bite to insure a important level of agreement (Henderson, chpt. 3-4.) In the cases just envisioned, the agreement found is an uneasy sort of agreement in factual judgment, but not in conceptualization.

The range of possibilities discussed above reflect a rich set of translational practices that may be understood as varying degrees of directness, and of reconstruction, in translation. At one pole, we have straightforward direct translation into the vocabulary of presently held and commonly used theory. At the other pole, there is the sort of deep and extensive reconstruction that we have seen in Evans-Pritchards treatment of mangu and other concepts special to Zande witchcraft and magic. Typically, reconstruction of significant ranges of native theory leads us to levels of direct translation and agreement. However, at the extreme, we can imagine cases of thoroughgoing reconstruction in which we have reconstruction all the way down, in which no place is found for direct translation.

Intermediate cases occur when we find something like direct translation into usages that require more or less caution.

Now, we can address the question of whether direct or reconstructive translation should feature in the translatability criterion for languagehood for which Davidson has argued. I believe that the answer is obvious. To begin with, employing direct translatability in this role leads immediately to untenable results. For example, as we have seen, those Zande vocalizations that Evans-Pritchard features in his Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande are not directly translatable into English. But it is simply unacceptable to conclude that the vocalizations are not tokens of types in a language. Even were this an isolated case, it would be a powerful one. Of course, the need for reconstruction is widespread, it is the rule in interpretive anthropological work, not the exception. So this case against direct translatability could be reiterated at will.

Still, one might wonder whether reconstructive translation will serve as the translatability associated with languagehood. To begin with, consider the following rather picky argument against using reconstructive translatability in this fashion. Davidson argues that translatability into our language features in whatever criterion of languagehood we settle on. But, does reconstructive translation really produce a scheme for translating the other language into our language? One upshot of the earlier discussion of reconstructive translation, and of the limited role of stand-ins there, is that the source-language there gets translated, not into our English (or our home-language) with its antecedently existing usages, but into an expanded English where certain syntactical strings come to be used to express concepts that were not antecedently expressed in our English.[13] In reconstructive translation, the source-language is not translated into our language, but is translated into a closely related language. Does this mean that reconstructive translation cannot serve as the sort of translation at issue in Davidson's standard? Two responses seem to be in order.

First, were this argument to show that reconstructive translation does not provide translation into our language in the sense required in Davidson's standard for languagehood, so much the worse for that standard. While translatability into some language intimately related to the home-language

may be a criterion for languagehood, translation into our language without reconstructed, expanded, usages is too much to ask. The translatability standard is not to be understood so rigidly. Davidson says as much when he recognizes limited ranges of possible conceptual divergence and failures of easy translation (1984d, p. 192). Further, as we will see, the considerations that motivate the translatability standard are themselves satisfied by reconstructive translation.

Second, there is a way of understanding reconstructive translation that instructively evades even the picky argument. Recall that the short stand-ins resorted to in reconstructive translation are of little use taken by themselves. Rather, they serve as shorthands that must be read against the background of the reconstructed theory. However, so long as we care little for tractable formulation, we could settle for translations that, in effect, pack all or most of the reconstruction itself into the translation of simple source-language utterances involving terms from that theory. The basic idea here was suggested by Ramsey, and it intrigued positivists who were concerned with the place of theoretical terms in science (for example, Hempel 1965).[14] Take any translation in which the "problematic" stand-ins are featured. In place of that sentence, one can produce another by replacing those stand-ins with existentially quantified formulations describing the type set out in the relevant reconstruction entry. Thus, in the first step, the simple stand-in formulation, 'Joe carries witchcraft substance in his belly' gets expanded into:

> There is dark substance to be found in the belly of certain persons which yields to its carrier the power to bring about ill effects (of a typically gradual nature) such as illness in others; which effects are triggered (even unknowingly) by animosity or grudges on the part of the carrier; and . . . and it is inherited, being passed along from fathers to sons and from mothers to daughters, and its ill effects can be combated and avenged by use of Magic^{Zande} and Medicines^{Zande}, . . . and Joe carries some of it in his belly.

