Chapter 1:
Introduction
Two simultaneous explosions occurred at the United States Embassies in Dar
el Salem, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya, on 7 August 1998, exactly eight years to
the date that the United States entered the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with
military troops, as part of an international coalition, whose mission was to
liberate Kuwait from the hands of the Iraqi “aggressors”. These two bombings left over 200 people
dead, and an estimated 5,000 wounded.
The United States response was swift and immediate. On 20 August 1998, President Clinton, ordered
a military air strike against Osama bin Laden, targeting his camps in both
Sudan and Afghanistan. The President
declared: “Our mission was clear: to strike at the network of radical groups
affiliated with and funded by Osama bin Laden, perhaps the preeminent organizer
and financier of international terrorism in the world today (Bodansky, 1999,
IX).”
This action by the United States was the first time that a leader of a
terrorist group had been targeted personally by the military (Bodansky,
1999). Secretary of Defense William S.
Cohen issued the following press statement in the aftermath of the Embassy
bombings:
The growing terrorist menace cynically wraps itself
in the rhetoric of holiness. Far from
being holy, terrorism—when stripped of its pretense—presents the face of pure
evil. Radical extremists have declared
war against America and our friends.
They have slaughtered innocent civilians, as well as soldiers and
diplomats, and rejoiced in the agony of their victims. Armed with their truck bombs, they have
demanded that we withdraw from many parts of the world. This option of retreat may appeal to some,
but it is not worthy of our nation (Cohen, 1998).
Bin Laden’s statement and his call to action have emboldened
thousands[4]
of Muslims to take up arms against the United States. Nonetheless, bin Laden’s
activities are not the only acts of terror that the world witnesses today. Terrorist activities occur worldwide, on a
daily basis, and claim the lives of innocent people. Many of these violent acts remain unsolved by
the nation in which they were committed.
An example of this is the number of bombings that occur in the United
States. The Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI) reported that there were over 1,100 bombings in the United
States alone last year (FBI Web Site).
Was each one of those bombings the work of a “irrational”
terrorist? The answer is probably
not. Nonetheless, they occurred, and yet
the United States has not singled out each one of the alleged bombers as they
have bin Laden. Why is it necessary for
the United States to demonize its archenemies?
Some of the more recent examples of this tactic are: Poncho Villa in the
1910’s, Fidel Castro from the 1960s to the present, the Ayatollah Khomeini from
1979 until his death in 1989, Saddam Hussein from 1991 to the present, Mullah Mohammed
Omar, from 1982 to the present, and Osama bin Laden from 1996 to the
present. How then, does the
international community, more specifically the United States, deal with such
activities?
The methodology I have chosen is to conduct a descriptive analysis
of the current conflict between the United States and Osama bin Laden. This analysis will include the “bases,
emergence, and escalation” of the United States foreign policy decisions and
the general public’s attitude towards bin Laden using Kriesberg’s model of
conflict. Since there are two parties to
the conflict, this paper will also cover the bases, emergence and escalation of
bin Laden’s position in the conflict.
The United States seems to be as enthralled with the hunt
for Osama bin Laden, as they are watching the TV show “America’s Most Wanted”
on Friday nights. After all, the label
that the United States, specifically the FBI and State Department, have given
to bin Laden is that of “common criminal.”
This title is based on the theory that bin Laden has committed acts of
terrorism against innocent people and he is just an “irrational” Islamic
fundamentalist; much like the US’s impression of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the
revolution he led in Iran in 1979. Or,
another example of this demonization is the overall lack of trust of the United
States policy makers towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War. After all, the Soviets were the “evil empire”
set out to destroy the world through communism.
It is easier for the average American to understand the
meaning of terrorism and terrorist, more specifically bin Laden, as an
irrational, violent psychopath that is randomly committing acts of terrorism
against American targets. Walter
Laqueur, a noted scholar on terrorism, concludes: “furthermore, the West needed the image of an
enemy after the end of the Cold War, and Islam, for a variety of reasons, has
come to fill that role (Laqueur, 1999, 128).”
Unfortunately, this would make our
analysis of Osama bin Laden, and his conflict with the United States and the
Saudi Arabian government, an easy study; based on the notion that bin Laden is
an “irrational, rag-head, Islamic fundamentalist (Taylor, 1991).” However,
Taylor argues that individuals like bin Laden are not “irrational;” in fact,
they are extremely rational and are committing acts of terror in a very
systematic and methodical manner based on a well-defined ideology. “This makes it difficult for most people to
understand how individuals who are in other respects quite unremarkable can commit
brutal acts for political ends, often in the cause of freedom or liberation
(Taylor, 1991, 1).” If we closely
examine this conflict using Louis Kriesberg’s scientific analysis of conflict
and his “conflict model”, we will discover that Osama bin Laden has done what
leaders of nations[5] do
against their enemies, declare war to bring about political change. Why is this “phenomenon of bin Laden” treated
differently than actions of other terrorists?
For example, what was the reaction
of the American public when the Oklahoma Federal Building was bombed? I can remember exactly where I was when it
occurred: Naples, Italy. At the time, I
was with some friends and a “special bulletin” came over the TV. The station reported the events in the
Oklahoma City bombing at the Federal Building and stated something along the
lines that, “the US was looking for an Arab descent individual that had been
seen near the Federal Building on the day of the explosion.” I turned to my friends, and commented that I
did not think that it was an Arab terrorist, but probably an American that was
disenfranchised over the incidents at Waco and Ruby Ridge.
As the events unfolded, an American,
Timothy McVeigh was arrested, convicted and executed on 11 June 2001, for his
actions. What would have happened had
the Oklahoma City bombing been committed by a Muslim group or
organization? Would the American’s
perceptions be different? Were the
American public perceptions and the attitude towards the individuals convicted
in the New York World Trade Center bombing the same as they were towards
Timothy McVeigh?
When a massive bomb exploded outside the Alfred P. Murrah federal
building in Oklahoma City on 19 April 1995, killing 169 people, CNN reporters
invited experts on terrorism to give their immediate opinions on who may have
been responsible. It appeared to one
particular expert that all the signs pointed to Islamic militants. The heartland of the American Midwest had
finally been scarred by the consequences of poor U.S. relations with the
militants of the Islamic world and the governments of particular Islamic
countries…the readiness with which this particular commentator could reach such
a conclusion…was a watershed. No logical
conclusion could be reached other than that the enemies of the West had had
their way. The outcome of the subsequent
investigation, trial and verdict is now well known. What remains contentious is why the Islamic
world was the first to be accused (Huband, 1998, xv).
It appears
that the United States and general public does not know what to do with
terrorism or the whole idea that political change can be less than peaceful;
after all, violence was a tool that was used during the formation of the United
States. One such example is the infamous
Boston Tea Party, nonetheless, violence was a tool used for political change in
both cases. McVeigh’s actions were
simple. He targeted the Federal building
in Oklahoma City where Federal Law Enforcement Agents that had been involved
with the Waco Incident and David Koresh’s Branch Davidians Movement, in which
ordinary men, women and children lost their lives, and the Ruby Ridge Incident
in which a woman and child were killed, all in the name of justice and
protection of the innocent (Laqueur, 1999).
McVeigh’s message, albeit a controversial one, was intended to bring
about political and organizational change to the Federal Law Enforcement
agencies that took part in those two events.
Yet, on the day of Timothy McVeigh’s
execution, his lawyers remarked that McVeigh stood fast in his convictions that
the Federal Government and various law enforcement agencies engage in the same
criminal behavior that he committed.
Right or wrong, is not the context in which I provide the correlation,
but the notion of who determines what is the acceptable way to bring about
political change. In addition, in
listening to various victims and family members of those killed in the Oklahoma
City Federal Building, many still believe that McVeigh was part of a larger
organization and a conspiracy set to destroy America (CNN News Station, 10 Jun
2001).
It is my argument that the United
States policy makers demonize its adversaries, such as bin Laden, to promote
our foreign policy and justify its actions in the world. Not everyone in the world would agree with
this approach, which is why the Unites States finds itself engaged in this
conflict with bin Laden, and other “Islamic Resurgence” groups. Americans tend to have an ethnocentric
understanding of other nations, religions and culture. Which can be empirically measured in the
context of whom the United States Executive and Legislative Branch support in
their foreign policy decisions, which tend to focus on nations, people,
religion and culture that are similar to Americans in general. And, in addition, this is exemplified in the
American’s “Weltanschauung” towards other countries, religions and cultural
aspects that are different from their own.
American’s have a propensity to view
the world through elitist lenses. A
quintessential part of understanding these differences in attitudes between
other peoples is the ability to objectively analyze the complex components of
conflict and those involved. This is not
a simple process to measure or evaluate.
An important part in understanding the “bases” of this conflict is to
define four key concepts that are an integral element of both sides to this
conflict: terrorism, identity formation, nationalism, and the rise of religious
nationalism. The significance of these
terms are they remain a key ingredient or root of bin Laden’s conflict with the
United States and vice versa.
Terrorists
have the need for group affiliation and structure. Bin Laden’s movement satisfies this need for
thousands, if not millions, of Muslims.
Many attracted to this movement are seeking a return to a strictly
Islamic State based on the Koran and Sha’ria law. “The group itself becomes the
aim of many people…and that many terrorists expressed a need for the structure,
discipline, and commitment they found in group life (Crenshaw, 1986).” The benefits of belonging outweigh the
political behavior of the group, in that “joining a terrorist organization was
the last of a series of attempts at identity formation. These potential terrorists were searching for
meaning, structure and a stable social role (Crenshaw, 1986).” Group affiliation is necessary for all
people, whether or not it manifests itself in a secular ideology, such as the
United States Constitution and system of governance, or in the case of bin
Laden, a religious ideology that “can focus on several such groupings, linking
together otherwise diverse groups—class-based religious ideology… ideology
defines a group to which the member can belong (Taylor, 1991, 89).” If Taylor’s hypothesis is correct, then how
do individuals and groups form identity?
Eric Fromm provides insight into the how identity is formed individually
and in groups.
Modernization, in short, does not necessarily mean
Westernization. Non-Western societies
can modernize and have modernization without abandoning their own culture and
adopting wholesale Western values, institutions and practices. The latter, indeed, may be
impossible…Modernization, instead, strengthens those cultures and reduces the
relative power of the West. In
fundamental ways, the world is becoming more modern and less Western
(Huntington, 1996, 78).
Political change is necessary when an individual,
group, or society feels that its growth has become stagnant and there is
competition between the structural and socio-psychological conditions within a
society and its attempts to modernize.
This change can manifest itself in various forms, from non-violent to
violent activities.
Each society is unique, and based on
individual characteristics that bond together a group of people, which is known
as a Western notion of the definition of a nation. Societies bound by the state are drastically
different than those societies bound by religion as they transcend arbitrarily
defined borders. This goes against the
cognitive maps of many Western countries.
For the average American, religious ideology and violence is a concept
that they cannot politically, socially or morally support due to the secular
foundation of the United States constitution, which embodies the separation of
state and church. “In places like the
United States and Europe, where secular nationalism, rather than religion, has
become the dominant paradigm in society, religion is shunted to the periphery
(Juergensmeyer, 1993, 35).”
Religiosity
is the primary foundation of bin Laden’s ideology and movement. In this case, religion is to bin Laden what
Nationalism is to most Americans and other Western nations that have similar
political systems. Religion and
Nationalism contain three powerful elements: “fraternity, power, and links time
and history (Anderson, 1996, 36).” Both
concepts embrace the system of an “imagined community”, and promote a cause to
die for in the vernacular that both groups bin Laden and the American public,
can relate to in the context of their respective political ideology (Anderson,
1996).
Prior to Benedict Anderson, many scholars believed that nationalism
found its beginnings in eighteenth-century France and was based on a popular
sentiment that glorified the state or nation.
It was founded on the premise that there was a willingness to work for
the nation against all forms of foreign or domestic domination, and its roots
came from a group consciousness of shared history, language, race and values,
et.al. (Anderson, 1983). Anderson took a
very structuralist view, and he stated that nationalism is not a European
concept, but found its origin in the Americas, and was an “imagined political
community (Anderson, 1983).”
It is
imagined political community- and imagined as both inherently limited and
sovereign. It is imagined because the
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their
fellow-members, meet them or even hear of them…the nation is imagined as
limited because even the largest of them…has finite, if elastic boundaries,
beyond which lie other nations. No
nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind (Anderson, 1983, 6).
These communities
exist only in our minds based on a shared history. It isn’t something that we can feel or touch,
but we are willing to die for it (Anderson, 1983).
Anderson believes the French and English Revolution or the Age of
Enlightenment did not cause Nationalism, although they are three key factors,
but found its origins in the Americas.
Nationalism rose during a time that four important cultural systems were
diminishing or on the decline; religion as the “cosmic center of society”,
“scripted languages”, “the dynastic realm, and the “apprehension of time
(Anderson, 1983).” As the European
powers explored the world, they became exposed to new people and new languages
which “abruptly widened the cultural and geographic horizon and hence also
men’s conception of possible forms of human life (Anderson, 1983, 45).” The state up to this point, centered on a
higher authority, “its legitimacy derives from divinity, not from populations,
who, after all, are subjects, not citizens (Anderson, 1983, 47).” States sought ways to link communities
together which once had been rather “porous” and undefined (Anderson,
1983). They accomplished this through
the use of “print-capitalism (Anderson, 1983).”
