Ed Becker’s most recent research project in epistemology has come to fruition in The Themes of Quine's Philosophy: Meaning, Reference, and Knowledge, (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). Becker’s book explores Quine's views on conventionalism, the linguistic theory of the a priori, the analytic-synthetic distinction, the indeterminacy of translation, and ontological relativity. The last chapter is constructively critical of Quine; it argues against the indeterminacy of translation and the inscrutability of reference and attempts to show that the analytic-synthetic distinction can be rehabilitated using the analytical apparatus developed in Word and Object.

Aaron Bronfman's research in epistemology focuses on how one should cope with one's own epistemic imperfections. He investigates this question with respect to certain "cognitive biases," arguing that they in fact constitute good strategies for imperfect reasoners, and with respect to the epistemic significance of disagreement. He is also interested in how reasoning should proceed when one lacks perfect access to facts about one's own mind.

Al Casullo’s research in epistemology is focused on the nature and existence of a priori knowledge. His earlier work, which culminated in the publication of A Priori Justification (OUP, 2003) centered around four primary questions: What is a priori knowledge? Is there a priori knowledge? What is the relationship between a priori knowledge and necessary truth? What is the relationship between a priori knowledge and analytic truth? He argues in favor of a minimal conception of a priori knowledge, maintaining that the traditional arguments for and against the existence of a priori knowledge are largely inconclusive, and contends that the traditional preoccupation with articulating the relationship between a priori knowledge and both analytic truth and necessary truth is of limited epistemological import. Moreover, he argues that the most promising route to resolving the impasse over the existence of a priori knowledge is to appeal to empirical evidence. More recent work has addressed a variety of themes including epistemic overdetermination, testimonial knowledge, modal knowledge, the epistemic status of intuition, and scepticism regarding the cogency of the a priori–a posteriori distinction. This work will appear in his Essays on A Priori Knowledge and Justification (OUP, 2012). He is presently co-editing with Josh Thurow The A Priori in Philosophy (OUP, forthcoming) and previously edited The International Research Library of Philosophy volume on A Priori Knowledge (Ashgate, 1999).

David Henderson’s research focuses on both epistemology and the philosophy of science—in the latter case, with a focus in the philosophy of the social sciences. In epistemology, he is particularly interested in the implications of recent work in cognitive science for venerable issues in epistemology. He has explored this idea: the cognitive processes by which humans can manage their cognitive chores—the processes by which they can arrive at warranted beliefs—are of a wider sort than has commonly been appreciated by epistemologists. This idea is central to what he and Terry Horgan term iceberg epistemology. At the same time, he is interested in ways in which a sensitive naturalized epistemology can respect concerns reflected in “internalist epistemologies.” This line of thought has led him (and again Terry Horgan) to develop a new form of reliabilism — transglobal reliabilism. These ideas have found expression in their recent book, The Epistemological Spectrum (Oxford, 2011). This work is continuing, as Henderson is interested in understandings of epistemic entitlement — the idea that one has a default entitlement for what is gotten by way of certain sources (perception, memory, and testimony, plausibly) without the need for antecedent general beliefs certifying such sources. He is also working on a contextualist account of knowledge — one in which attributions of knowledge are fitting to the regulation of situated communities of inquirers. His work in the philosophy of science has been similarly informed by recent cognitive science, and has focused on the limited role for rationality (and related normative matters) in both interpretation and explanation. Here he has developed the idea that both interpretation and explanation are fundamentally constrained by descriptive understandings rather than normative principles.

John Gibbons works on a number of issues in epistemology, including the internalism/externalism debate, and the nature and reach of privileged access, not just access to our own beliefs, but also to justification and to our own intentional actions. He also has a book manuscript under review called The Norm of Belief, which is about the nature of epistemic normativity. In some sense, beliefs are supposed to be true. Perhaps they’re supposed to constitute knowledge. And in some sense, they really ought to be reasonable. Which, if any of these is the fundamental norm of belief? The book argues against the teleological or instrumentalist conception of rationality that sees being reasonable as a means to our more objective aims, either knowledge or truth. And it tries to explain both the norms of knowledge and of truth in terms of the fundamental norm, the one that tells you to be reasonable.