Now, this has obviously employed yet further "problematic" stand-ins. So, to dispense with expanded usages, the relevant portions of the longer translation need to be expanded into existentially quantified clauses by drawing again on the reconstruction. As long as one has a reconstruction of the source-

language theory in the home-language, and one has almost unlimited patience, then, for any given sentence expressing Zande witchcraft beliefs, one could produce a sentence that, while baroque, does not require expanding the home-language in the course of translation. The fact that such unwieldy translations into the home-language (strictly taken) are made accessible to us by drawing on reconstructive translations should undermine whatever force the picky argument had. (Additionally, the kind of unwieldy construction envisioned just now will be useful in the discussions yet to come.)[15]

For a more principled appreciation of how reconstructive translation can serve in Davidson's translatability criterion for languagehood we would do well to consider some of the concerns that led Davidson to insist that there is no translation independent criteria for languagehood. These concerns emerge most clearly when Davidson undertakes to show that plausible ways of fleshing out the following general understanding of languages and conceptual schemes do not lead us to a translation independent criterion: "The idea is then that something is a language, and associated with a conceptual scheme, whether we can translate it or not, if it stands in a certain relation (predicting, organizing, facing or fitting) experience (nature, reality, sensory promptings)" (Davidson 1984d, p. 191). This formulation points in two directions: that something is a language if it organizes objects or experience, and that something is a language if it fits or faces the tribunal of experience. However, Davidson argues, our understanding of these criterial tasks is ultimately dependent on notions of translation and translatability.

If something is to be a language that organizes objects, it must have predicates picking out classes of objects. But, we can only make sense of a language doing this, when we can translate at least many of its predicates. So, Davidson concludes that the idea of a language that organizes objects is the idea of a language that is at least partially translatable into our own. It must be one for which we can determine the extension of many of its predicates. Presumably, for a language to organize objects in this fashion, its predicates commonly must be associated with sets of central theoretical principles that are to be respected in translation. If so, then Davidson would hold that, for something to be a

language, we must be able to determine the constitutive criteria for many of its predicates (along with their extension).

The idea of a language organizing experiences leads to much the same conclusion. The components of the language that deal fairly directly with objects and those that deal with experience are intimately connected. So, organizing experience parallels organizing objects (some would even say that explicitly organizing experience is parasitic on organizing objects, see Quine 1960, chpt. 1).

The central point, not to belabor it, is that translatability comes to be associated with languagehood because (1) languagehood is associated with organizing objects and experience in that languages employ predicates with extensions and constitutive criteria, and (2) our understanding of this requires that the language be at least largely translatable. This seems to be correct, and it bodes well for reconstructive translatability as the form of translatability at issue. For, as we have seen in earlier discussion, reconstructing a theory and embedded constitutive criteria, and doing so in a way that allows us to fix on the extension of predicates within the foreign theory, is central to reconstructive translation.

The figure of a language fitting or facing the tribunal of experience leads Davidson to focus on sentences rather than predicates. It has to do with the truth of theory and its various sentences.[16] But, Davidson points out, we do not understand the notion of truth as applied to a language at all well independent of the notion of translation: "Since Convention T embodies our best intuition as to how the concept of truth is used, there does not seem to be much hope for . . . the assumption that we can divorce the notion of truth from that of translation" (1984d, p. 195).

So, not only is translatability associated with languagehood through a constitutive concern with the extension of, and constitutive criteria for, predicates, translatability and languagehood are also wedded through a concern for truth in a language. Sentences of a language, or at least many of them, must have truth-conditions uncoverable in translation. Happily, reconstructive translation is devoted to explicating the truth-conditions for sentences, even for sentences expressing foreign theories. On this score, the above discussion of Ramsey-sentence-like treatments of utterances proves instructive.

Drawing on reconstructive translations, one can explicate any short stand-in translation of a source-language sentence so as to produce an unwieldy sentence that, nevertheless, may be said to express truth-conditions for the foreign sentence.