Man could now fuse together his thought, and time, which allowed him to
individually be extremely powerful in his world (Anderson, 1983). This allowed society and man to form the
bases for national consciousness, and allowed, “These fellow-readers, to whom
they were connected through print, formed, in their secular, particular,
visible invisibility, the embryo of the nationally imagined community
(Anderson, 1983, 44).” No longer was
religion the center of man’s universe, he was able to think for himself
(Anderson, 1983).
Bin Laden and his followers are just
that, an “imagined community”, and their belief in Islam is the cornerstone of
their shared ideology and their Islamic nation.
Up until the end of the cold war[6],
many scholars and academia would agree that religion was on the decline. States came together in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries in an industrial revolution full of mass production,
communication and modes of travel, that not only connected them economically
but politically as well (Juergensmeyer, 1993).
According to Juergensmeyer this new replacement for religion was known
as secularism and was accepted not only by the Americas but the Europeans as
well.
The glue that
held all these changes together was a new form of nationalism: the notion that
individuals naturally associate with the people and place of their ancestral
birth in an economic and political system identified with a secular
nation-state. Secular nationalism was
thought to be not only natural but also universally applicable and morally
right (Juergensmeyer, 1993, 27).
It was no longer
the will of God, but the will of man that made the rules (Juergensmeyer,
1993). Man adopted this new secular
nationalism as its religion and transported it across all boundaries and
borders. The colonial powers imposed
this secular and nationalistic ideology on “Asia, Africa and Latin America,”
and forced these areas to adopt their religious and political practices. These practices led to a majority of the
indigenous population being exploited by colonial powers (Juergensmeyer,
1993). For most countries, any political
or religious practices were absorbed into this new phenomenon, shedding their
old skin for a new cover like those that they had been colonized by
(Juergensmeyer, 1993). Often, however,
colonization just pushed the political and religious ideologies
underground. However, these identities
did not die off, in fact by considering them subversive movements they became
highly idealized and when given the opportunity became revitalized
(Juergensmeyer, 1993).
These religious
revolutionaries are concerned not so much about the political structure of the
nation-state as they are about the political ideology undergirding it. They are concerned about the rationale for
having a state…At the same time, however, they see no contradiction in
affirming certain forms of political organization that have developed in the
West…as long as they are legitimized not by the secular idea of a social
contract but by traditional principles of religion (Juergensmeyer, 1993, 7).
When secular nationalism failed in these new states, many of the
religious leaders that had been vocal in the background, came to the forefront
with their religious ideas and provided the people with an avenue for their
voices to be heard. They were not
satisfied with the status quo of failed and corrupted governments
(Juergensmeyer, 1993). The religious
leaders in these states called for religion and government to be one, as was
the case in the revolution in Iran, Afghanistan and Indonesia (Juergensmeyer,
1993). The turmoil caused by the US
involvement in the Middle East has fueled the fire for bin Laden and other such
similar movements, whose tactics range from political dissention to terrorism
to revolutions.
Two examples of such events occurred in the 1970s that gave way to why
secular nationalism gave way to the rise of religion as a reaction to
Westernization and had a profound influence on the rise of Islamic Resurgence
Movements. First, was the Iranian
Revolution in 1979, which resulted in the creation of a theocracy—“a government
of God”, in the name of a Divine leader in response to the alienation that was
felt by the people due to the Shah’s inability to respond to a clash between
secular ideology, religious nationalism and Westernization (Juergensmeyer,
1993). The second factor that occurred almost
concurrently with the Iranian Revolution was a civil war in Afghanistan between
the Soviet installed communist government, and the population of Afghanistan
who were predominately Muslim (Juergensmeyer, 1993). Much like that of the Shah’s, this government
was seen as another “puppet regime”, which led to many of the tribes in
Afghanistan, including the Taliban, to take up arms against communism. Bin Laden became part of that fight against
the Afghanistan Communist state and once the Soviets were defeated he would
then target the next threat to Islam, the United States. The United States was seen as the second
threat to Islam and represented the liberal/Western model secular government
that intended to destroy the “nation” of Islam (Frontline, 2000).
In Friedman’s book, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, he attempts to
explain away the importance of religion, cultural and national identities
through the use of the analogy that all the world wants is “stuff”, and that
because the economy is now globally tied together. The author suggests that
everyone in the world wants their own “McDonalds and Golden Arch’s,” which
translated means that everyone wants to be like Americans (Friedman,
2000). I couldn’t disagree more with
Friedman’s hypothesis, and it is my assessment that his theory is
problematic. In that, not everyone in
the world is tied to property rights, McDonalds and “stuff”, at the expense of
losing their cultural identity, nationalism and religion. Clearly, not everyone wants the Lexus by
giving up their olive trees: yes, to
modernization; no, to westernization.
What is going on in the world today, in the very
broadest sense, is that through the process of globalization everyone is being
forced toward America’s gas station. If
you are not an American and don’t know how to pump your own gas, I suggest you
learn (Friedman, 2000, 364).
To simplify the
needs of the world into a system driven by the “American Dream” and a desire to
be like the West is not taking into account the structural and
socio-psychological factors that are found in conflict today, especially that
of Islamic Resurgence Movements.
Literature Review:
There is a plethora of information
on the subject of Osama bin Laden, his espoused ideology, and his
activities. I have found the majority
of the details and writers extremely biased against bin Laden because of
cultural and religious differences. This
biasness could be attributed to part of the causes that have led bin Laden to
find himself on the FBI’s ten-most wanted list, with a five million dollar
reward for information leading to his capture (FBI Most Wanted List). Richard Labeviere concludes in his book, that
bin Laden’s network is vast and well financed.
In addition, he states:
The Nairobi and Dar
es Salaam attacks could not have been committed without a large organization
and complex logistics, which consequently required financing. The evolution of the Islamist networks,
through their transnational racketeering circuits and their offshore companies,
also constitutes—in addition to the existing legal apparatus—a specific tool
for the fight (Labeviere, 2000, 349).
Various other
authors such as Maria Do Ceu Pinto conclude that religious terrorism is on the
rise, and the danger in that, is that this type of terror is “more prone to use
indiscriminate terror (Pinto, 1999).”
Yet, in her article she contradicts this statement by concluding that
bin Laden has clearly defined goals: “to drive US forces from the Arabian
Peninsula, overthrow the government of Saudi Arabia, and liberate Muslim holy
sites in Palestine (Pinto, 1999). I
disagree with her analysis as bin Laden’s goals are well stated, defined, and
publicized, and his actions have been linked, by the United States, in the
bombing of Khobar towers in Dhahran, the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and a
Navy Ship, the U.S.S Cole docked in Yemen.
And if bin Laden is truly responsible for these activities, how then can
Pinto legitimately classify these acts as act of “indiscriminate terror”?
Bin Laden has, on numerous occasions, publicly stated that he intends to
attack all US military and civilian targets abroad for as long as they remain
on the Arabian Peninsula (Frontline, 2000).
How could this be classified as acts of “indiscriminate terror” when he
has given the United States advanced warning of his actions, and what steps the
United States should take to avoid this situation. Unfortunately, these two authors offer little
scholarly insight into bin Laden’s activities, the reaction by the United
States and Saudi Arabia, and fail to address the ideology and political
motivations of either side in this conflict.
Louis Kriesberg has written extensively on conflict and conflict
resolution. He is the author of several
books on this subject, which concludes that conflict cannot be resolved, but
managed in a way that avoids “destructive relations (Kriesberg, 1998).” In his book, Constructive Conflicts: From
Escalation to Resolution, he identifies a “cycle of conflict” that all
conflicts sequence through. In order to
effectively bring about a process of manageable conflict, both parties must
make a conscious effort to keep the conflict at a level that is socially,
economically and politically acceptable to all sides[8]
in the conflict (Kriesberg, 1998). On
the surface Kriesberg’s model appears to be circular in nature, however, I
believe the model to be at least three dimensional, and closely represents a
molecular structure of a DNA chain. This
visualization is important in understanding my approach to using Kriesberg’s model
in the analysis of the conflict.
Kriesberg states that the goal of resolution of any conflict is
unrealistic; nonetheless, if appropriate measures are taken to identify the
“bases” of conflict, both sides can transform it into a managed process
(Kriesberg,
1998). In the case of bin Laden and the
United States, both sides are actively engaged at odds with one another. This is a result of differences between the
United States stated foreign policies and national security, and bin Laden, who
has repeatedly espoused his political and religious ideologies. Although Kriesberg has not specifically
addressed this conflict, through his methodology the conclusion can be drawn
that both are currently in the escalation phase and will continue in that phase
for some time.
Kriesberg specifies two areas; internal and external factors, that
contribute to each conflictor’s development of their “bases” for conflict. These factors are both structural and
socio-psychological based and have contributed to the conflict that the United
States and bin Laden find themselves in.
The primary cause of this lack of understanding of the other’s
socialization process did not occur over a short period of time. In fact, one could argue that this factor has
taken generations to formulate and is found in how civilizations have
transcended through time, as seen through each respective societal lens. The result is the dissimilarity in the two
respective cultures, American and Muslim.
This is exacerbated by the differences in each side’s ability to
understand the importance of religion and individual governance of each
respective society.
As stated in the beginning of the literature review, many who have
written on bin Laden have bought into the whole conspiracy theory of bin Laden
and his movement, and I have found their work incomplete and methodologically
unsound. Of the material published specifically on bin Laden only two authors
were noteworthy to use in my analysis.
The first, Mark Huband, who outlines Islamic political movements in Asia
and Africa, and the other Yossef Bodansky, who researches and outlines bin
Laden, his movement, and his activities in a typical anti-Muslim theme. Bodansky presents non-scholarly work, in
that, he relies heavily on open-source material, numerous “confidential”
interviews, and does not present any type of methodology for his work. The only item the two have in common is the
study of bin Laden and from there they take polarized approaches. Although Bodansky does provide a detailed
account of bin Laden’s activities, it is written and reads as a sensationalized
novel. Nonetheless, when used in
conjunction with a series of reports compiled by the State Department,
Frontline, and varies Websites, the majority of his information on bin Laden is
accurate for times, places, and movement connections.
Methodology:
By conducting a descriptive analysis
of the bin Laden conflict, I will outline the bases for the “phenomenon” of bin
Laden’s apparent conflict through escalation with the United States and Saudi
Arabia by examining the structural and socio-psychology conditions highlighted
in Kriesberg’s model. Kriesberg
identifies six key components in the study of conflict: bases, emergence, escalation,
de-escalation, termination, and consequences.
Each phase of his cycle are not mutually exclusive, in fact are linked
in nature by time, and the conflict can oscillate between stages (Kriesberg,
1998). The conflict model is much like a
circle in that it begins and ends at the same point, and is
three-dimensional. This model is a
framework for analysis of conflict that can categorize and study the patterns
of events in any conflict (Kriesberg, 1998).
When looking at
the bases of the “phenomenon” of bin Laden and the US’s conflict we can clearly
identify internal and external factors that have contributed to its
escalation. As Kriesberg identifies in
his section on “social interaction”:
some members of groups, through their socialization and upbringing can
become “prone to conflict (Kriesberg, 1998, 36).” I will show the connection between bin
Laden’s formative years, and his time spent in Afghanistan during the war with
the Soviets, as an instrumental process in the development of his ideology. In addition, the United States repeated
history of developing foreign policy in response to events, and those similar
in religion, secularity and culture is a similar internal factor that has
contributed to this conflict.
The West’s view of Islam is important.
Western attitudes towards the Islamic world, from precolonial times to
the present day, have had an enormous impact upon the direction the religion
has taken. Western attitudes towards
Muslims—the people of the Islamic world—have a tremendous influence on the
political direction the Islamic world has taken throughout the twentieth
century. But is the impact of Western
actions really appreciated by those in the West who form the links—diplomatic,
political, and military…it would seem rarely the case. Although Western countries have their allies
in the Islamic world, these alliances are superficial and exposed as such when
subject to strain. It is rare for the
United States to accede to the wishes of its Arab “friends” in the Middle East
if such accessions are at the expense of Israel (Huband, 1998, xvi).
According to Kriesberg conflict can vary in nature. However, in all conflicts it is important to
keep in mind the following measurable items: “issues in contention,
characteristics of the contending parties, relations between adversaries,
context in which adversaries contend, means used to conduct the struggle, and
the outcome of the struggles (Kriesberg, 1998, page).” Our study of this conflict will take us
through only three of the phases that Kriesberg has identified: bases, emergence and escalation. This conflict has just begun the escalation
phase, and it will be sometime before it is brought to the de-escalation phase,
if it is at all.
It is necessary to analyze the source of a specific
conflict and its processes of escalation, de-escalation, and settlement in
order to consider what alternatives might be pursued to minimize the unwanted
aspects of the conflict and to maximize what is desire (Kriesberg, 1998, 4).
