

WHAT IS ENTITLEMENT?

In his seminal paper, “Content Preservation,” Tyler Burge (1993) defends an original account of testimonial knowledge and its relationship to a priori knowledge. The originality of the account is due, in part, to the fact that it is cast within a novel epistemic framework. The central feature of the framework is the introduction of the concept of *entitlement*, which is alleged to be a distinctive type of positive epistemic support or warrant. In a later paper, Burge (2003, 504, n.1) maintains that entitlement and justification are sub-species of warrant, and offers the following characterization of the difference between them: justification is “the internalist form of warrant,” but entitlement is “epistemically externalist.”

The term ‘entitlement’ has gained wider currency in the epistemological literature, especially in discussions of the a priori.¹ But, as Burge himself (2003, 504, n.1) notes, it is used to refer to a wide range of different epistemic notions. My focus in this paper is Burge’s conception of entitlement and there are three primary issues that I wish to address. What is the relationship between entitlement and the more traditional concept of justification? In what sense is entitlement epistemically externalist? Has Burge introduced a new epistemic concept or merely coined a new term for a familiar epistemic concept?

I

Burge (1993, 458) introduces the distinction between justification and entitlement in the following passage:

Although both have positive force in rationally supporting a propositional attitude or cognitive practice, and in constituting an epistemic right to it, entitlements are epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even accessible to the subject.

Justification and entitlement have some common features:

- (C1) Both have positive force in rationally supporting beliefs; and
- (C2) Both are epistemic rights or warrants.

There are also important differences between them. Burge stresses two features of entitlements:

- (E1) Entitlements need not be understood by the subject.
- (E2) Entitlements need not be accessible to the subject.

Burge (1993, 458-459) goes on to elaborate the differences between justification and entitlement:

We are entitled to rely, other things equal, on perception, memory, deductive and inductive reasoning, and on . . . the word of others. The unsophisticated are entitled to rely on their perceptual beliefs. Philosophers may articulate these entitlements. But being entitled does not require being able to justify reliance on these resources, or even to conceive such a justification. Justifications, in the narrow sense, involve reasons that people have and have access to. These may include self-sufficient premises or more discursive justifications. But they must be available in the cognitive repertoire of the subject.

Here Burge draws attention to two additional features of entitlements:

- (E3) Being entitled to rely on a resource does not require being able to justify reliance on that resource.
- (E4) Being entitled does not require being able to conceive such a justification.

Burge also introduces two features of justifications:

- (J1) Justifications involve reasons people have and have access to.

- (J2) Justifications involve reasons that must be available within the cognitive repertoire of the subject.

The features introduced to characterize the difference between justification and entitlement are heterogeneous. Four features are prominent. The first is the requirement of *reasons*: (J1) maintains that justifications involve reasons; entitlements, presumably, do not. The second is the requirement of *understanding*: (J1) maintains that justifications involve reasons that people have. Presumably, in order for a person to have a reason, it must be understood by that person. (E1), however, maintains that entitlements need not be understood. The third is the requirement of *access*: (J1) maintains that justifications involve reasons that are accessible; whereas (E2) maintains that entitlements need not be accessible. The fourth is the requirement of *second-order justification*: (E3) maintains that being entitled to rely on a resource does not require being able to justify reliance on that resource. Moreover, (E4) maintains that it does not require being able to conceive such a justification.

Each of the features that Burge highlights in drawing the distinction between entitlement and justification has been at the center of recent epistemological controversies. Each, for example, has been central to the dispute between foundationalists and coherentists.² Some of the controversy, however, is due to the fact that different theorists characterize these features differently. So we are faced with two tasks in attempting to understand Burge's distinction between entitlement and justification. First, we need to identify the primary feature that distinguishes the two. Second, we need to determine how that feature is characterized by Burge.