I conclude that the concerns that lead Davidson to associate translatability with languagehood are satisfied by allowing translational relations as loose as reconstructive translatability to provide the translatability at issue.

Let us take stock. We have noted that in the writings of proponents of the conceptual scheme idea there is talk (of failures of calibration, of incommensurability, and of difficulties and awkwardness of translation) that suggests that, in some sense, translatability of languages features as a criterion for conceptual scheme identification and individuation. However, several writers posit conceptual schemes and proceed to do something that strikes us as translating between such schemes. Thus, to be fair to these thinkers, I have attempted to delineate two distinct notions of translation. To begin with, there a demanding notion of translation, which I have called direct translation, that might plausibly be associated with conceptual scheme identification and individuation. This association of direct translatability and conceptual schemes is straightforward: it keys on the idea that distinct conceptual schemes are marked by conceptual differences, and that such differences are paralleled in languages that differ in that each has antecedently developed simple ways of expressing concepts that have no antecedently developed expressions in the other. Languages expressing the same conceptual schemes are directly translatable because they have, ready to hand, ways of expressing the same concepts. In contrast, I have discussed a less strict form of translation, reconstructive translation, that is evinced in much anthropological literature. Reconstructive translatability is plausibly associated with languagehood. This undercuts a central line in Davidson's objection to the idea of conceptual schemes. There can be systems that are reconstructively translatable, and thus can qualify as languages, while failing to be directly translatable, thus expressing differing conceptual schemes. We have found textual support in the writings of friends of conceptual schemes for taking direct translation to be so associated

with conceptual schemes. We have found that reconstructive translation addresses the concerns that led Davidson to associate translatability with languagehood.

III. On Deep and Extensive Differences

To many sympathizers with Davidson's misgivings regarding the idea of conceptual schemes, all this may seem to miss a second central thrust in Davidson's discussions and to provide only a hollow victory for the friends of schemes. Reconstructive translation seems to be a case of what Davidson would call partial translation.[17] Thus, I say that the language may be fully reconstructively translatable, while being only partially (directly) translatable. Now, Davidson would insist that such partial translatability would limit the extent of disagreement across putatively different conceptual schemes, either by virtue of a having a basis in direct translatability or by virtue of the general charitable constraint on interpretation. In fact, Davidson argues, there remains no room for the really significant and deep differences that are commonly posited in connection with talk of conceptual schemes. We must now turn to evaluating this objection to the idea of conceptual schemes.

In view of my concessions regarding the need to find agreement under translation, does Davidson have me where he wants me? Have I defended certain understandings of conceptual schemes against the charge of incoherence only to be left with an uninteresting or unexciting understanding of the possibilities of cognitive variation? Much turns on how extensive the background of shared concepts and beliefs found in translation must be in order to provide a secure basis for attributions of conceptual variation and attendant variation in fairly deep theoretical beliefs.

Davidson's central principle regarding the epistemological status of attributions of differences in beliefs or concepts is that, "we improve the clarity and bite of declarations of difference, whether of scheme or opinion, by enlarging the basis of shared (translatable) language or of shared opinion" (1984d, p. 197). Here, again, shared or translatable language is associated with shared concepts ("scheme") and what I have called direct translation. As we have already seen, sharing concepts is associated with sharing certain central beliefs, constitutive beliefs. Thus, the principle boils down to an application of Davidson's strong principle of charity in interpretation: we are to so interpret that we find

others rational and holding true beliefs (by our lights) so far as possible (Davidson 1984a, 1984b, 1984c). The importance of attributing shared concepts in Davidsonian interpretation can be understood as a matter of putting a premium on finding agreement on constitutive criteria.

Now, if one combines (a) the principle that the epistemological security of attributions of error is proportionate to the background of related agreement found in interpretation, with (b) a low tolerance for insecurity (and (c) with a forgetfulness that such insecurity might be mitigated by the relative sparsity of background agreement being marked by explicable differences in belief),[18] then one arrives at Davidson's central claim against the possibility of significant variation in concepts or beliefs: cognitive differences must be very localized and fairly shallow. This claim may be elucidated along the following lines, which find textual support in Davidson's writings.