Structural conditions, along with socio-psychological factors, such as
the influence of bin Laden’s family and friends, the Islamic religion and the
significant role of his father’s involvement in hosting numerous religious
scholars over the years, cemented bin Laden’s formative years. In addition, another major influence was
the result of bin Laden’s assistance to the Mujahdeen and the Taliban Movement
during the Afghanistan war. Yet a third factor, the loss of his Saudi
citizenship and his vast financial resource, created massive alienation for bin
Laden. Using Kriesberg’s model in
determining the bases for bin Laden’s activities and why he is currently
engaged in a conflict with the US and Saudi Arabia, it is important for us to
first look at the socio-psychological information on the life, family and
schooling of bin Laden. This insight
will assist us in understanding the bases of the “Islamic Jihad” espoused by
bin Laden through his numerous fatwa and edicts, and why we seem to be now in
the escalation phase of the conflict.
An important factor in this conflict is the understanding that it will
not end with the arrest or death of bin Laden.
In fact, if bin Laden is captured and tried or even killed by the US, I
believe that it will lead to a further escalation of the conflict. I am basing this statement on my research
that bin Laden’s fatwa and edicts are symptomatic of a much deeper problem, in
that many Muslims feel alienated against what they perceive is
“westoxification” much was the case in the Iranian revolution (Rinehart, 1997).
One of bin Laden’s closest associates, Dr. Saad Al-Fagih, head of the
Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia, revealed in an interview with Frontline:
To explain why bin
Laden emerged…one of the two main factors for the emergence of the ‘phenomena’
of bin Laden is the circumstances in Saudi Arabia. With the pathological rule of the royal
family in a country like Saudi Arabia.
But there’s another important factor which is very important…(you’re)
creating the picture of America in the eyes of Muslims as (an) arrogant,
hostile country to Muslim causes.
Because of those two factors together, you would not be surprised to see
a ‘phenomena’ of bin Laden…he’s a product of a new social structure. A new social feeling in the Muslim
world. Where you have strong hostility
not only against America, but against many Arab and Muslim regimes who are
allying to America…And that’s why if bin Laden was not there, you would have
another bin Laden. You would have
another name, with the same character, with the same role, of bin Laden
now. That’s why we call it a ‘phenomena’
not a person (Frontline, 2000).
Based on this
statement and my research on this subject, that by portraying bin Laden as a
crazed fanatical terrorist, the US has, as is the case with Saddam Hussein and
others, catapulted bin Laden into “hero status” for many Muslims (Bodansky,
1999). If he were to be arrested or
killed, he would gain immediate martyr status in their eyes. I am testing the
theory of perceptions: the US overall is inflicted with a lack of understanding
of Islamic dissident movements, their bases, emergence and political ideology
(The Polling Report). American’s have a
general distrust of Arabs, Muslims and the Middle East as compared to other
like groups. This conflict is based on
irrational thoughts instead of a rational methodology and creates a
“dissensual” relationship as defined by Kriesberg. The result of this type of relationship has
led the US and bin Laden to take actions that are contrary to finding a resolution
in this conflict.
The US has crafted an enemy in the
vernacular that American’s can understand.
How did such an attitude emerge in the American psyche? What is the reality of this attitude? Bin Laden has used the American’s perception
to build his momentum and status with like-minded Muslims. What is bin Laden’s systematic goal to carry
out his plans of creating a Muslim Nation, governed by the Sha’ria?
My hypothesis is based on answering two questions, using Kriesberg’s
conflict model. First, is it possible
that the bin Laden phenomenon is a manifestation of American tendencies to cast
their enemies in the contest of a conspiracy theory? Second, is there a legitimate relationship
between the phenomenon of bin Laden and other Islamic Resurgence
movements? Clearly it takes two opposing
views, actions and reactions to create a conflict. What actions have the US and bin Laden taken
during the formation of the “bases” of this conflict to push this movement into
the escalation phase? The result of
these actions are what Kriesberg would define as escalatory in nature, and will
continue to push this conflict in that direction for some time.
In attempting to answer the two questions that I have posed, I have
broken the body of the thesis down into three chapters, which follow
Kriesberg’s conflict model. Chapter 2,
3, and 4 outline Kriesberg’s definition of the “bases, emergence and
escalation” of conflict as a general framework.
In each Chapter following the overview of the conflict model, I apply
the methodology to bin Laden’s position and then the United States position
respectively. My intent is to conduct a
descriptive analysis using Kriesberg’s model of the two parties in this
on-going conflict. The final section, is
my conclusion of the analysis and to provide an answer to my hypothesis, and
whether or not there is ample evidence to support my argument or not.
Chapter II: Bases of Conflict
Bin Laden
The factors in the “bases” of conflict that bin Laden has with the
United States and the Saudi Arabian government can be measured through the
three components in Kriesberg’s model: “internal factors, social systems, and
relations between adversaries (Kriesberg, 1998).” First, bin Laden’s upbringing in Saudi
Arabia, his religious training, and formal university education caused him to
develop a strong sense of religious ideology in the Islamic faith. Second, bin
Laden was driven by his upbringing to engage with known “Islamists[10]”
who espoused strict interpretation of Islam and the duties bound by
Muslims. This caused bin Laden to seek
out a method to engage with other like-minded Muslims to bring about change in
their respective countries using Iran’s Revolution and the Ayatollah Khomeini
as the Islamic model for all others to follow.
The war in Afghanistan provided this opportunity. This was the first
time that “Islamists” felt as if they had defeated the West by crushing the
Communist State in Afghanistan. Third,
as bin Laden developed his loyalty in the religious ideology of Islam, and this
well-entrenched belief, which was challenged by the actions of the Royal Family
and the Saudi government during Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The result was for bin Laden to form a
critical disapproval and condemnation to the Saudi leadership, specifically
King Fahd (Huband, 1999). Since the
Saudi government accepted Western military forces, specifically the United
States and Britain, on the soil of the Holy Sites in the Arabian Peninsula, bin
Laden’s cognitive map was severely tested.
Fourth, bin Laden had trained over the years in Afghanistan and after
the war in Sudan, with hundreds, if not thousands, of Muslims from around the
world that held similar beliefs in the return to strict Islamic states wherever
there was a Muslim population. These
associations became part of what I would characterize as the “loyal
compatriots” of bin Laden, and are part of the Islamic Resurgence Movements
found in the world today.
The majority of the information I found on the life and family of Bin
Laden supports the fact that Bin Laden is from a self-made family of Yemeni
descent. His father, Mohammed bin Laden,
founded a construction business, which is now one of the most powerful
businesses in Saudi Arabia, and is the wealthiest non-royal family inside the
Kingdom (Jane’s Intelligence Review, 2001).
The elder bin Laden assisted the King in repairing one of the Holy Sites
and all future government construction contracts were automatically given to
the bin Laden family. Osama was one of
fifty-seven children, and his father, a profoundly religious man of Sunni
following, died when he was twelve.
Hosted by his father, bin Laden’s early life experiences centered on
being exposed to many Islamic religious clerics, Hajiz pilgrims, and religious
meetings and studies (Frontline Report, 2000).
Bin Laden studied Engineering and received a degree from the University
of Jeddah. His time at the University,
coupled with his earlier exposure to Islamic thinking, led Osama to be a
devoutly religious man. During his time
at the University he was exposed to the radical thinking of the Muslim
Brotherhood and two key figures in his life, Abdullah Azzam and Mohammed Qutb
(Jane’s Intelligence Review, 2001). This
experience is key to understanding how he gained his future religious
inspiration, and led him to eventually assist the fighting in Afghanistan, both
as a well-known fighter and financier.
The University of Jeddah is known as a gathering place for Islamic
groups, many of whom advocate radical Islamic thought. A critical piece in our understanding is to
discuss the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood, and how it later impacted on
Bin Laden’s actions (Frontline Report, 2000).
The Muslim Brotherhood or “Al-Ikhwan Al-Moslemoon” is based on what many
Islamic Scholars have called a ‘declaration of war’ against Islam that took
shape in 1924 with the collapse of the “Khilafa[11]’
by Mustafa Kemal who created a secular state in Turkey (Huband, 1999). Khilafa is a line of successors to the
Prophet Muhammad and without a named Khilafa the fate of the Islamic people and
religion is in jeopardy (Huband, 1999).
The movement’s ideology is based on the principle of regaining the
Khilafa, spreading Islam, and has six identifiable goals which include:
“building the Muslim individual, family, society, state, the Khilafa and
mastering the world with Islam.” This
movement has over seventy branches throughout the world, and has advocated the
“liberation of Muslim lands” by whatever means necessary to return to a rule of
government based on the Sha’ria law (Huband, 1999).
The theme of the Muslim Brotherhood is best described in the following
passage: “Allah is our objective. The messenger is our leader. Quran is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in
the way of Allah is our highest hope (Muslim Brotherhood, Ummah.net).” According to a well-known scholar on Islam,
Henry Massé, the Caliphate is important because:
It is not necessary
to dwell on the political aspects of these modernist tendencies…in one way or
another they have usually taken the form of nationalism; and since the
abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate by the Angora Assembly and the fall in 1924
of the Great Sherif of Mecca who had proclaimed himself Caliph, these
nationalist movements have been based on some realization of historical
forces…in Turkey, the Swiss code has replaced the traditional Muslem Law; the
religious Brotherhoods are suppressed (Masse, 1966, 259).
Bin Laden spent a great deal of time, money and effort in the war effort
against the Soviets during 1982 to their withdrawal in 1989. Bin Laden did not initially spend much time
in Afghanistan during the early years of the war, but returned to Saudi Arabia
to lobby for money and fighters to assist the Mujahedeen and the Taliban
(Huband, 1999). In 1984, he used his
engineering background to assist in building camps in Peshawar for the
Mujahedeen fighters, working once again along side Azzam who was engaged in
raising money and gaining the media’s attention in the conflict. In 1986, Bin Laden decided that he would
build camps in Afghanistan for Arab fighters to use as a base of their
operations, which was later termed as “Al Qa-edah” which, translated into
English means, “the base.”
Bin Laden also gained the majority of his fighting experience in the
later years of the war in Afghanistan.
During this time Bin Laden saw a need for establishing a documentation
system for family members to learn about their loved ones. Al-Qaedah became the entry point for all Arab
fighters, and was used to record their names prior to entry into the war, and
when they returned from fighting, if they returned (Frontline Report,
2000).
After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, bin Laden returned
to Saudi Arabia with the intention of assisting fellow Afghans, led by Sheik
Abdallah bin Hussein al-Ahmar, who were starting a similar movement against the
secular government in Yemen in the early 1990’s (Labeviere, 2000). Bin Laden and Sheik Abdallah believed that
the movement could be as successful in Yemen as they were in Afghanistan, and
boasted of his “Afghans killing 158 leaders of the Yemeni Socialist party
between 1990 and 1994 (Labeviere, 2000, 89).”
Bin Laden has a vision upon his return from Afghanistan that Saddam
Hussein was planning an invasion against Kuwait, and he both publicly and
privately speaks of the vision in his religious circles (Frontline, 2000). Bin Laden met with Prince Sultan, the
Minister of Defense for Saudi Arabia, and outlined a ten-page proposal that
called for the use of Afghan fighters from the war against the Soviets, and
warned the Kingdom not to invite the American’s (Bodansky, 1999). The King was not pleased with his activities
and Bin Laden was asked to keep a low profile (Frontline, 2000). Dr. Fagih stated during his interview with
Frontline that Bin Laden’s response to the King’s willingness to allow US
troops in Saudi Arabia, was that Bin Laden had “lost hope altogether with the
regime… and regarded the country from that moment forward as occupied
(Frontline, 2000).” Bin Laden’s popularity
with the “Islamists” continues to grow during this time, as he is extremely
critical of the “House of al-Saud (Bodansky, 1999, 31).” Bin Laden’s continued criticism of King Fahd
and the decision to allow American military forces into Saudi Arabia unites a
coalition of supporters at the “grassroots” level (Bodansky, 1999). Fearful of this mounting opposition against
the Saudi Royal Family invokes a serious response from the Kingdom to bin Laden
(Bodansky, 1999).
King Fahd ordered Bin Laden under house arrest, threatened to drive the
family business into bankruptcy, so he left Saudi Arabia and eventually found
refuge in Sudan (Bodansky, 1999). Bin
Laden stayed in Sudan as until the Sudanese government caved into the demands
of the US and asked Sudan to expel bin Laden.
However, during his short time in Sudan bin Laden put his engineering
degree and background to work and built much needed infrastructure projects,
such as roads, bridges and schools in Sudan (Huband, 1999). Bin Laden is blamed during his time in Sudan
for two anti-American incidents in Yemen and Somalia that occurred in
1993. In Reeve’s book he quotes bin
Laden as saying:
It is true my
companions fought with Farah Adid’s forces against the US troops in Somalia…but
we were fighting against US terrorism.
Under the cover of the United Nations, the United States tried to
establish its bases in Somalia so that it could get control over Sudan and
Yemen. My associates killed Americans in
collaboration with Farah Adid. We are
not ashamed of our Jihad (Quoted in Reeve, 1999, 182).
The Saudi government went on the offensive against bin Laden by freezing
his assets, conducting several assassination attempts and withdrew his
citizenship (Reeve, 1999). In addition, he is linked to the bombing of the New
York World Trade Center, where an “alleged associate” of his, Ramzi Ahmed
Yousef, was determined to be the mastermind behind the attack (Reeve,
1999). From 1995 forward, bin Laden
became very vocal in the world and espoused a strong ideology, through his
edicts and controversial fatwa (Frontline, 2000). Are these statements a source that can be
studied using Kriesberg’s model of conflict as a method for determining whether
the “phenomenon” of Bin Laden is a legitimate conflict or not? It is my assessment that these statements
provide the most accurate method of discovery of Bin Laden’s ideology and what
activities he has engaged in, supports and promotes in the Islamist world
today.