We begin with access and second-order justification, since they are connected. In order to articulate the connection, let us introduce a useful distinction, due to William Alston (1989a, 237-242) between two types of epistemic access:

- (A1) S has access to the *ground* of the belief that p iff S's belief that p is based on ground G and S has access to G; and
- (A2) S has access to the *adequacy* of the ground of the belief that p iff S's belief that p is based on ground G and S has access to justification for the belief that G is an adequate ground for S's belief that p.

The connection between access and second-order justification is evident in the case of access to the adequacy of grounds. An adequate ground for S's belief that p is one that warrants that belief. Hence, for S to have access to the adequacy of her ground for her belief that p, S must have access to justification for a belief to the effect that her ground for her belief that p warrants that belief. But a justified belief to the effect that one's ground for one's belief that p warrants that belief is a second-order justified belief.

In order to make this distinction more concrete, let us apply it to Burge's account of testimonial warrant. According to Burge, testimony is a *fundamental* source of warrant; i.e., S need not certify T's epistemic credentials, such as T's honesty or reliability, in order to be justified in believing that p on the basis of T's testimony. Therefore, Burge (1993, 467) endorses the following epistemic principle, called the *Acceptance Principle*, governing testimonial warrant:

- (AP) A person is entitled to accept as true something that is presented as true and that is intelligible to him, unless there are stronger reasons not to do so.

Let us now suppose that some subject S believes that p on the basis of p's being intelligible and presented as true, and there are no countervailing considerations. In order for S to have access to the ground of his belief that p, S must have access to p's being intelligible and presented as true. In order for S to have access to the adequacy of that ground, S must have access to justification for the belief that p's being intelligible and presented as true provides an adequate ground for the belief that p, which is to say that S must have access to justification for believing an instantiation of the epistemic principle (AP). Therefore, access to the adequacy of the ground of a belief requires access to justification for a belief to the effect that an instantiation of some epistemic principle is true; that is, it requires access to a second-order justified belief.

There is, however, a third type of access that Alston does not discuss: one that is stronger than (A1) but weaker than (A2). According to Burge (2003, 513),

Epistemic norms are certain types of standards governing fulfillment of representational functions. . . . They are norms governing achievement of the representational good, truth. . . . Epistemic warrant is an epistemic good that consists in meeting such epistemic norms.

Epistemic norms are closely related to epistemic principles. Such norms state the conditions that must be satisfied in order for beliefs to be warranted. An epistemic warrant attaches to a belief by virtue of the fact that the belief satisfies the standards articulated by the norm. Similarly, the antecedent of an epistemic principle states sufficient conditions for a belief to attain the epistemic status in its consequent. The third type of access is access to the *epistemic principle* (or *norm*) governing the ground of a belief:

- (A3) S has access to the *epistemic principle* governing the ground of the belief that p iff S's belief that p is based on ground G and S has access to the epistemic principle that states that G is an adequate ground for S's belief that p.

Consider again our subject S who believes that p on the basis of p's being intelligible and presented as true (absent countervailing considerations). S has access to the epistemic principle governing the ground of S's belief that p just in case S has access to (AP).

III

Returning to Burge's characterization of the difference between justification and entitlement, we can now see that

- (E2) Entitlements need not be accessible to the subject

is ambiguous since it does not distinguish between

- (E2a) The ground of an entitlement need not be accessible;
 (E2b) The adequacy of the ground of an entitlement need not be accessible; and
 (E2c) The epistemic principle governing the entitlement need not be accessible.³

(E2b) and (E3) are connected. Since justifying reliance on a source requires justifying that it is a source of warrant, (E3) in effect states that access to the adequacy of the grounds of one's belief is not necessary in order to be entitled to it. Therefore, (E2b) is not necessary for entitlement.

Moreover, Burge's account of basic testimonial entitlement entails that (E2c) is not necessary for entitlement. According to (AP), p's being intelligible to S and presented as true by T is sufficient for S to be entitled to accept T's testimony that p. Since p's being intelligible to S and presented as true by T does not entail that (AP) itself must be accessible, (E2c) is not necessary for entitlement.