First, Davidson insists that the differences must be very localized in the following respect. To attribute disagreement, we must be in a position to identify the content of the relevant beliefs. But, these putative beliefs can only be assigned content (indeed, only have the content they have) by being "anchored" or located in a patterned network of associated beliefs. The principle of charity requires us to find agreement with the majority of beliefs in the network. Thus, differences must be localized in that disagreements can only be identified if the particular belief (and the concept) at issue is fairly directly anchored by its association with many related beliefs (having to do with related concepts) on which there is agreement. The matter is not precise, for there is much room for compensating variations, as beliefs are attributed holistically. But, Davidson's idea is that a disagreement on inheritance must be localized by that belief and related beliefs about inheritance being associated with largely agreed on beliefs about related matters, such as biological parentage, what counts as a phenotype, and so forth.

In a related vein, Davidson suggests that disagreements on a topic or subject cannot go very deep. By this I mean that, for Davidson, not only must disagreement be localized by agreement on intimately related matters, but most of a person's beliefs on that same subject must also be ones on

which we agree. This, along with the concern for the localization of disagreement, are reflected in the following passage:

> We can, however, take it as given that <u>most</u> beliefs are correct. The reason for this is that a belief is identified by its location in a pattern of belief; it is this pattern that determines the subject matter of the belief, what the belief is about. Before some object in, or aspect of, the world can become part of the subject matter of a belief (true or false) there must be endless true beliefs about the subject matter. False beliefs tend to undermine the identification of the subject matter; to undermine, therefore, the validity of a description of the belief as being about that subject (1984c, p. 168).

This limitation on the depth of attributable disagreement, implies that only very short flights of reconstructive translation could be needful. After all, one might then reason, most of our subject's beliefs about a given topic must be true, so, at most, we need only mention the very limited beliefs they might hold on this subject that are at odds with ones we presently hold. Mentioning these few differences would then serve to reconstruct their theory of that subject as a near relative to our own. Similarly, the requirement that disagreement be quite localized also implies that the place for reconstruction in translation must be very limited; it implies that we will not have to reconstruct a really significant series of foreign concepts and beliefs in reconstructing someone else's theory, as we will quickly come to familiar, shared concepts anchoring our analysis, and thus to familiar patterns. Taken together, the restrictions to shallow and local differences of belief and theory imply that in adequately reconstructing another peoples' theory the translator will need simply to mention a few different beliefs regarding any one subject matter and regarding related subject matters (as, on all subjects, there will be a preponderance of agreement).

This limited view of the sorts of moves that can usefully be employed (to say nothing of being necessary) in significant anthropological interpretation flies in the face of many of the most respected pieces of ethnographical investigation. Now, it may be conceded that perverse interpretive schemes can be contrived so as to make others appear needlessly foreign. Of course, one should not make those interpreted seem more strange or foreign than need be. Still, on reflection upon the body of respected

ethnographic work, there should be no question but that differences in speech dispositions, and other dispositions, across communities can make extensive reconstructive treatment necessary. Such reconstructions may be as "homely," and simple, as any treatment possible. Yet they may reveal our subjects as "common Joes" (and Janes) who, nevertheless, by dent of varying technical, economic, political, cultural, and social, situations, have understandably been led to hold systems of beliefs, and thus concepts, quite different from our own. Coming to terms with such foreign belief systems, we commonly must engage in a systematic reconstruction of an impressive range of source-language expressions for concepts that we do not antecedently share. In other words, differences are commonly not as localized as Davidson's discussion suggests. Further, our reconstruction may lead us to view most of what our subjects believe on a given topic as false, having truth-conditions that do not obtain. This possibility is clearly evinced in Evans-Pritchard's treatment of Zande witchcraft discussed above, as we are led to conclude that many Zande beliefs regarding <u>mangu</u>, witchcraft^{Zande}, are false. (This was particularly clear in the Ramsey-sentence treatments envisioned earlier.)