Clearly, bin Laden’s activities during the initial stages of the
formation of his ideology, and steadfast belief in Islam, has led him to
promote political and cultural changes with like-minded Islamists that
transcend the Western concept of the State.
Bin Laden has come to think, as many other like minded Muslims, that the
West is corrupting Islam and the way of life that many mainstream Islamists
want to live. Bin Laden also considers
the Royal Family and the Saudi Arabian government as having facilitated the
destruction of Islam, and the way of the Koran and Sha’ria law because they
have become a “puppet” regime under the control of the United States and its
foreign policy (Bodansky, 1999). Bin
Laden believes, which is clearly evident in the statements he has issued, that
the United States is using Saudi Arabia, its oil and others as well. In addition, he has publicly stated that
there is a strong parallel with the Shah of Iran and the Iranian people prior
to the Iranian Revolution and King Fahd and the Saudi government (CDLR
Website). Bin Laden is not alone in these
views and for many in the “Islamic Resurgence Movement”, the differences in
ideology and religion is the focal point of why others are drawn to the rise in
religiosity. Huntington outlines the
success’s in these types of movements as a more well defined sense of group
identity and affiliation. For bin Laden
and other Islamists, the affiliation with these “grassroots” movements that
center on religion provide an outlet for these groups dissatisfaction towards
their existing governments.
Islamic Resurgence Movements and their activities are a direct result of
the existing political, religious, and social structures failure to meet the
needs of the people (Huntington, 1996).
In case after case, from Algeria to Indonesia these organizations have
provided for the basic needs of many Muslim societies, where the legitimate
government has failed (Huntington, 1996).
These organizations have opened schools, hospitals, and mosques and in
the case of natural disasters were often the first respondents and “were on the
streets within hours, handing out food and blankets while the Government’s
relief efforts lagged (Huntington, 1996, 112).”
The pervasive attitude of these movements centered on one of the five
basic pillars of Islam in that all Muslims should strive to take care of ones
less fortunate (Gibb, 1964). The failure
of these governments was seen as “success” for the activities of these
alternative movements, and many young people were drawn in (Huntington,
1996). Bin Laden cognitive map of
himself, his religion and his duties allowed him to find comfort in the rise of
Islamic Resurgence as a way to meet the needs of not only himself, his family
and but others Islamists as well.
The success of Islamist movements in dominating the
opposition and establishing themselves as the only viable alternative to
incumbent regimes was also greatly helped by the policies of those regimes
(Huntington, 1996, 114).
Bin Laden’s
ideology, religiosity and association with the Islamic Resurgence created the
“bases” for his conflict with the United States and was exacerbated by the
Saudi Arabian governments inability to meet the goals of such groups.
In the next section, I will show the “bases” of the United State’s
conflict, which adds to why this conflict is classified by Kriesberg as a
“dissensual” relationship, in that, the United States and bin Laden have
conflict over the method and the end point to bring about political change. Or
do they?
United States
Similarly, the factors in the
“bases” of conflict that the United States, in conjunction with the Saudi
government can also be measured through the three components in Kriesberg’s
model: “internal factors, social system, and relations between
adversaries.” First, the United States
throughout its history has been marred in violence, which is exemplified in its
participation in numerous wars, battles and engagements since it was founded in
1776. Second, since the end of WWII the
United States policy makers have conditioned the American public to accept as
the status quo antagonistic relationships with our adversaries, and in the last
twenty years the United States has had such relationships with North Korea, the
Soviet Union through out the Cold-War, Cuba, Iran, and Iraq, to name a
few. Third, the very nature of the
United States participation in the international community, and organizations
dictate that the policy makers and the American public recognize the legal
definition and concept of “States.” This involves recognition of boundaries and
territories, despite the fact that many of the borders in the world today were
arbitrarily defined after WWI and WWII.
Fourth, Americans cognitive map of the proper method for governance is
grounded in the principle that there is a clear separation of church and state. This implies that governments similar to the United
States are the only ones that are successful, and that any country that
deviates from this type of governance is ineffective. Finally, these attitudes towards other
countries, religions, foreign policy issues, and crime and punishment manifest
itself in a well-defined American culture, and value system, which is found in
behavior and socialization attitudes.
This results in the mind-set that anyone not like Americans is seen as
inferior and is less likely to receive support from the United States, its
policy makers and the general public at large.
A snapshot of the American ideology
since the beginning of its formation can be found in the theory of William
Appleman Williams. Williams supports the
hypothesis that American foreign policy is based on the premise that the world
wants Western democratic capitalism.
From the very beginning of the concept of the “American Nation” has been
an Anglo-American persona bent on the pursuit of the American dream with a goal
to promote the power of American business worldwide and to create an
environment to promote capitalism (Williams, 1972). The flaw in this thinking resulted in
“elitist” governance throughout its history.
The rise of “elitism” began to develop under President William McKinley
after the war with Spain and the “acquisition of the Philippines” and the
“military intervention in China”, which was a private decision made by a few
politicians in power (Williams, 1972).
Next, came President Theodore Roosevelt’s sole decision to intervene in
the “control the Panama canal route” is best summarized by Roosevelt himself as
“I took the Canal Zone (Williams, 1972, 6).”
Followed by the activities of President Woodrow Wilson during WWI, in
which he independently made the decision to change the “policy on loans to the
Allies, and intervening with force against the Bolshevik Revolution (Williams,
1972, 6).” This type of independent
decisions didn’t end with these two presidents, and continued with President
Harry S. Truman with a renewed sense of governance by a select few, and
“elitism consolidated those gains, and took new ground, during the Korean War
crisis of 1950-1952 (Williams, 1972, 7),” which took place after WWII. The result of these decisions in all three
cases was the promotion of democracy at the price of countries less powerful
than the United States to ensure big business and economic success (Williams,
1972). The decisions of the Presidents
were not the only secretive programs to foster economic success, in fact,
During those years, moreover, the Central
Intelligence Agency enlarged its power and freedom to undertake various
self-selected interventionist projects around the world. It deposed premiers, installed
counter-revolutionary governments, and in all probability assassinated various
men and women it considered dangerous or troublesome (Williams, 1972, 7).
This type of activity in world
affairs created an environment of bi-polar superpower rivals, and the Soviet
Union step up to the plate to protect its interests in Eastern Europe (Williams,
1972). In real terms the cold war was a
conflict between ensuring economic western capitalism and those countries not
able to protect themselves (Williams, 1972).
American policy at this time was grounded in three fundamental
principles. First, American’s are
genuinely concerned and wanted to help people “solve their problems (Williams,
1972, 13).” Second, is a “principle of
self-determination applied at the international level” that seeks to assist
people to overcome their difficulties (Williams, 1972, 13). Third, the naïve thought that the people of
the world are really incapable of accomplishing anything on their own and if
they are to be successful they must “go about it in the same way as the United
States (Williams, 1972, 13).” The real
problem for the United States and this type of foreign policy is that it has
and continues to create an extremely “antagonistic” type of relationship with
countries that it involves itself in.
Other societies come to feel that American policy
cause them to lose their economic, political, and even psychological
independence…that inclines them to resort to political and economic
retaliation, which only intensifies and further complicates a problem that is
very complex at the outset (Williams, 1972, 16).
The United States desired to make
other sovereign societies like their own, especially core values, norms and
ideologies (Williams, 1972). This
resulted in an “open door policy[12]”
with the Soviet Union and led to the onset of the Cold War. The United States had three basic
perceptions, 180 degrees out from the Soviet’s, which manifested itself in a
nuclear and economic race against one another (Williams, 1972). First, the attitude towards the Soviets after
the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, was that not only were the “Russians weak
they were evil” as well (Williams, 1972, 229).
The main purpose of the United States was to keep the Soviets from
establishing a “stronghold economically and politically in Eastern Europe (Williams,
1972).” Second, the United State’s own
impression of itself, its societal cognitive map, which was publicly defined by
its leaders as “the symbol and the agent of positive good as opposed to the
Soviet evil and assumed that the combination of American Strength and Russian
weakness made it possible to determine the future of the world in accordance
with that judgment (Williams, 1972, 232).”
And finally, paramount to America’s economic success, was based on the
outlook that it would “suffer a serious depression if it did not continue to expand
overseas (Williams, 1972, 232).” This
attitude was articulated by President Harry S. Truman who stated that: “Russia would soon be put in their places,
and that the United States would then take the lead in running the world in the
way that the world ought to be run (Williams, 1972, 240).”
President Truman did not stop there
with his outspoken attitude or policies toward the Soviet Union. Truman blamed “all the troubles of the world
on the Soviet Union and American leaders in and out of government bombarded the
American people with a ‘hate the enemy’ campaign rarely seen in our history;
never, certainly, in peace time (Williams, 1972, 273).” Despite attempts by a series of Presidents
since the American Revolution to promote its economic and political freedoms
and to obtain “sole superpower” status in the international community,
The United States found itself persistently thwarted
in its efforts to inspire, lead and reform the world. This supreme paradox of American history
becomes comprehensible when viewed as a direct result of the nation’s concept
of itself and the world in terms of open-door expansion. For American’s weakness in strength was the
product of its ideological definition of the world. The United States not only misunderstood the
revolutions in economics, politics, color and anti-colonial nationalism; it
asserted that they were wrong or wrong-headed and that they should be opposed
in favor of emulation of the American example…by concentrating on the communist
so much, for example, American’s under-estimated or discounted such realities
as world poverty, the fantastic increase in world populations, western
society’s persistent discrimination against other races and ideas, and the
continued vigor of man’s ancient urge towards self-definition and creative
activity (Williams, 1972, 278, 289).
The attitudes of Truman were passed on to Kennedy and his foreign policy
endeavors in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the war with Vietnam (Williams,
1972). And, although Williams hypothesis
was originally published in 1959, again in 1962 and finally in 1972 and does
not address more recent events, his ideas have merit both historically and
academically in establishing a pattern of the development of American foreign
policy and the attitudes of the American public. By using his argument in the “bases” of the
conflict the United States finds itself with bin Laden and other such enemies,
Williams’s argument shows that there is a clear connection with the foundation
of American foreign policy and nations that are not Western or American
enough.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has found itself as the
only superpower in the world. And, until
very recently with the events in China, no other state challenged that role. The United States and China are at odds with
one another over the continued collection of intelligence and the emergency
landing of a United States military plane.
These activities have created an adversarial relationship between the
respective governments and the American public’s attitudes towards China. This is not the first conflict since the Cold
War that the United States has found itself engaged in, however, the majority
have been with other “state” actors, but in the case of bin Laden this seems to
be a conflict with a “non-state” actor.
This particular conflict is not based on the economic differences
highlighted by Williams, but a religious one instead. Religiosity has added a new dimension in
conflictual issues found in world events today and the United States has not
seemed to respond appropriately to develop policies that incorporate this
religious “phenomenon.” In ideological
terms Religious Nationalism as defined by Juergensmeyer is the replacement for
the Soviet Union and anti-communism sentiment found during the Cold War. The attitudes of the American public towards
other countries, religions, foreign policy and crimes are a good method for
supporting the argument that American’s in general have distrust for others
that are not like them.
Polling data is a good source of information to analyze American public
opinion on a variety of issues. I did
not conduct any polling myself, however, several research firms such as the
Gallup Poll, Roper Poll, CNN and USA Today have asked questions that are relevant
in this study. I looked at several
issues, to include, American’s attitudes towards other countries, religions,
crimes, conspiracy theories, and foreign policy. Overall, American’s are more likely to be
supportive of those that are like us.
The survey results will be presented in the graph format.
Table 1:
Attitudes towards foreign
countries
Source: Gallup
Poll (see note 10)
In a survey conducted by the Gallup Poll[13]
on 1-4 February 2001 measured American attitudes towards other countries can be
best summarized as the top sixteen countries are non-Muslim governments, while
the bottom four represent governments that are Muslim.
Table 2: Attitudes towards foreign
countries
Source: iPoll
(see note 11)
In a survey conducted by
Gallup/CNN/USA Today[14]
on 20-21 April 2001, American’s were asked whether or not a specific country
was considered an ally or not of five countries. Similar results are found as were found in
table one, of the two countries that are not considered an ally, China and Iraq
have on-going conflictual governmental relations.
Table 3: American
Attitudes towards Religion
Source: Princeton Survey Research Associates (see
note 13)
In the same survey conducted in
Table 3[16],
the question was asked of whether or not “American’s supported or opposed
groups applying for governmental funding to provide social services to people
in need.” Similar results were found as
the question of religion. Only 38%
supported Muslim Mosques receiving funding.
Table
5: Sympathies in the Palestinian/Israeli
Conflict
Source: Poll Track
(see note14)
In a survey conducted by CNN/Gallup/USA Today[17]
on 4-6 December 1998, American’s were asked whether or not the United States
should support the Israeli’s or the Palestinian side, or take neither. Although a majority of responded in favor of
not taking either side, however, of those that chose a side, 17% supported the
Israelis as compared to only 2% supporting the Palestinians.