We have focused exclusively on the requirements of entitlement. In order to articulate the difference between entitlement and justification, we must now turn to the requirements of justification. Consider again

(J1) Justifications involve reasons people have and have access to.

(J1) suggests the following proposal regarding the fundamental difference between entitlement and justification:

(P1) Justified belief that *p* involves having an accessible reason to believe that *p*; entitled belief that *p* does not.

(J1) and (P1) introduce a new notion: *reasons*. In order to evaluate (P1), we need to (a) articulate this notion and (b) its relationship to the notion of *grounds*.

The term ‘reason’ has been a subject of controversy in the epistemological literature. The controversy is partially substantive and partially terminological. John Pollock (1986, 19) alleges that

Until quite recently, it was customarily assumed by epistemologists that the justifiability of a belief is a function exclusively of what beliefs one holds—of one’s “doxastic state”. . . . I will call this the *doxastic assumption*, . . .

Clearly the question of whether the doxastic assumption is true is a substantive question. Pollock (1986, 22) rejects the assumption on the grounds that

Belief acquisition is determined by cognitive processes that have access to more than just our beliefs. Beliefs and perceptual states are alike in being “internal states”. These are, roughly, states of ourselves to which we have “direct access”, and our cognitive processes

can appeal to internal states in general—not just to beliefs. This suggests that the justifiability of a belief should be a function of our internal states.

But there is also a terminological issue here. Pollock (1986, 175-176) maintains that

Epistemic norms must be able to appeal directly to our being in perceptual states and need not appeal to our having beliefs to that effect. In other words, there can be “half-doxastic” epistemic connections between beliefs and nondoxastic states that are analogous to the “fully doxastic” connections between beliefs and beliefs that we call ‘reasons’. I propose to call the half-doxastic connections ‘reasons’ as well, but it must be acknowledged that this is stretching our ordinary use of the term ‘reason’.

Summarizing his position, Pollock (1986, 176) maintains that “Reasons are always reasons *for* beliefs, but reasons themselves need not be beliefs.”

What is a ground? What is the relationship between grounds and reasons? Alston (1989b, 176) tells us that

Some epistemologists will want to restrict grounds to other knowledge or justified belief possessed by the subject. This is to identify grounds with *reasons*, propositions that the subject has come to know or justifiably believe. There is no doubt that grounds can be reasons, but if they can only be reasons, this rules out the possibility of immediate justification, . . . In order to avoid ruling out the possibility of immediate justification, I will construe grounds as including *experiences* as well as *reasons*.

Alston (1989b, 176) goes on to note that “this extension of the category of ‘grounds’ still leaves them restricted to what the subject has ‘registered’ cognitively, what has come within one’s ken in some way or other.”

Comparing the positions of Alston and Pollock, we can immediately see that they agree on the substantive issues. First, the doxastic assumption is false. Second, it is false because experiences as well as propositional states can justify. Third, both experiences and propositional states are directly accessible to the cognizer. Despite their agreement on all the substantive issues, they have a terminological dispute. Alston employs the term ‘reasons’ narrowly, restricting it to beliefs or propositional states, whereas Pollock employs the term more broadly, allowing it to include non-propositional states. So let us distinguish two senses of reason: the *narrow* sense restricts reasons to beliefs or propositional states; the *broad* sense does not. Hence, Alston rejects the doxastic assumption by maintaining that grounds include both reasons and experiences. Pollock rejects it by maintaining that reasons include both beliefs and experiences.

We are now in a position to evaluate (P1). Burge (1993, 460) maintains that unsophisticated cognizers are entitled to rely on their perceptual beliefs and that “the justificational force of the entitlement backing such beliefs partly consists in the individual’s having certain sense experiences.” But, as both Alston and Pollock stress, sense experiences are accessible even to unsophisticated cognizers. Consequently, if Burge construes reasons broadly to include the cognizer’s sense experiences then, according to (J1), sense experiences justify (rather than entitle) perceptual beliefs. But, according to Burge, sense experiences entitle (rather than justify) perceptual beliefs. Therefore, (P1) is incompatible with Burge’s account of perceptual entitlement given the broad construal of reasons.