To the extent that Davidson's principle would rule out deep and nonlocal cognitive differences in belief and concept, it must be evaluated as, at best, overly schematic, unduly constraining, and naive in ignoring countervailing considerations within interpretive contexts. Illustrative reconstructive ethnographies could be proliferated. Indeed, reflective anthropologists such as Geertz seem to view such significant reconstruction as the very heart of cultural anthropology. In "From the Native's Point of View" (1983), Geertz insists that while we cannot readily so shift our own conceptual adjustment to the world as to "perceive what [our] informants perceive," yet we can attend to the structure and application of their system of concepts: "What [the ethnographer] perceives, and that uncertainly enough, is what they perceive "with"--or "by means of," or "through" . . . or whatever the word should be" (Geertz, 1983, p. 58). To do this, we must reconstruct theories that we do not antecedently hold and concepts that we antecedently have no way of readily expressing. Doing so allows us to find ordinary people operating according to significantly different theories and systems of concepts:

Looking at the ordinary in places where it takes unaccustomed forms brings out not, as has so often been claimed, the arbitrariness of human behavior (there is nothing especially arbitrary about taking sheep theft for insolence in Morocco), but the degree to which its meaning varies according to the pattern of life by which it is informed. Understanding a people's culture exposes their normalness without reducing their particularity. (The more I manage to follow what the Moroccans are up to, the more logical, and the more singular they seem.) It renders them accessible: setting them in the frame of their own banalities, it dissolves their opacity (1973, p. 14).

Looking at the subjects of ethnographic study through the lens of our reconstructive translations, we perceive how they proceed in ways that are, as one level, familiar to us, while employing a series of significantly different concepts (and a web of theory very different) from those we would have antecedently had ready to apply ourselves. Good ethnography commonly manages this.

As noted earlier, perhaps the central agreement among proponents of conceptual schemes has been that (a) we employ a family of interrelated concepts that are interrelated and embedded within theories comprising our view of the world, (b) different groups or societies might fail to share our theories and related concepts, instead employing a significantly different set, and (c) when they do, translation becomes awkward and difficult. My discussion of reconstructive translation has been intended to vindicate just such posits of differences in a manner that does not rob them of interest. If one allows that there is, or can be, a place for significantly reconstructive translation, then one is, I think, conceding almost all that many proponents of conceptual schemes have wanted.[19]

I have argued that distinguishing between direct and reconstructive translation allows us to make good sense of the notion of conceptual schemes. Failures of direct translatability reflect significant theoretical and conceptual differences, but need not preclude reconstructive translation. Criteria of languagehood entail or involve reconstructive translatability, not direct translatability. Thus, the difficulties of translation associated with conceptual scheme individuation occasion no paradoxical positing of untranslatable languages. I have examined the possibilities for reconstructive translation so as to bring out the possibilities for deep and extensive variation in belief and conceptualization that

they open up. Accordingly, we find much that has occasioned much of the interest in conceptual schemes can be vindicated.

Notes

1. Although writers critical of the notion of conceptual schemes, such as Davidson himself (1980, pp. 216-221), have helped themselves to talk of concepts.

2. The successes Whorf envisions would seem to be at the heart of the sort of referential semantics that Davidson envisions. It is then somewhat surprising that Davidson chooses to criticize Whorf (1956) for holding an incoherent notion of conceptual schemes according to which alternative schemes are untranslatable.

3. The idea that we should distinguish between two interpretive projects and relate them differently to criterion of languagehood and conceptual schemes has at least one precedent: Rescher (1980) distinguishes between translation (narrowly understood) and interpretation.