Table
6: Israeli and Palestinian Attitude
(10-year period May 88 – Dec 98)
Source: Poll Track (see note 15)
In the same poll taken in Table 5[18],
the question was asked whether or not they were sympathetic to the Israelis or
the Palestinians, or neither, and polling data was provided over a ten-year
period. Consistently, with the exception
of February 1991, during the Gulf War crisis, overwhelmingly most were more
sympathetic to the Israelis then they were towards the Palestinians.
Table 7: Israeli or
Palestinian Sympathies in July 1999
Source: Poll Track
(see note 16)
In a survey conducted by CNN/Gallup/USA Today[19]
on 22-25 July 1999, American’s were asked again, whether or not their
sympathies were towards the Israelis or Palestinians. From the date provided in Table 5, a shift
from the majority of the people polled not supporting or taking either side, to
less than 30%. The support for the
Israelis rose from 17% in the poll in December 1998, to 43% in July 1999.
Table 8:
Oklahoma City Bombing and attitudes towards Timothy McVeigh
Source: Poll Track (see note 17)
In a survey conducted by ABC/Nightline[20]
by Chilton Research on 2 June 1997, Americans were asked on their opinion of
whether or not Timothy McVeigh should receive they agreed with the guilty
verdict or not. Overwhelmingly, 89% felt
that McVeigh was guilty.
Table
9: Death Penalty attitudes towards Timothy
McVeigh
Source: Poll Track
(see note 18)
In the same survey taken in Table 8[21],
the question was asked whether or not McVeigh should receive the death penalty
for his actions in the Oklahoma bombing, and 67% felt that he should receive
the death penality.
Table 10: Oklahoma City Bombing Responsibility
Source: Poll Track (see note 19)
In a survey conducted by Yankelovich Partners[22]
on 16-18 April 1997, the question was asked whether or not all the people
involved in the Oklahoma Federal Building bombing had been captured and
identified, over 76% felt that not all those involved had been captured or
identified.
Table 11: Public Opinion Missile Strikes
Against Afghanistan and Sudan
Source: Poll Track (see note 20)
In a survey conducted by Chilton Research[23]
on 20 August 1998, a question was asked whether or not they approved of
missiles strikes in response to the US Embassy bombings in Africa, against
suspected terrorist sites. A majority of
those polled supported President Clinton’s decision.
Table 12: Effectiveness of Missile
Strikes Against Afghanistan and Sudan
Source: Poll Track (see note 21)
In a survey conducted by Chilton Research Services[24]
on 20 August 1998, the question was asked whether or not the missiles strikes
against Sudan and Afghanistan would increase or decrease terrorism. The results were split between the two
sides. In this same poll the question
was asked whether or not they supported the missile attacks, and interestingly
80% support the strikes, even though they felt it might increase terrorism.
Table
13: Is President Bill Clinton
trustworthy to make foreign policy decisions
Source: Poll Track (see note 22)
In the same survey as Table 12[25],
the question was asked whether or not they felt that President Clinton was
trustworthy to respond to terrorism in light of the ongoing scandal surrounding
the affair with Monica Lewinsky. A
majority of those surveyed felt that President Clinton was trustworthy to
respond to terrorism.
Table 14: Reason for Missile Attacks
against Afghanistan and Sudan
Source: Poll Track (see note 23)
In the same survey as Table 13[26],
the question was also asked whether or not they felt he launched the missile
strikes in order to fight terrorism or divert attention away from the scandal,
over 64% felt that he was attempting to fight terrorism, while only 30% felt he
was attempting to divert attention away from the scandal.
Table 15:
American Public Opinion whether or not victim of Terrorism
Source: Poll Track
(see note 24)
In a survey conducted by Gallup Poll[27]
on 20 August 1998, the question was asked whether or not they worried whether
or not they or someone in their family would be the victim of a terrorist
act. Over half, felt not worried, or not
worried at all that. Yet, in the same
survey the question was asked whether or not the missile strikes would increase
or decrease terrorism against the United States, over 47% felt that there would
be an increase in terrorism against the United States.
When it comes to American attitudes towards other countries, there is a
positive correlation between countries that are similar in values and
identities, and an unfavorable attitudes towards those countries not similar in
value and identities. When it comes to
the question of religion, there is a positive correlation between a favorable
attitudes towards religions similar to American’s, and an unfavorable attitude
towards non-Christian, Jewish or Orthodox religions. Likewise, with regards to the events
surrounding the Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing, a majority of
American’s feels that not all were caught and convicted, and that there is a
positive correlation to support the attitude of a “conspiracy theory” behind
the attack.
The whole premise behind including
this polling data, is to support one of the questions in my hypothesis that
American’s are distrusting of those that are not like us, which leads policy
makers to demonize its enemies to fit their cognitive maps of what the world
should look like. This is evident, especially
when it comes to individuals that are different from us not only in looks, but
in religious attitudes and background as well.
A majority of American’s are extremely distrusting of Muslims in
general.
Conclusion
The “bases” for the conflict between the United States and bin Laden are
grounded in a fundamental difference of ideology, religiosity and the cognitive
maps of the individuals and the groups themselves. These differences have led both groups to
develop a well-defined sense of political, religious, and cultural
identities. In the case of bin Laden,
his adherence to Islam, coupled with his upbringing, religious training, and
life, led him to become involved in a movement to rid another Muslim state from
communist rule and that was accomplished, he and other like-minded Islamists
sought out to bring about political change[28]
starting with Saudi Arabia.
Likewise, the United States
throughout its entire history was based on the premise that it has the
responsibility to be exceptional in world affairs. This is evident in the development of the
general attitude of American’s towards others, and in the way politicians go
about making foreign policies towards other countries. This ethnocentric and elitist approach is the
internal factors that have formulated the “bases” of its conflict with bin
Laden and the others involved in the Islamic Resurgence movement. In the next section, I will cover the
emergence of this conflict.
Chapter
III: Emergence of the Conflict
The measurement of the “emergence”
of conflict is based on four conditions that need only be “minimally
satisfied”: identity formation, grievance, formation of contentious goals, and
ideology (Kriesberg, 1998, 58). Only
when a party to the conflict believes that they have an equal chance at
resolving the conflict in accordance with their ideology can the “escalation”
phase be avoided (Kriesberg, 1998). As
in the case of the “bases” of the conflict these four conditions are not
mutually exclusive, and depending on the conflict one can be more important
than the other. Each will be outlined in
detail.
First, “identity” varies from person
to person, is not time dependent, and can be “long enduring.” This is the case when conflict transcends
generations (Kriesberg, 1998). The key
point in understanding the importance of identity is that it involves a
conscious-raising event, is relative to the position of the group, is a product
of experiences, and is not only a learned behavior but a cognitive one as well
(Kriesberg, 1998). If the group believes
that they have suffered an injustice and that they have a legitimate grievance
against another group, here is where when the group begins to pull together in
identifying the source of the problem and what measures can be taken to change
the situation, this can be the group as a whole, or individuals within the
group. (Kriesberg, 1998). It is not necessary that others outside the
group identify the grievance as legitimate, only the group members
themselves. “Grievance” is directly related
to identity (Kriesberg, 1998).
Second, “grievance” is measured in
the context of the magnitude of the deprivation that the members of the group
identify with and what is the source of the deprivation. If the source of their complaint, inequalities
or differences equate to an identifiable adversarial group, the result is the
formation of goals that intend to create a conflict with the other group. Often, the result of the impingements are
measured by a of a self-defined injustice and does not have to be recognized
outside the group (Kriesberg, 1998).
Third, the move from grievance to
“formulation of contentious goals” is a difficult decision for any group that
believes that it has a legitimate complaint, and this is where leadership,
culture and social system, and the relationship of the adversary of the two
opposing group is critical. A “conflict”
that has goals that are more alike in nature are more likely to result in the
resolution of the existing conflict.
Whereas, groups that are dissimilar based on structural or
socio-psychological differences result in a more enduring, utopian, and
apocalyptic agenda. Finally, the result
of the leadership to shape and mobilize the group manifests itself in a clear
cut, well-defined ideology that can become highly institutionalized and
ritualized, especially in the cases of religious or nationalist conflicts
(Kriesberg, 1998).
These four measurable factors can be
found in the current conflict between the United States and bin Laden. First, are each party’s definition of who
they are; their self-awareness and identity, for the United States that
definition is “American Superpower”, and for bin Laden, the definition is
Arab. The second issue, centers on the
“dissensual” relationship the two parties have with one another. In the case of the United States and its
policy makers, the United States feels that its role is that of “world
protector” and “promoter of democracy”, and for bin Laden he sees himself as
the “underdog”, and “a devout Muslim that has taken on the role of spokesman
and leader” for others associated with his cause, and who can stand up to
United States aggression and imperialism that is promotes worldwide (Frontline,
2000). Third, is the development of their
respective goals, the United States develops its terrorism policy as a “denial
strategy” and “military supremacy strategy” through the “use of force”, such as
the missile attacks against targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. In the case of bin Laden, his goals are
obtained through the “use of force” that equates to his “declaration of war”
against the United States, terrorist tactics, and the disruption of peaceful
methods for resolving this conflict. A
concept that is worth exploring is the current “denial strategy” of the United
States towards terrorism.
Bin Laden
The factors in the “emergence” of
conflict that bin Laden has with the United States and the Saudi Arabian government
can be measured using Kriesberg’s model.
First, bin Laden’s religious identity is easily measured in his
commitment to bringing about political change in Saudi Arabia and other
countries. He has surrounded himself
with other like-minded Muslims that are as strong in their convictions as he
is. Second, bin Laden movement, as well
as other Islamic Resurgence Movements, have, on numerous occasions, issued
statements that vocalize their grievance with the United States, and other
governments such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Afghanistan on the premise that
those governments are committing atrocities against Islam. The magnitude of the crisis for many involves
the complete destruction of the existing political, social and religious
structures of their respective country.
Third, bin Laden stands as an icon and well-respected leader to many
Muslims around the world. US’s actions
against him have generated much of his notoriety among Islamists. And finally, due to bin Laden and the
Taliban’s success against communism in Afghanistan, he, like many others,
believes that if they could defeat the Soviet Union, at the time one of the
most powerful countries in the world, they can also defeat the United States
and the West.
In Chapter 2, I have shown that the
connection between bin Laden’s identity and ideology is founded in Islam. Bin Laden was deeply involved with religion
and known Islamists during his early experiences at the University of Jeddah. This formal university training built on his
childhood associations with his father’s many religious contacts and this had a
profound “Islamic” effect on bin Laden.
This type of religious environment that bin Laden found himself in was
conducive to “imitation, modeling, and reinforcement” in his religious convictions
and caused him to associate with like-minded followers. Kriesberg outlines this type of behavior as:
Conditions
that foster emotions and cognitions driving members of social systems to
externally directed attacking behavior.
The characteristics include cultural values and norms that foster
antagonistic behavior towards members of other social systems; and they include
institutions and social structures that engender external conflict (Kriesberg,
1998, 37).
Clearly, bin Laden’s activities in Afghanistan fit the pattern that
Kriesberg has identified as the necessary conditions for an individual to
express their ideological framework.
Although there is evidence that bin Laden had issued communiqués to the
King of Saudi Arabia and his religious circles between 1989 and 1995, I was
unable to find anything prior to 1995.
These statements are really the only information that clearly identifies
his ideology and his intent. I believe
these statements are the bases for his conflict. However, his conflict is only part of the
problem as the US has interpreted them and further escalated the conflict
without much analysis or attempts to de-escalate the conflict (Kriesberg,
1998). In April 1995, in an interview
with a French journalist, bin Laden describes his fight with the Taliban
against the Soviets. Bin Laden states
that they were not his only targets:
For us, the idea was not to get involved more than necessary in the
fight against the Russians, which was the business of the Americans, but rather
to show our solidarity with our Islamist brothers. I discovered that it was not enough to fight
in Afghanistan, but that we had to fight on all fronts against communist or
Western oppression. The urgent thing was
communism, but the next target was America…This is an open war up to the end,
until victory (Frontline, 2000).
The war with the Soviets was seen as the first time that the Muslim
people had been victorious against the one of the two evils, first, communism
and second, the West, and would provide strength in their future
activities. Later that year, bin Laden
openly criticized the King and the Saudi government and accused the King of
“lack of commitment to Sunni Islam, inability to conduct a viable defense, and
squandering of public funds and oil money (Frontline, 2000.)” Bin Laden called for a “guerilla war” to rid
the peninsula of US forces. Shortly
thereafter, he issued another statement, and the result was an attack on the
Saudi National Guard compound where five US personnel were killed. Within months of that attack, a massive truck
bomb was detonated in front of Khobar towers, a US Military Housing Compound,
killing twenty-four US personnel. Bin
Laden issued an interview shortly afterwards stating that these two attacks
were: “ The result of American behavior
against Muslims, its support of Jews in Palestine, and the massacre of Muslims
in Palestine and Lebanon (ADL Backgrounder, 1998).”
On July 10, 1996, bin Laden issued a
statement to a British newspaper and claimed the attack on the American forces
was necessary to help drive them out of Saudi Arabia:
The ordinary man
knows that SA is the largest oil producer in the world, yet at the same time is
suffering from taxes and bad services.