Burge (2003, 528), however, rejects the broad construal of reasons; he maintains that “reasons must be propositional.” Hence, Burge sides with Alston on the terminological issue. Moreover, he (2003, 530) denies that perceptual experiences must be propositional: “A claim

that [veridical] perceptual states are in general propositional is empirically implausible.” Since Burge construes reasons narrowly and denies that perceptual experiences are propositional, perceptual experiences are not reasons and, *a fortiori*, not reasons that we have access to. Therefore, the alleged incompatibility between (P1) and Burge’s account of perceptual entitlement is only apparent, and (P1) remains a viable proposal regarding the fundamental difference between justification and entitlement.

(P1), however, faces a second challenge. It appears to clash with Burge’s view of testimonial entitlement. According to (AP), S is entitled to accept p as true provided that p is intelligible to S and p is presented as true to S (absent contravening considerations). Both understanding the content of a communication and understanding its assertive force, however, are paradigmatic examples of states that are propositional. Since the entitlement to accept the testimony of another is based on propositional states, it is based on reasons (even on the narrow construal of reasons). Moreover, those reasons are accessible to the cognizer. Therefore, according to (J1), the warrant conferred by (AP) is justification rather than entitlement. But, according to (AP), the warrant that it confers is entitlement. So, (P1) appears to be incompatible with Burge’s account of testimonial entitlement even on the narrow construal of reasons.

IV

Burge’s (2003) more detailed remarks regarding perceptual entitlement suggest a resolution to our quandary. Here he (2003, 504) he maintains that

Entitlement is *epistemically externalist* inasmuch as it is warrant that need not be fully conceptually accessible, even on reflection, to the warranted individual. The individual need not have the concepts necessary to think the propositional content that formulates

the warrant. . . . Justification is warrant by reason that is conceptually accessible on reflection to the warranted individual.

So we now have the following contrast between entitlement and justification:

(E5) Entitlement is warrant that need not be conceptually accessible to the subject.

(J3) Justification is warrant by reason that is conceptually accessible to the subject.

(E5) and (J3) focus attention on the conceptual repertoire of the subject. Hence, to articulate the distinction, we must be clear on which concepts are required for having a justification or, more specifically, for having a reason.

Burge's (2003, 528) initial comments on perceptual entitlement arise in the context of defending his view against Sellarsians:

Some Sellarsians oppose any appeal to a non-propositional perceptual state in the epistemic account of warrant for perceptual belief. They hold that any such appeal is as incoherent as the traditional pure-sensation account, because it grounds epistemic warrant in something that is not a reason for a belief.

Burge (2003, 528) agrees that non-propositional perceptual states do not *justify* perceptual beliefs because they are not reasons:

I certainly agree with Sellars that reasons must be propositional. Perceptual beliefs are not normally reason based. The normative transition from perception to belief is not a piece of reasoning. If perceptual representations were reasons for perceptual beliefs, such transitions should count as reasoning. But they do not. Such transitions are not justifications in the traditional sense. They are normative elements in entitlement to perceptual belief.

This passage marks two key differences with Sellars. First, Burge denies that only reasons can warrant beliefs; entitlement is also a form of warrant. Second, he introduces a conception of reasons that is richer than the Sellarsian conception.

Burge ties the question of whether perceptual representations are reasons to the nature of the transition from perceptual representations to perceptual beliefs. Perceptual representations are reasons for perceptual beliefs only if the transition from perceptual representations to perceptual beliefs is a piece of reasoning. This conception of reasons is stronger than the Sellarsian conception since perceptual representations could be propositional and yet the transition from perceptual representations to perceptual beliefs not be a piece of reasoning.⁴

Burge's conception of reasons is central to his contention that perceptual representations entitle rather than justify perceptual beliefs. If perceptual representations justify perceptual beliefs, they are reasons for perceptual beliefs. If they are reasons for perceptual beliefs, then the transition from such states to perceptual beliefs is a piece of reasoning. If it is a piece of reasoning, then it is mediated by inferential principles. The inferential principles that mediate such transitions are epistemic principles. Therefore, for Burge, S's perceptual representation R is a reason for S to believe that p (or, alternatively, R justifies S's belief that p) only if S has conceptual access to the epistemic principle that mediates the transition from R to p.