4. I realize that formulating my account of reconstructive translation in terms of the reconstruction of "theory" and embedded concepts will touch sensitive nerves. It may seem to beg the question on several points that have been contested in both anthropological and philosophical debates concerning interpretations. Both neo-Wittgensteinians (Winch 1958, 1964) and symbolist anthropologists (such as Leach 1954, Beattie 1964, and Firth 1964) have insisted that religious and magical symbol systems develop with a dynamic quite dissimilar to scientific systems. However, both tend to associate "theory" rather narrowly with scientific theorizing. This much will need to suffice here: whatever the virtues of the contention that religious and related systems develop according to a different dynamic, symbolists themselves typically allow that the systems, at any one time, come to have technological-instrumental usages, and, in many ways, they function in individuals' lives like other sets of "beliefs." As long as we do not too narrowly associate "theory" with scientific theory, then, symbolist reservations can be accommodated.

5. For instance, the Zande have no role for pacts with some supremely evil being, nor is mangu associated with acquired skills at using incantations, potions, trinkets, and so forth. In these respects, traditional western concepts of witchcraft seem somewhat closer to the Zande concept of ngue, which itself seems yet more closely parallel to our traditional notion of magic--insofar as the latter is separable from witchcraft in our traditional thought.

6. Evans-Pritchard's translational stand-ins for <u>mangu</u> and <u>ngue</u> force us to parallel Zande usage in translation by thinking of witchcraft and witches as largely distinct from magic and magicians. In so doing, Evans-Pritchard's translation itself accentuates differences (as well as similarities) between the Zande "theory" and our traditional "theories".

7. This formulation should not obscure the important role of empirical theory regarding cognitive functioning in modeling those we seek to understand. Being able to model the constitutive criteria in a foreign theory is only one aspect of the modeling under interpretation that makes for interpretive adequacy (Henderson 1993, chpts. 3-4).

8. The issue of the intelligibility of the notion of significantly different conceptual schemes is, in effect, the issue of the allowable extent of differences in belief and theory. Overly limited views of the ways in which we might model others in interpreting them can unduly restrict our appreciation for allowable differences. This occurs in Stich's recent (1990) discussions of the intentional interpretation as understood in Grandy's (1973) principle of humanity. Stich rightly objects that interpretation, tied to Grandy's sort of unambitious modeling, is unacceptably parochial. Stich concludes, so much the worse for intentional psychology. To say that we sometimes need to reconstruct an impressive range of theory and concepts an employ them in our modeling is to say that a much more ambitious and nonparochial sort of modeling may be associated with intentional interpretation. Indeed, I think that such ambitious modeling is evinced in much respected ethnography (Henderson 1993, chpt. 4). Supporting points are found in Geertz's writings (1983, 1973, p. 14).

9. I have supposed that direct translation provides us with a way of translating components of the source language into that portion of the target-language expressing a theory that we hold. To the extent that this obtains, a basic level of conceptual and factual agreement will obtain where we have direct translatability. However, strictly, this need not be the case. (My implicit supposition merely allows a useful simplification in my discussion.) We could imagine cases in which our subjects hold theories that we understand and can readily express but do not hold. For vividness, we might imagine that they hold some historical scientific theory that we have learned but do not hold. Here, we would contentedly directly translate into the appropriate historical usage (which is retained as a component of our broader contemporary language). (Think of the exhausting surveys of usages one finds in authoritative dictionaries such as the O.E.D.) In such cases, direct translation need not signal the sort of general agreement that has been supposed. For it then signals only agreement with a theory that we no longer hold. This mitigates somewhat the force of the present considerations. However, it may be argued that the direct translation into historical usages merely

forestalls the recognition of a level at which we must find direct translatability <u>and</u> agreement. However, while this is typically the case, I see no in principle way of insuring that this is always so. The historical conceptualization that we antecedently understand and employ as direct translations may be fairly low-level taxonomic conceptualization, and we need not look for a deeper level of agreement.

10. Hollis (1970) insists that a bridgehead of agreement established in the earlier stages of translation must give rise to a set of cross cultural universals so that we can somehow know a priori just what agreement is to be found. I do not believe that we can know a priori just where agreement is to be found (at least as rationalists such as Hollis would understand a priori knowing). Nor does my point here depend on there being significant universals. (See also, Lukes 1982; Henderson 1993, chpts. 3-4.)