Now the people understand the speeches of the ulemas in the mosques—that
our country has become an American colony.
They act decisively with every action to kick the Americans out of Saudi
Arabia. What happened in Riyadh and
Dhahran when 24 Americans were killed in two bombings is clear evidence of the
huge anger of Saudi people against America.
The Saudis now know their real enemy is America (Frontline, 2000).
Although bin
Laden may not have directly ordered the attack on either the National Guard
Headquarters in Riyadh, or Khobar towers, his espoused ideology and fatwa’s
incited like-minded Islamists that believed in the same call to an Islamic
Nation (Huband, 1999). An important
factor that is known about the bombing in Riyadh in 1995 is that the four men
that the Saudi Arabian government tried and executed were former soldiers of
the Mujahedeen, and fought with bin Laden in Afghanistan for at least three
years (Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 2001). The four to six members of this group were
all under the age of 25, not employed and had secondary or religious
schooling. They formed their group in
September 1995, and two months later attacked the site at the Saudi National
Guard Compound (Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 2001). During Dr. Fagih’s interview with Frontline
he concludes:
Well, the Saudis
did not say he’s involved…I think that Saudis don’t like to say he’s involved
because they don’t want to give him credit…it was proof that a man can do what
he claims he can do. He did it. It was an actual incident. There was a bomb. There was Americans killed. And then it happened again in Khobar…it
happened twice. So it was very
significant. So this man has the role and
has the eagerness but also has the capacity to do the job. Now, he has not said that he is behind the
bombings, 100 percent. But all the
circumstances lead to the belief that he is indirectly or directly responsible
for those two incidents (Frontline, 2000).
Bin Laden was forced to leave Sudan
because of US and Saudi pressure on the Sudanese government. Soon after his expulsion, bin Laden issued
one of his most important statements, known as the “Declaration of War Against
the Americans Who Occupy the Land of the Two Holy Mosques (MSANews,
1996).” The text is over twelve pages
long, and bin Laden himself best summarizes his conflict and the bases of his
conflict:
Muslims burn with
anger at America. For its own good,
America should leave Saudi Arabia…there is no more important duty than pushing
the American enemy out of the Holy Land… The presence of the USA Crusader
Military forces on land, sea, and air of the states of the Islamic Gulf is the
greatest danger threatening the largest oil reserve in the world. The existence of these forces in the area
will provoke the people of the country and induces aggression on their
religion, feelings and prides and pushes them to take up armed struggle against
the invader occupying the land…Due to the imbalance of power between our armed
forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted i.e.
using fast-moving, light forces that work under complete secrecy. In other words, to initiate a guerilla war,
where the sons of nations, and not the military forces, take part in it
(MSANews, 1996).
Soon after issuing his “Ladenese Epistle,” he
conducted an interview with Nida’ul Islam magazine. Bin Laden reiterated his feeling towards the
US and the Saudi Arabian governments:
As for their
accusations of terrorizing the innocent, the children and the women, these are
in the category of accusing others with their own affliction in order to fool
the masses. The evidence overwhelmingly
shows the Americans and Israeli killing the weaker men, women and children in
the Muslim world and elsewhere. A few
examples of this are seen in the recent Qana massacre in Lebanon, and the death
of more than 600,000 Iraqi children because of the shortages of food and
medicine which resulted from the boycotts and sanctions against the Muslim
Iraqi people, also their withholding of arms from the Muslims of
Bosnia-Herzegovina leaving them prey to the Christian Serbians that massacred
and raped in a manner not seen in contemporary history. Not to forget the dropping of H-bombs on
cities with their entire populations of children, elderly, and women, on
purpose, and in a premeditated manner as was the case with Hiroshima and
Nagasaki (Nida’ul Islam, 1996).
Magnus Ranstorp, attempted to understand
and explain bin Laden’s meaning behind his interviews and statements. He concludes that these ‘fatwa’ are:
Calculated
decisions to maximize both the distribution of his message among broader
segments of the Muslim community…is illustrative of bin Laden’s general
political astuteness and awareness of local, regional and global issues…Bin
Laden has forged tactical alliances with other ‘like-minded’ mainstream as well
as radical Islamic groups (Ranstorp, 1998).”
In the article Ranstorp includes bin Laden’s latest
fatwa that he issued with four other known Islamic groups:
The ruling to kill
the Americans and their allies—civilians and military – it is an individual
duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to
do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque (Mecca) from
their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of
Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim (Ranstorp, 1998).
Sheikh Mir Hamzah, the leader of the
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan, which is considered to be a “mainstream Islamic
movement;” was one of the signatories to the fatwa and in addition to the fatwa
a new movement was named: The
International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders (Ranstorp,
2001). Excerpts from bin Laden’s fatwa
include the following important statements:
For over seven
years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of
places, the Arabian peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers,
humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the
Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim
peoples…despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the
Crusader-Zionist alliance, and the huge number of those killed, which has
exceeded one million…despite all this, the Americans are once again trying to
repeat the horrific massacres, as though they are not content with the
protracted blockade imposed after the ferocious war or the fragmentation and
devastation. So here they come to
annihilate what is left of this people and to humiliate their Muslim
neighbors…if the American’s aims behind these wars are religious and economic
the aim is also to serve the Jew’s petty state and divert attention from its
occupation of Jerusalem and murder of Muslims there. The best proof of this is their eagerness to
destroy Iraq, the strongest neighboring Arab state, and their endeavor to
fragment all the states of the region…into paper statelets and through their
disunion and weakness to guarantee Israel’s survival and the continuation of
the brutal Crusade occupation of the peninsula…the ruling to kill the Americans
and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim
who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to
liberate the al-Asqa mosque and the Holy Mosque (Mecca) from their grip, and in
order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and
unable to threaten any Muslims (Ranstorp, 2001).
Six months after the “declaration of war” was issued,
two embassies were bombed in Africa, exactly eight years to the date that US
troops entered Saudi Arabia. The attacks
on Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam left hundreds dead, including twelve
Americans. Although bin Laden was in
Afghanistan the US has since linked and indicted bin Laden in US Federal Court,
as the mastermind behind the attack (Frontline, 2000).
Bin
Laden has since given several other interviews, all with the same theme and
message; a united Arab nation based on Shari’ a law, the return of the Al-Asqa
Mosque from Israel and the US presence out of Saudi Arabia. The undertones of bin Laden’s message is
two-fold. First, that not only does he
want US forces out of Saudi Arabia, he is advocating the removal of the King of
Saudi Arabia, to be replaced by a leader, government and legal system similar
to Iran’s Islamic theocracy (Bodansky, 1999).
Second, bin Laden is calling for the destruction of the US and Israeli
coalition which includes the destruction of the State of Israel (Ranstorp,
2001). The bases for his conflict with
the US and Saudi Arabia are quite clear, as long as US forces occupy[29]
the lands of Saudi Arabia and that the Holy Mosque in Jerusalem remain in the
hands of Israel, he will continue to call for “jihad” against both the US and
Israel. The US has responded to these
terrorist activities on several occasions by attempting to kill bin Laden, and
his fighters in Afghanistan by launching several cruise missile attacks on
their camps (ABCNEWS Website). The US
was unsuccessful and immediately after the last attack in 1998, bin Laden made
another statement that he was still alive and well, but several of his fellow
soldiers were killed. The US’s action
only intensified bin Laden’s activities.
In fact, he publicly acknowledged to John Miller of ABC during an
interview, that he is attempting to gain access to weapons of mass destruction
to be used in his jihad against the US; “if I seek to acquire such weapons,
this is a religious duty. How we use
them is up to us (Frontline, 2000).”
Using
Kriesberg’s model for conflict, my analysis is bin Laden has defined the bases
for his conflict with the US and Israel.
He has issued statement after statement with regard to his ideology and
his intent. Obviously religion is the foundation
of bin Laden’s identity, ideology, and cognitive outlook towards non-Muslims. Bin Laden’s identity has taken on a series of
conscious raising events, and by doing so he has informed not only his
followers, but also the world of his position.
An analysis of bin Laden’s publicly stated identity has resulted in a
set of well-defined published grievances that contain formulated goals, and a
specific ideology that he shares with a nation, an Islamic nation. Samuel Huntington highlights the importance
in understanding the “Islamic Resurgence:”
This Islamic
Resurgence, in its extent and profundity is the latest phase in the adjustment
of Islamic civilization to the West, an effort to find the ‘solution’ not in
Western ideologies but in Islam. It
embodies acceptance of modernity, rejection of Western culture, and
recommitment to Islam as the guide to life in the modern world…as a top Saudi
official explained…foreign imports are nice…but intangible social and political
institutions imported from elsewhere can be deadly—ask the Shah of Iran…Islam
for us is not just a religion but a way of life…Islamic Resurgence is the
effort by Muslims to achieve this goal…the Resurgence is mainstream not
extremist, pervasive not isolated (Huntington, 1996, 110).
This “Islamic Resurgence” movement is
taking shape across Asia and Africa, from Algeria to Indonesia, in countries
that have an active Muslim population.
These movements include well-known groups such as the Muslim of
Brotherhood, al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya, and various unknown groups with ties to
terrorist activities. Who then, are the
people attracted to bin Laden’s movement and why? Are those involved in his call to arms from
one country or is there a connection in his original activities in
Afghanistan? Is there a divergence of
the Shi’ite population of countries such as Iran, and Iraq that have forged
their espoused ideological differences?
Do these other groups play an important role in carrying out bin Laden’s
fatwa against the US and Israel? Due to
the scope of this paper I will concentrate on two countries, Afghanistan,
and Egypt. Although, similar movements and activities
can be found in other countries to include: Indonesia, the Philippines, Sudan,
Algeria, Lebanon, and Israel.
The first movement and country to
consider is the role of Afghanistan in this conflict. Thousands of Arab fighters from outside of
Afghanistan fought during the war against the Soviets. The camps established by bin Laden and other
Muslims promoted the idea of “pan-Islamic” resurgence that spread from Algeria
to Indonesia (Labeviere, 2000). Bin
Laden, as well as other Islamists such as Azzam, felt that it was “their
obligation” to create an armed struggle against “un-Islamic” regimes to bring a
return of the establishment of the Khilafah (Bodansky, 1999). As stated early in the paper, bin Laden
recruited thousands of fighters from these countries to participate in the war,
and once the war was over many returned to their original countries only to
find themselves in what Ted Gurr would call “aspirational deprivation.” This was caused by many of the fighters
finding hope that they could also achieve Muslim Government in their own
countries (Rashid, 1999).
Despite the Taliban’s insular nature, bin
Laden and the current leader of the Taliban, Omar Massoud, struck up a
friendship during bin Laden’s early years in Afghanistan. There is no indication that either is
threatened by the other’s presence. In
fact, the Taliban has continued to provide bin Laden a safe haven during his exile
from Saudi Arabia, and there is no indication that the UN, the US, or any type
of sanctions to turn bin Laden over to the US will influence them (Frontline
Report, 2000).
Striking up a
friendship with Omar, the Taliban Chief, bin Laden moved to Omar’s base in
Kandahar in early 1997. Bin Laden
reunited and rearmed Arab militants still remaining in Afghanistan after the
war against the Soviets…recent Taliban statements reflect a bin Laden-style
outrage, defiance, and pan-Islamism that the Taliban had never used before his
arrival (Rashid, 1999).
These movements, and their respective leaders, seem
to be drawn to this grassroots attempt at bring about political change to their
current governments. Although a majority
of them served in Afghanistan with bin Laden, in some fashion, there does not
seem to be a clear “hierarchy” that the United States insists that exists that
bin Laden is the mastermind behind all of these groups (Huband, 1999).
According to Jane’s Sentinel, several
other countries, to include Egypt, have groups opposed to its secular style of
governance.
It is likely that
there would have been Islamic eruptions whether or not there had been Arab
veterans of the Afghan war or not. But
what is undeniable is that these combat experienced zealots have given the
fundamentalists a powerful arm that they would not otherwise have had (Jane’s
Intelligence Review, April 1995).
The “pan-Arab movement,” the desire to use the “Iranian theocracy” as a
model and overall discontent with the current political structures in their own
respective countries, are a few examples of the connection between those who
fought in Afghanistan and bin Laden’s movement.
In the majority of the countries with a large Islamic population, the rise
of “Islamic Resurgence” has become a way of life and many are drawn bin Laden’s
cause because he provides the voice for the world to hear. Although they may not receive direct orders
from bin Laden, they too are in engaged in a conflict within their own
countries because of their experiences in the war. Bin Laden has given them the necessary
ideological framework to mobilize and attempt to bring about change within
their governments.
United States
Similarly, the factors in the “emergence” of the conflict that the
United States has with bin Laden and the other Islamic Resurgence Movements can
be measured using Kriesberg’s model.
First, the United States, its policy makers, and the general public, as
shown in Chapter 2, truly believe that they alone are responsible to bring
about peace and stability in the world.