This reading of Burge's conception of reasons is supported by his arguments against the Sellarsian view, which contends that only justifications or reasons can warrant beliefs.

According to Burge (2003, 528-29), such a view "hyper-intellectualizes" epistemology:

Children and higher non-human animals do not have *reasons* for their perceptual beliefs.

They lack concepts like *reliable*, *normal condition*, *perceptual state*, *individuation*,

defeating condition, that are necessary for having such reasons. Yet they have perceptual beliefs. . . . There is no sound basis for denying that epistemology can evaluate their perceptual beliefs for epistemic warrant.

Note that Burge is not claiming that children and higher non-human animals lack the perceptual concepts that are necessary to think their perceptual representations. He is claiming that they lack epistemic concepts, such as *reliable* and *defeating condition*, that are necessary to think the epistemic principles governing perceptual warrant. Therefore, the conjunction of Burge's contention that justification requires having reasons with his contention that having reasons requires possessing at least some epistemic concepts suggests that having a reason to believe that p requires that the epistemic principle governing the adequacy of that reason be conceptually accessible to the cognizer.

Burge makes similar remarks in the context of arguing that even in the case of mature adults, perceptual beliefs are not normally warranted by reasons. Being in a perceptual state plays a role in warranting such beliefs. According to Burge (2003, 529), however,

Understanding the warranting force of being in a relevant-seeming perceptual state and having some grip on the general shape of conditions that undermine such force are part of having a reason. The idea that all human adults with warranted perceptual beliefs have even a conceptualized “know-how” mastery of this territory would, I think, overestimate the conceptual capacities of adult human-kind. The idea that adults who cannot conceptualize the relevant epistemic conditions lack warranted perceptual beliefs would, I think, betray a hyper-intellectualized conception of warrant. Such adults lack reasons and justification, but are warranted in their beliefs—entitled to them.

Two important points emerge in this passage. First, adults who cannot conceptualize the conditions under which perceptual states warrant perceptual beliefs and the conditions under which such warrant is undermined lack reasons and justification for their perceptual beliefs; they are entitled to them. Second, they lack reasons and justification because understanding these epistemic conditions, both warranting conditions and undermining conditions, are “part of having a reason.”

Finally, consider the following passage where Burge (2003, 521) contrasts the warrant that critical reasoners possess with that of non-critical reasoners:

In critical reasoners, these norms become objects of reflection. But to be applicable to mental states of non-critical reasoners, many such norms need not be conceptually accessible to reflection. In young children and higher subhuman animals, they are not conceptualized. Such children and animals *cannot* think about them. They lack the concepts *epistemic*, *warrant*, *entitlement*, *reason*, *reliable*, *competence*, *entails*, *perception*, and *perceptual state*. It is doubtful that all mature human adults have all these concepts. Thus for many beings with warranted beliefs, fulfillment of the relevant norms is constitutive of an individual’s having epistemic *entitlements*—having epistemic warrants that need not be conceptually accessible to the warranted individual.

Three points emerge in this passage. First, the salient difference for Burge between critical and non-critical thinkers is that epistemic norms are conceptually accessible by reflection for the former but not the latter. Second, the reason that non-critical thinkers lack conceptual access to epistemic norms is because they lack epistemic concepts such as *warrant*, *entitlement*, and *reason*. Third, the consequence of lacking such concepts is that their warranted beliefs are

entitled rather than justified. Hence, a necessary condition for having a justification or reason to believe that *p* is having conceptual access to the norm governing the ground of that belief.