11. Although we obviously hold different accounts of the etiology of illness, enough otherwise seems common to us and the Azande (and our grandparents) that differences call only for the mildest of cautions, leaving us with fairly direct translation. Similarly, we supposedly share substantially the same crude or basic commonsensical notion of a feature bringing about other features. On these scores, it is perhaps best to think of our own concept of causality (or of illness for that matter) as something of a cluster concept that is built up by similarity relations to a set of basic cases. Presumably, we and the Azande share many of the same sorts of basic cases from which we begin to learn our more elaborately tailored notion (see Miller 1989, Horton 1970, 1982).

12. On the other hand, reconstructing and calling attention to particulars of the Zande beliefs regarding passing along traits can usefully remove temptation to see the Azande as sharing with us a more elaborated notion of inheritance. Evans-Pritchard provides just such information (1937, pp. 23-5). With such devices, interpretive practice can be quite nuanced.

13. This is to think of natural languages in an unrealistically inflexible manner.

14. My application requires no division between observational and theoretical vocabularies.

15. It should also now be clear that my position gives no comfort to the relativist position that there are schemes and associated theories that disagree with our own and that, where the theories conflict, both the sanctioned claims are true. In my view, reconstructive translation leads to information regarding the truth-conditions of statements, and where two statements disagree in the sense of having conflicting truth-conditions, at most one is true. However, I do not believe that my position conflicts with the views expressed by many important proponents of conceptual schemes. For example, Quine (1981) associates

truth with ontology, and insists that discussions of conceptual schemes should have to do with epistemology rather than ontology. Whorf, on the other hand, commonly takes as a given the truth of the then emerging scientific view of the world as a set of wavelike particles; he then suggests that one virtue of Hopi is that it has the resources to express such a view more easily or naturally than does standard English (for example, 1956, p. 55).

16. As Quine (1981) points out, this move from facing the tribunal of experience to the truth of sentences and theory is strained, seeming to conflate epistemic and ontological issues. Still, it seems undeniable that our notion of a language is intimately associated with our notion of a symbol system in which true and false sentences can be generated, and this is what Davidson needs for his argument.

17. Translatability is associated with antecedently shared concepts in Davidson's writings. Thus, reconstructive translation typically does not involve complete intranslatability, for it commonly gives way to direct translation, which involves the sharing of some beliefs and concepts. Nor is reconstructive translation complete translatability, for its point is to deal with differences of theory and associated difference of antecedently expressed concepts.

18. This parenthetical clause points to difference in Davidson's and my understandings of charity that, while relevant, are not emphasized here. I have elsewhere argued that explicability, rather than charity as such, provides the fundamental constraint on interpretation (Henderson, 1987, 1990, 1993).

19. I do believe that one common reason for interest in schemes centers around the suspicion that the sorts of deep and extensive differences discussed can "structure experience." There is something to this figure of schemes structuring experience, although care must be taken in unpacking it. While one also finds talk of "organizing" or "coloring" experience, these formulations lead to special problems that do not plague the figure of schemes structuring experience. In particular, working with the figure of schemes structuring experience, we can avoid the unwanted suggestion of a set of basic or primitive experiences awaiting organization. Something can be structured in its production, rather than subsequent to production. If conceptual schemes are to structure experience, this should be understood as a matter of their role in the production of experiences. Churchland's recent (1989a, 1989b) connectionist treatments of theory and explanation, as well as perception, provide some useful hints regarding how to understand this role.

Bibliography Beattie, J. (1964), Other Cultures. New York: The Free Press.

Churchland, P. (1989a), "On the Nature of Theories: A Neurocomputational Perspective." In Churchland, <u>A Neurocomputational Perspective.</u> M.I.T. Press, pp. 153-96.

--------. (1989b), "On the Nature of Explanation: A PDP Approach. In Churchland, <u>A Neurocomputational Perspective.</u> M.I.T. Press, pp. 197-230.