This has led Presidents and policy makers since the inception of the
United States, to create an identity based on this premise. Second, the United States does not recognize
states that it classifies as rogue states, or non-state actors such as bin
Laden, the Ayatollah, or Fidel Castro, and goes to great lengths to publicly
humiliate and destroy them in the international community. As shown in Chapter 2, the United States and
general public have this attitude towards those countries and individuals that
are different politically, socially, culturally, and religiously. Third, based on these types of attitudes the
United States and its policy makers go out of their way to form adversarial
relationships and aggressive foreign policies towards those countries not like
them. And finally, the United States
believes that bin Laden is the leader of a well-financed, well-organized group
that is set in the destruction of America, and that if they simply remove him
from the equation, in whatever way, that the movement will end. However, this type of redress with its
adversaries is unrealistic and naïve.
The United States, its administration, and general public must consider
the differences in culture and religion and begin to formulate a foreign policy
that attempts to minimize these types of conflict, instead of escalating them.
As stated in the introduction, the United States ordered a series of
military air strikes against targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, 20 August 1998,
two weeks after the Kenya and Tanzania Embassy bombings. And, despite the strong support of the
American public as shown in the polling data from Chapter 2, the success of the
response is questionable, and perhaps has caused the conflict to escalate
further. In Afghanistan, over thirty
missiles fell on a camp associated with bin Laden, killing twenty-one people,
of which fifteen had “alleged” ties with bin Laden and his movement (ABCNEWS
Website). The sentiment of those living
near the camps is remarkably the same as bin Laden, and “are more determined
than ever to stand up to the United States (ABCNEWS Website).”
Regarding the bombing of the
pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, ABCNEWS investigated a report that the United
States might have targeted the wrong site.
In an interview, the owner of the plant, Salal Idris, stated that “one
can understand the legitimate right of the U.S. government to go after
terrorists and to control terrorism…but they need to have legitimate
targets. I am not the right target
(ABCNEWS Website).” Idris denies that he
has ever met with bin Laden, works for him, or knowingly worked with any of his
agents (ABCNEWS Website). In addition,
the United States Defense Intelligence Agency has conducted an investigation
into the soil samples taken from the plant, and concluded that it was the
“wrong target based on bad information (ABCNEWS Website).” Idris and his lawyers conducted their own
investigation, and had soil samples taken from various sites around the plant,
and three independent laboratories concluded that there was no chemical being
produced that contained the deadly nerve agent that was reportedly being
produced there (ABCNEWS Website).
In a 150-page indictment, United
States Attorney Mary Jo White has charged Usama Bin Laden[30],
along with sixteen others, with 308 various counts to include over 200 counts
of murder, for their alleged activities in the two embassy bombings and other
events worldwide. Calling the activities
of this group: “an international terrorist group…dedicated to opposing
non-Islamic governments with force and violence (FBI Website).” Although only four of the total charged in
the indictment have been extradited to the United States and put on trial. The four were found guilty, and are awaiting
sentencing for their participation in the US Embassy bombings. FBI Director Louis Freeh praised the work of
Mary Jo White and the federal law enforcement agents that participated in the
investigation and subsequent verdict in the trial (FBI Website).
Although the official transcripts of
the trial and the evidence presented is not yet available, I was able to obtain
a copy of the indictment, and will provide a summary and analysis of its
contents.
Suffice to say,
that a majority of the information presented in the indictment is
unsubstantiated and uncorroborated in the actual indictment itself. What it does show is the American
“identity”, and the “grievance” towards terrorism and religious movements. Interestingly in the second paragraph the
District Attorney lays out four primary reasons for bringing the case forward:
Al Qaeda opposed the United States for several
reasons. First, the United States was
regarded as ‘infidel’ because it was not governed in a manner consistent with
the group’s extremist interpretation of Islam.
Second, the United States was viewed as providing essential support for
other ‘infidel’ governments and institutions, particularly the governments of
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the nation of Israel and the United Nations
organization, which were regarded as enemies of the group. Third, al Qaeda opposed the involvement of
the United States armed forces in the Gulf War in 1991 and in Operation Restore
Hope in Somalia in 1992 and 1993, which were viewed by al Qaeda as pretextual
preparations for an American occupation of Islamic countries. In particular, al Qaeda opposed the continued
presence of American military forces in Saudi Arabia following the Gulf
War. Fourth, al Qaeda opposed the United
States Government because of the arrest, conviction and imprisonment of persons
belonging to al Qaeda or its affiliated terrorist groups or with whom it
worked, including Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman (FBI Website Indictment).
The entire
document is based on these four statements, and presents evidence to support
the primary fact that bin Laden is the leader of a “conspiracy” and
“well-organized”, “extremist group” whose goal is to “unlawfully, willfully and
knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed to kill nationals of the
United States (Indictment).” The “overt
acts” taken to accomplish this contained over 200 examples of the activities
those charged have taken in order to carry out their activities. Many of the examples provided are in part due
to activities taken by the United States itself in its “cold-war” against the
Soviets in the early part of 1980.
First, the issue of the base camps and the purpose for establishing them
are considered part of the “conspiracy”.
In addition part two of the charges include the idea that these camps
where used to train members of al Qaeda.
“At various times from at least early as 1989, the defendant…providing
training camps and guesthouses in various areas, including Afghanistan…for the
use of al Qaeda and its affiliated groups…Mamdouh Mahmud Salim managed some of these
training camps and guesthouses (Indictment).”
A point not brought out in this indictment is the United States
involvement initially in the establishment of these sites (Huband, 1999). It has been established by various sources
that the United States Central Intelligence Agency had provided not only money
and training to establish these sites in Afghanistan and Pakistan, they had
encouraged these groups to fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan from early
1977 (Huband, 1999). “Support for the
Afghan Mujahideen was a key element in this strategy, coinciding with the U.S.
determination to actively confront the Soviet forces through surrogates. American and Saudi financial assistance…where
channeled through Pakistani Intelligence…where the Afghan parties had their
headquarters in exile (Huband, 2000, 9).”
Second, the indictment charges that the defendants “engaged in financial
and business transactions on behalf of al Qaeda” that provided money to
purchase military equipment and explosives (Indictment). During 1980 to 1985, the United States
provided in excess of $250 million dollars in aid to the Mujahideen in
“Operation Cyclone (Huband, 1999).” This
figure reached over $1 billion dollars from 1986 to the Soviet’s withdrawal in
1989 (Huband, 1999). “The United States
also began supplying the Mujahideen with shoulder-held, laser-guided Stinger
missiles (Huband, 2000, 10).” The
Mujahideen would not have been successful without the support of both the
United States and Saudi Arabia. Saudi
Arabia matched dollar for dollar during this time and encouraged men, including
bin Laden, to participate in the war against the Soviets (Huband, 1999). This created a “social movement” that the
United States decided that it was no longer convenient to be part of (Huband,
1999).
The entire indictment follows the same theme, and although the four
defendants that have been convicted did participate in the bombings of the
Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, it is my assessment that the “conspiracy
theory” presented with regards to bin Laden and his associates is just that, a
conspiracy theory, crafted in the context that puts the American public at ease
that the “evil” terrorists will be punished.
In Chapter 2, I highlighted the polling data in regards to whether or
not American’s feel that during their lifetime they will ever be a target of
terrorism, and over 70% were not worried about it (Roper Poll). The American general public attitude can also
be found in the United States foreign policy towards the Middle East as well.
An example of this is found in the “imbalances in favor of Israel” over
the Palestinians, both in the policies of the United States and its influence
over resolutions in the Security Council (Huband, 1999). As highlighted by William Applemen Williams,
the policy towards the Middle East region, is one grounded in an economic
double standard and results in them “feeling that they are being harmed rather
than helped (Williams, 1972, 15). This
type of policy has since continued, and is a “feigned equanimity” in that the
US policies towards Israel are less imposing, compared to the policies towards
the Palestinians (Huband, 2000.) Israel
is authorized under Resolution 242, in the name of peace, any means necessary,
including nuclear weapons, to instill peace and security in the region (Huband,
1999). American policy makers have a
clear agenda with their policies in the region and are exemplified in this
resolution to allow Israel, which most Americans and policy makers consider to
be more like them.
Another example of this double standard is the economic sanctions
imposed by the United Nations, at the request of the United States, against
Iraq. The success of these sanctions
against the Iraqi government can best be described in their child mortality rates,
which has risen from “3.7 to 12 per cent” since pre-Gulf War (Huband, 2000,
167). Apparently, the sanctions have
only had an effect on the population and not the Saddam Hussein, or the
government of Iraq. In Huband’s book,
Edward Said is quoted as saying:
It would be a mistake, I think, to reduce what is
happening between Iraq and the United States simply to an assertion of Arab
will and sovereignty versus American imperialism, which undoubtedly plays a
central role in all this. However
misguided Saddam Hussein’s cleverness is not that he is splitting America from
its allies, but that he is exploiting the astonishing clumsiness and failures
of U.S. foreign policy (Huband, 2000, 171).
International
opinion does not support the United States foreign policy in either of these
cases, and was denounced by “Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Oman during
an Arab league meeting in January 1999 (Huband, 2000, 178).” The United States policy makers inability to
recognize that they are not objective when it comes to the policies in the
Middle East through the “formulation of their goals” is adding fuel to the fire
for Islamic Resurgence Movements, and bin Laden.
Conclusion
The importance of understanding both the
structural and socio-psychological conditions of conflict formulates the bases
and emergence of bin Laden and his movement, as well as the United States. The conflict between the United States and
bin Laden is centered on religion, and the cognitive maps of each individual
and the group as a whole. What we have
is a fundamental ideological difference in the goals of each group, and neither
is willing to change their position. One
is based on the individual, which violates the principles of the other, which
is opposed to individual needs at the expense of the group (Juergensmeyer,
1993). These ideological differences
will be hard to overcome and are “deep and abiding” (Juergensmeyer, 197). In this case, both sides are unwilling to
accept the other’s beliefs, and are extremely intolerant of each other, which
has resulted in violence. In the case of
bin Laden, he is attempting to create a system of politics and religion that
works for people that share his views.
They are creating
something new: a synthesis between religion and the secular state, a merger
between cultural identity and legitimacy of old religiously sanctioned
monarchies and the democratic spirit and organizational unity of modern
industrial society. This combination can
be incendiary, for it blends the absolution of religion with the potency of
modern politics. Yet it may also be
necessary, for without the legitimacy conferred by religion, the democratic
process does not seem to work in some parts of the world. In these places, it may be necessary for the
essential elements of democracy to be conveyed in the vessels of new religious
states (Juergensmeyer, 1993, 202).
Likewise, in the case of the United States, it is
attempting to hold onto its secular form of governance. There in lies the root of the problem.
Whether or not bin Laden is
ultimately responsible for the bombings of OPSANG, Khobar Towers, the US
Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, or the attack on the U.S.S Cole, is not the
source of his activities or those Islamists associated with him. Understanding this conflict in the context in
which it is founded is the dimension in which both parties must come to terms
with in order to bring this conflict to the de-escalation phase. These two—very different—cultures and
ideologies are bound to be conflictual.
Just as it is the responsibility of the US and its policy makers to
understand bin Laden and his political and cultural requirements, it is also
bin Laden’s responsibility to understand the US and Saudi Arabia’s position in
world affairs. Without this
understanding, the conflict will continue in the next phase that Kriesberg
identifies as the “escalation” phase (Kriesberg, 1998). The “escalation” phase is exactly where we
find this conflict in and will for some time until the two parties find common
ground to resolve their differences.
Chapter 4: Escalation
of the Conflict
The key to understanding and defining the “escalation” phase of conflict
is simple, if you have violence, then you are in “escalation” (Kriesberg,
1998). The measurement then becomes
two-fold: scope and severity (Kriesberg, 1998).
“Scope” is the adversaries’ attitudes towards one another, and can be
measured by hostility and hatred (Kriesberg, 1998). It is increased participation by the members
associated with the group. The strength
of the scope can be measured in the number of those participating or
associating with the entire movement such as those attracted to the “Islamic
Resurgence movement” and not just bin Laden.
It is clear that in the case of bin Laden and this conflict, that he is
not alone and that a number of other parties and groups are involved. Take for instance the kidnapping of twenty
tourists in the Philippines in May 2001, by members of an “Islamic Resistance
Movement” in the Philippines, a rebel group with “alleged” ties with bin Laden
(ABC News Website). Yet, the very nature
of the action shows that more and more people are attracted to bin Laden’s
ideology, and the number of conflicting issues is expanding (Kriesberg, 1998). Bin Laden’s increased public statements are
more acrimonious each time and in turn, the United States responds by
increasing the reward, and increasing the number of people wanted in connection
with bin Laden, who may or may not really have an active association with bin
Laden.
There are several structural factors that are clearly identifiable in
the escalation phase of this conflict which include political and economic
sanctions. These factors have resulted
in the United States Judicial Branch’s indictment of bin Laden and his
associates in the Second District Federal Court in New York for the two embassy
bombings in Africa, and the recent indictment of fourteen individuals in United
States Eastern District Court for the Khobar Tower’s bombing (FBI
Website). Another factor in the
escalation phase is the United States Ambassador to the United Nations has
pushed the United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions against Sudan
and Afghanistan in hopes that this will induce the governments to turn bin
Laden over to the United States (Huband, 1999).
However, this type of continued pressure only leads to reactions by bin
Laden’s movement to take on more severe and frequent violent activities and
renewed sense in their cause. I will
analyze both bin Laden and the United States action in the escalation phase.