We are now in a position to articulate the fundamental difference between justification and entitlement. The key to understanding the distinction is the recognition that Burge introduces a third conception of reasons that is different from, and stronger than, the two articulated by Alston and Pollock:

- (R) R is a reason for S to believe that *p* only if S has conceptual access to the conditions under which R warrants the belief that *p* and the conditions under which that warrant is undermined—i.e., only if S has conceptual access to the norm or epistemic principle governing R.

Let us call this sense of reason, the *strong* sense of reason. If we return to our original proposal regarding the fundamental difference between justification and entitlement:

- (P1) Justified belief that *p* involves having an accessible reason to believe that *p*; entitled belief that *p* does not,

we are now in a position to see that, properly understood, it is in fact correct. A proper understanding of (P1) requires reading ‘accessible reason’ as Burge’s strong sense of reason.

More explicitly, the proper reading of (P1) is

- (P1*) Justified belief that *p* requires conceptual access to the epistemic principle governing the ground of the belief that *p*; entitled belief that *p* does not.

Our initial concern with (P1) was that it appeared to be incompatible with Burge’s account of perceptual entitlement on the broad construal of reasons. We argued, however, that the incompatibility is only apparent since Burge rejects the broad construal of reasons. Our

second concern with (P1) was that it appeared to be incompatible with Burge's account of testimonial entitlement even on the narrow construal of reasons since, according to (AP), basic testimonial entitlement is based on propositional states that are accessible to the cognizer. We are now in a position to see that this alleged incompatibility is also only apparent since Burge's conception of reasons is stronger than the narrow conception. Understanding that p is presented as true by some testifier does not provide a cognizer with a *strong* reason to believe that p since it does not entail that the cognizer possesses the concepts necessary to think (AP), which is the epistemic principle governing the ground of the belief that p. Hence, (P1) is compatible with both Burge's account of perceptual entitlement and his account of testimonial entitlement.

V

Having located the fundamental difference between entitlement and justification, we can now address our two remaining questions. In what sense is entitlement epistemically externalist? Has Burge introduced a new epistemic concept or merely coined a new term for a familiar epistemic concept? In section II, we introduced the tripartite distinction between access to the ground of one's belief that p, access to the adequacy of that ground, and access to the epistemic principle governing that ground. Utilizing this distinction, we can articulate three different internalist conditions on justification:

- (I1) The ground of S's belief that p is accessible;
- (I2) The adequacy of the ground of S's belief that p is accessible; and
- (I3) The epistemic principle governing the ground of S's belief that p is accessible.

The three conditions are independent. (I1) does not entail either (I2) or (I3). Neither (I2) nor (I3) entails (I1). Although (I2) entails (I3), (I3) does not entail (I2).

We now distinguish three forms of internalism with respect to some species of positive epistemic support ϕ . *Strong* internalism maintains that (I1), (I2), and, *a fortiori*, (I3) are necessary for ϕ . *Moderate* internalism maintains that (I1) and (I3) are necessary for ϕ . *Weak* internalism maintains that only (I1) is necessary for ϕ . There are also three corresponding forms of externalism with respect to some species of positive epistemic support ϕ . *Strong* externalism denies that (I1), (I3) and, *a fortiori*, (I2) are necessary for ϕ . *Moderate* externalism denies that (I3) and, *a fortiori*, (I2) is necessary for ϕ . *Weak* externalism denies only that (I2) is necessary for ϕ .

Burge regards entitlement as epistemically externalist and justification as epistemically internalist. His (2003, 504-505) most explicit statement of the basis for this claim is in the following passages:

- (B1) Entitlement is epistemically externalist inasmuch as it is warrant that need not be fully conceptually accessible, even on reflection, to the warranted individual.
- (B2) Justification is warrant by reason that is conceptually accessible on reflection to the warranted individual.

We argued in the previous section that the conjunction of (B1) and (B2) should be read as

- (P1*) Justified belief that p requires conceptual access to the epistemic principle governing the ground of the belief that p; entitled belief that p does not.