Davidson, D. (1980), "Mental Events." In Davidson, <u>Essays on Actions and Events</u>. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 207-25.

--------. (1984a), "Radical Interpretation." In Davidson, <u>Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation</u>. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 125-40.

--------. (1984b), "Belief and the Basis of Meaning." In Davidson, <u>Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation</u>. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 141-54.

--------. (1984c), "Thought and Talk." In Davidson, <u>Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation</u>. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 155-70.

--------. (1984d), "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme." In Davidson, <u>Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation</u>. Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 185-98.

Evans-Pritchard, E. (1937), <u>Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande</u>. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

--------. (1956), <u>Neur Religion</u>. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Firth, R. (1964), <u>Essays on Social Organization and Values</u>. London School of Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology, no. 28. London: Athlone Press.

Geertz, C. (1973), "Thick Description: Towards an Interpretive Theory of Culture." In <u>The Interpretation of Cultures</u>. New York: Basic Books, pp. 3-30.

--------. (1983), ""From the Native's Point of View": On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding. In <u>Local Knowledge</u>. New York: Basic Books, pp. 55-70.

Hempel, C. (1965a), "The Theoritician's Dilemma." In Hempel, <u>Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science</u>. New York: The Free Press, pp. 173-226.

Grandy, R. (1973), "Reference, Meaning, and Belief." <u>Journal of Philosophy</u> 70: 439-52.

Henderson, D. (1987), "The Principle of Charity and the Problem of Irrationality." <u>Synthese</u> 73: 225-52.

--------. (1990), "An Empirical Basis for Charity in Translation." <u>Erkenntnis</u> 32:83-103.

--------. (1993), <u>Interpretation and Explanation in the Human Sciences</u>. Binghamton: State University of New York Press.

Hollis, M. (1970), "Reason and Ritual." In B. Wilson, <u>Rationality</u>. Worchester: Basil Blackwell, pp. 221-39.

Horton, R. (1970), "African Traditional Thought and Western Science." In B. Wilson (ed.). <u>Rationality</u>. Worchester: Basil Blackwell.

--------. (1982), "Tradition and Modernity Revisited." In M. Hollis and S. Lukes, eds. <u>Rationality and Relativism</u>. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press.

Kuhn, T. (1970), <u>The Structure of Scientific Revolutions</u>. 2nd Ed. Enlarged. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Leach, E. (1954), <u>Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure</u>. London School of Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology, no. 44. G. Bell & Sons, 1954; reprint ed. London: Athlone Press, 1954.

Lukes, S. (1982), "Relativism in its Place." In M. Hollis and S. Lukes, eds., <u>Rationality and Relativism</u>. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 261-305.

McGinn, C. (1977), "Charity, Interpretation, and Belief." <u>Journal of Philosophy</u> 74: 521-35.

Miller, R. (1987), <u>Fact and Method</u>. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Putnam, H. (1975), "The Analytic and the Synthetic." In Putnam, <u>Mind, Language and Reality</u>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rescher, N. (1980), "Conceptual Schemes." In French, Uehling, and Wettstein, eds. <u>Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 5</u>. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 323-45.

Quine, W. (1953), "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." In Quine, <u>From a Logical Point of View</u>. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

--------. (1960), <u>Word and Object</u>. Cambridge, MA: M I T Press.

--------. (1970), "Philosophical Progress in Language Theory." <u>Metaphilosophy</u> 1: 2-19.

--------. (1984), "On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma." <u>Theories and Things</u>. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 38-42.

Stich, S. (1990), <u>The Fragmentation of Reason</u>. M.I.T Press.

Whorf, B. (1956), "The Punctal and Segmentative Aspects of Verbs in Hopi." In <u>Language, Thought and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf</u>. J. B. Carroll, ed. Cambridge, MA: The Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pp. 51-56.

Winch, P. (1958), <u>The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy</u>. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

--------. (1964), "Understanding a Primitive Society." <u>American Philosophical Quarterly</u> 1: 307-24.