**Philosophy 913**

**Advanced Epistemology**

**Spring 2011,** Tuesday 4 PM

**David Henderson**

**Required Texts:**

Fish (2010) *Philosophy of Perception.* Routledge.

Raftopoulos (2009) *Cognition and Perceptio*n. MIT Press

Siegel, *The Content of Visual Experience.* Oxford.

**Other Readings:**

On blackboard

**Evaluation:**

**90% of grade:**

**Write a paper.** A good one…on a topic chosen in consultation with the professor. Approximately 20 pages. The official due date: ~~May 3~~~~rd~~~~.~~ [Now May 10th] I would love to see papers at that time—and I would be open to giving feedback on drafts received by that date. However, I understand that students often face an end of semester crunch, which is commonly made worse by grading responsibilities. So, generally (with consultation), I am open to a 3-week extension, with an incomplete. However, I also believe that incompletes hanging indefinitely over a student’s head are a bad thing. So, except in extraordinary circumstances, I will **not** allow a further extension. I will assign a grade based on whatever I have received at that point: ~~May 26~~~~th~~. [Now June 2nd]

**10% of grade:**

**short response papers**—responding to the assigned readings for the week—first meeting excluded. Due no later than 10 AM each Tuesday morning. These might usefully formulate your understanding of the general ideas in the reading for that week and your quick response—questions, concerns, objections…. Typically, these can be about a page in length. They will help me formulate my discussion in the seminar.

**Schedule:**

**week 1: Introduction:**

* Cohen
* Henderson

**week 2: Older Metaphysical Views:**

* Fish, Ch. 1--4

**week 3 and 4: Intentionalism/ Representationalism:**

* Fish, Ch. 5
* Byrne (2001) Intentionalism Defended
* Horgan and Tienson (2002) “The Phenomenology of Intentionality and the Intentionality of Phenomenology

**week 5: Disjunctivism/Direct Realism:**

* Fish, Ch. 6

Byrne and Logue, Either/Or

McDowell, The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument

* Wright, (Anti-) Skeptics Simple and Subtle: G.E. Moore and John McDowell

**week 6 and 7: Consciousness, Attention, and Experience:**

* Raftopoulos, part I (up to p. 127)
* Lamme and Roelfsema (2000) The Distinct Modes of Vision Offered
* by Feedforward and Recurrent Processing
* Block (2008) Consciousness and Cognitive Access
* Byrne, Hilbert, Siegel (2007) Do we see more than we can access? (BBS30 2007)

**week 8: Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content:**

* Raftopoulos, Ch. 4
* Heck (2000) Nonconceptual Content and the “Space of Reasons”

**week 9: Content of Experience:**

* Raftopoulos, Ch. 5--6

**week 10: Informational Encapsulation I:**

* Fodor (1984) Observation Reconsidered
* Churchland (1988) Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality
* Raftopoulos, Ch. 7

**week 11: Content of Experience/Informational Encapsulation:**

* Siegel, Part 1

**week 12: Content of Experience/Informational Encapsulation:**

* Siegel, Chapters 4-6

**week 13: Cognitive Penetration**

* Siegel, Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification
* Markie?

**week 14: Dogmatism or Entitlement**

* Burge, Perceptual Entitlement
* Pryor, The Skeptic and the Dogmatist
* White, Problems for Dogmatism
* That week 1 stuff