It follows that entitlements are moderately external since they do not satisfy either (I2) or (I3).

Are entitlements also strongly external? Does Burge deny that entitlements must satisfy (I1)? Burge is not explicit on this point, but there is some evidence that suggests that he rejects strong externalism. Burge's accounts of testimonial and perceptual entitlement suggest that an

entitlement to believe that *p* requires that the subject have the concepts necessary to think the ground of that entitlement. As we argued in section II, the ground of testimonial entitlements are conceptually accessible since one's understanding that *p* is presented as true is essentially a propositional (or conceptualized) state. Burge's views on perceptual entitlement are more complex. On the one hand, he maintains that perceptual representations are non-conceptual. However, when he (2003, 541-542) discusses the transition from perceptual representations to perceptual beliefs, he maintains that, when the transition goes well, those representations are "correctly conceptualized":

Conceptualization is part of normal conversion of perceptual representations into propositional representations. . . . Through conceptualization the simplest sorts of perceptual beliefs are formed—beliefs that make reference to the same objects, properties, and relations that the perceptual system represents.

These remarks suggest that the conceptualization of perceptual representations is an essential feature of perceptual entitlement and that the ground of such an entitlement is conceptually accessible. Therefore, an entitlement is a warrant that satisfies (I1), but not (I2) or (I3). A justification (in Burge's sense) is a warrant that satisfies both (I1) and (I3). An entitlement to believe that *p* is only moderately external: it involves access to the ground of the belief that *p*, but it does not involve access to the adequacy of one's ground for that belief or the epistemic principle governing that ground. A justification to believe that *p* is moderately internal: it involves access to both the ground of the belief that *p* and the epistemic principle governing that ground.

Is entitlement a novel epistemic concept? No. Entitlement is a species of positive epistemic support that is (only) moderately external. Moderate externalism is a familiar epistemic concept. For example, Alston (1989a) denies that either (I2) or (I3) are necessary for justification, but maintains that (I1) is necessary for justification. He endorses a version of moderate externalism that he calls *internalist externalism*. Hence, both Alston and Burge maintain that there is a species of positive epistemic support that is sufficient for knowledge and that is only moderately external (and only weakly internal). Moreover, both acknowledge that there are other species of positive epistemic support that are minimally sufficient for knowledge and more strongly internal. Alston elects to use the term ‘justification’ to refer to the genus of positive epistemic support and distinguishes two species of justification: one weakly internal; one strongly internal. Burge, on the other hand, wishes to reserve the term ‘justification’ to refer exclusively to a particular moderately internal species of positive epistemic support. Hence, he must introduce the new term ‘warrant’ to refer to the genus, and the new term ‘entitlement’ to refer to the weakly internal species of the genus. The innovation is terminological rather than conceptual.⁵

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thanks to Sarah Sawyer for stimulating my interest in the questions addressed in this paper and for a number of conversations that helped to clarify my responses to them, and to the participants in the Bled Epistemology Conference for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.

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NOTES

1. See, for example, Boghossian (1996) and Peacocke (2004).
2. See, for example, BonJour (1985) and Sosa (1991).
3. (E1) is also ambiguous since it does not distinguish between:
(E1a) The ground of an entitlement need not be understood;
(E1b) The adequacy of the ground of an entitlement need not be understood; and
(E1c) The epistemic principle governing the entitlement need not be understood.
4. Burge (1993, 530) exploits this point to argue against the position of neo-Sellarsians who maintain that perception is propositional and provides reasons for perceptual beliefs:
“Moreover, there is no plausible basis for thinking that perceptual states, even if they were propositional, provide *reasons* for perceptual beliefs.”
5. There is a conceptual innovation in Burge’s epistemology: his strong conception of reasons and the resulting strong conception of justification that is tied to it. The significance of these concepts is not clear since (a) they are not necessary for knowledge and (b) they don’t play a role in the ordinary knowledge of most mature adults.