Bin Laden
The “phenomenon” of bin Laden, his
movement and the United State’s response indicate that these two groups are
clearly in the escalation phase of Kriesberg’s conflict model. Each time bin Laden issues a fatwa or edict,
fellow Muslims around the world are motivated to take action. Although bin Laden may not be directly
involved in the action, his ideology affects those who are experiencing similar
relative deprivation in their current situation. Bin Laden and his followers are motivated by
their interpretation of the Koran. Right
or wrong, their interpretation leads them to take action that has manifested
itself in violent action against the United States, and other countries
(Kriesberg, 1998).
Bin Laden clearly wants the United States
out of Saudi Arabia, and the return of the mosque in Jerusalem. Until the
United States and Israel adhere to this request bin Laden will continue to
engage in behavior to encourage them to listen to his demands. This is in direct conflict to what the United
States and Israel believes is in their best interest. The United States refuses to discuss these
issues with bin Laden because they do not recognize him as a leader of any
nation and United States public policy demands that we will not “negotiate”
with any known or identified terrorist (Quoted in United States State
Department). In addition to bin Laden’s
grievance with the United States, Saudi Arabia is the target of bin Laden’s
conflict as well, and he believes that the King has “mismanaged the country,
and turned the people against Islam and Shari’ a law and has called for a
return to Islam (Frontline, 2000).” The
Saudi government responded by denouncing his citizenship and freezing his
assets (Frontline, 2000).
In a recent interview with Time Magazine
immediately after the United States bombed Iraq in February 2001, bin Laden
broke his silence that had been requested by the government in
Afghanistan. Again, he called for
“jihad” against the United States and Israel in order to liberate the holy
sites and rid the Arabian peninsula of the “Crusader forces.” A new message has appeared in his interview:
Winds of change
have blown in order to lift the injustice to which the world is subjected by
America and its supporters and the Jews who are collaborating with them. Look at what is happening these days in
Indonesia, where Suharto, a despot who ruled for 30 years was overthrown. During his reign, the media glorified him,
depicting him as the best president. The
media in Arab countries, regrettably, is doing the same these days. But things will change. The time will come, sooner than later, when
criminal despots who betrayed God and His Prophet, and betrayed their trust and
their nations, will face the same fate…Fighting is part of our religion and our
Shari’ a…Those who sympathize with the infidels—such as the PLO in Palestine,
or the so-called Palestinian Authority—have been trying for tens of years to
get back some of their rights. They laid
down arms and abandoned what is called violence and tried peaceful
bargaining. What did the Jews give them?
They did not give them even 1% of their rights..Osama Bin Laden is confident
that the Islamic nation will carry out its duty (Time Interview, 2001).
In
response to the conviction of the four individuals that were found guilty for
the Embassy bombings in Africa, bin Laden in a “recruitment video” taunts the
United States over the attack on the U.S.S Cole (CBS News). Although bin Laden does not take responsibility
for the attack he states “we thank God for granting us victory the day we
destroyed the Cole in the sea (CBS News).”
Bin Laden initially starts the video by reciting a poem: “and in Aden, they charged and destroyed that
fearsome people fear, and one that evokes horror when it docks and when it
sails (CBC News).”
So where does that leave us? Is the “phenomenon” of bin Laden, the
self-appointed leader of his newly formed International Islamic Front for Jihad
Against the Jews and Crusaders a group with a legitimate conflict? If so, what other constituent groups might
play a role in this conflict? Are the
leaders of those groups threatened by bin Laden and his activities? Are other legally recognized states at risk,
as was the case when the Ayatollah Khomeini[31]
motivated students, the ulama and others in Iran into a revolution that
ultimately led to the fall of the Shah in Iran (Munson, 1988). Is Osama bin Laden a dilettante? Or, are his activities and involvement of the
alleged terrorism that has been linked to him by the United States government
valid? Or is he a true leader, and in
reality, the mastermind behind all of the violence? It would appear that he is using the US and
its zealousness in his capture to capitalize on the momentum of the
people?
Bin Laden, is not alone in the escalation
phase of this conflict. Each time the
United States takes action, he responds by inciting fellow Muslims that believe
in his ideology and his cause. He may or
may not be the person that makes the ultimate decisions that lead to violent
activities by others associated in his political and religious ideology. The scope of his conflict reaches thousands,
if not millions of like-minded Muslims, and the severity of the conflict, has
caused hundreds to lose their lives.
Clearly, bin Laden’s escalation on his part can be measured according to
Kriesberg’s model. Next, I will examine
the United States actions in escalating this conflict.
United States
The response of the United States and
Saudi Arabia: to treat bin Laden as a criminal and avoiding any type of
diplomacy with him, further pushes the conflict into a continued
escalation. The United States reaction
has created a zero sum relationship with bin Laden. This lack of any form of communication
between the United States and bin Laden has created a situation in which both
parties have nothing to lose and everything to gain by continuing their fight
with each another (Kriesberg, 1998).
In a special report issued by Rand, Bruce
Hoffman describes the current policy of the United States towards terrorism as
a strategy of economic and military sanctions.
He concludes that the policy has not prevented attacks from
occurring. He goes further by pointing
out that the United States might not need larger budgets and more resources
dedicated to the prevention of terrorism, but a more coherent, clear-cut, well
thought out policy that has an appreciation of the threat and of those behind
the activities (Rand Website). Hoffman,
like Kriesberg, feels that perhaps taking military action, or indicting terrorists
have the opposite effect on the activities of the terrorist, in fact, “as
satisfying or cathartic as retaliating against terrorism may be, it can have
the opposite effect: provoking an
escalation rather than curtailing terrorist attacks (Rand).” Hoffman highlights this with the example of
the effectiveness of using military air strikes against Libya in the early
80’s, and concludes that it was probably the catalysis that provoked the Pan Am
103 attack a few years later (Rand).
Hoffman concludes that the “long reliance
on the use of military force and economic sanctions to counter terrorism”,
might be effective against “state” terrorism, but has little effect on
terrorists such as bin Laden as they are not reliant on a state for any
support, in fact, can move from country to country with minimal effort. In addition, they normally have the support
of the community in which they reside, which is the case for bin Laden, and the
more defiant he is with regards to the United States, the added martyr status, additional
followers and attention worldwide he gains.
There is a thin
line between prudence and panic. A
prerequisite to ensuring that the U.S. resources are focused where they can
have the most effect is a sober and empirical understanding of the terrorist
threat, coupled with comprehensive and coherent strategy (Rand).
In
response to the guilty verdict issued in Federal District Court on the 29 May,
2001 in the case against those responsible for the Embassy bombings in Africa,
the State Department issued a warning to all American’s abroad to take
precautions against a perceived threat in response to the verdict. The four defendants were found guilty on all
302 counts, and the maximum sentence could bring the death penalty for the
defendants. And, to add fuel to the
fire, the United States Eastern District Court of Virginia has indicted
fourteen individuals, thirteen Saudis and one Lebanese, on twenty-six counts to
include murder, for the Khobar Towers incident (FBI Website). Although bin Laden was not part of the
indictment, he is still believed to be the mastermind behind the attack. In anticipation of the response by the
Islamic community at large and the five year anniversary of the Khobar Towers
bombing, the United States has ordered all of its Navy military ships to sea
that are normally based in the Gulf region.
In addition, all ground forces have been put on a higher state of alert
(ABC News). The United States must
protect its citizens, to include military personnel. However, when it uses tactics that are
perceived as increasingly hostile, to bring about change, often this results in
further escalation.
The
United States political policies have caused this conflict to escalate
further. The rise and sheer magnitude of
individuals involved in “Islamic Resurgence Movements” can be empirically
measured in response to the context of policies, activities and sanctions
imposed on behalf of the United States towards bin Laden, and those associated
with his movement. By continuing to draw
media attention, demonizing bin Laden and others, promoting military responses
as non-retaliatory in nature, and economic sanctions in the International
Community, increase the very “scope and severity” of this conflict.
Conclusion
It is my assessment that neither the US
or bin Laden has responded appropriately.
What has been the result of the response of both the US and SA to bin
Laden’s activities? Each time a terrorist activity occurs, the
United States responds with military and economic sanctions, and as Hoffman has
concluded have not been effective, in fact, have increased the “scope” and
“severity” of the conflict to become much more intense and
“long-enduring.” It is my analysis that
this conflict will continue in the escalation phase for some time, unless
measures are taken by the US and SA to address bin Laden’s concern and his call
to arms of the Muslim world. Listening
to bin Laden’s concerns does not mean that the US must agree with the movement
or activities or even make any type of concessions. Nonetheless, sitting down and discussing each
side’s position, at this point, could do no greater harm than is already being
accomplished by continuing to escalate this conflict.
Bin Laden’s goal of removing the United
States forces from Saudi Arabia is well stated.
Nonetheless, I am not sure if moving troops out of SA is the right
answer, but since neither the United States nor Saudi Arabia has an open dialog
with bin Laden, bringing this conflict to the de-escalation phase is not
likely. Avoidance of the subject or of
bin Laden continues the escalation and his movement. Each time the United States imposes a
sanction, or takes military action against a Muslim government or group, bin
Laden issues a “fatwa.” These statements
have encouraged other Islamists to take action against the United States, and
whether or not there is a clear hierarchy and bin Laden is the supreme leader
or not is questionable. Nonetheless, one
thing remains the same, violence is the outcome, and as long as there remains a
difference in ideology and the method for political change, there will be a
continued campaign of bloodshed, which will target US installations and
citizens abroad, and perhaps on American soil.
Is the present approach the correct one?
Chapter 5:
Conclusions
There is a clear connection that Osama bin Laden has declared war with
the United States and Saudi Arabia. From
the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York to the latest bombing of the
U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, and numerous foiled attempts of violence, bin Laden’s
activities, either directly or indirectly linked, have accounted for several
hundred military and civilian people to lose their lives. The structural conditions placed on bin
Laden; i.e. the loss of his family income, loss of his citizenship, and in
conjunction with those social factors identified by Taylor, anomie and
alienation, have caused bin Laden to react in an extremely logical manner in
his actions, activities and statements.
Although his actions are ideologically different from the United States
approach, are they? In that, the United
States has taken military action by targeting sites in Afghanistan and Sudan,
which in reality, is no different than bin Laden taking military action against
legitimate US targets. The US and SA
have added fuel to the fire by targeting him, labeling him as a criminal, and
attempting to assassinate bin Laden and his followers. In the eyes of many Muslims around the world
his defiance to the United States, is their call to arms.
As
was the case in Iran, the overwhelming feeling of the Iranian people against
the Shah’s indignation and abuse[32]
of Islam created a condition where a charismatic leader could mobilize the
masses in search of a government created in the context that they felt
comfortable, religion (Rinehart, 1997).
Although not specifically addressed in this paper, there is evidence to
support the statement that the majority of the youth and religious clerics
(some of them in prison) in Saudi Arabia, are experiencing alienation and
relative deprivation due to the economic and political situation in Saudi
Arabia. They are not alone; from Algeria to Indonesia the rising youth
population has also become disenfranchised and alienated with their current
economic and political situation (Huntington, 1996). Bin Laden’s fatwa and edicts have mobilized
these groups, and even mainstream religious institutions are joining the
ranks. This “phenomenon” is more than
one man carrying out random acts of violence.
It is the rise of “Islamic Resurgence movements”, and as long as many
people, especially the youths of these countries, feel anomie and alienation,
they will continue to be attracted to these types of movements and the
activities of these movements, even if it includes violence.
It is my conclusion that the US must
understand the impact of religion, specifically Islam, and recognize that many
countries, and nations whose population is predominately Muslim are searching
for their identity and a method of governance that fits into the role of
Islam. Islam is not just a religion; it
is a way of life. My first trip to the
Middle East was made in 1990 during the US involvement in the Gulf War. My primary mission was to process enemy
prisoners of war. As our unit prepared to
depart the US and head for Saudi Arabia, we were given cultural and religious
briefings on the people that we would soon be encountering. For the first time I learned of the cultural
differences between the Saudis, Iraqis and Kuwaitis, and despite the majority
being from the Arabian Peninsula, and of the Islamic faith, they were not all
the same religion, culture or nation; nonetheless, the one common item the
majority shared was their belief in God, the Prophet Mohammed, the message he
delivered on behalf of God and the Sha’ria.
An enlightening moment I had in the Gulf was my experience in Riyadh, in
the center market place. I can remember
the first time I heard what is known as a “call to prayer” by one of the
religious men, umman, and as he was singing Arabic over the loud speaker at the
nearby mosque, the majority of the men from the shops[33],
closed their doors and headed towards the mosque. A sign was put in their door, “back in twenty
minutes, closed for prayer,” in English and Arabic. Not only did this happen once a day, it
happened five times a day, and all five times the same shop-keeper would leave
to go to pray. My initial thought
centered on the security of the store itself, as many did not lock their doors.
They truly believed that no one would bother their shop for two reasons, first,
we should all be at prayer call, second, stealing is punishable by the Koran
and would result in your right hand being chopped off under the Sha'ria law,
motivation enough to leave those things that did not belong to you alone. My next emotion was a bit more complex, and
centered on the notion of how so many people could be driven by the
“phenomenon” of religion, that I have never witnessed or experienced living in
the US or in Europe. What could be so
empowering that would drive people from their day-to-day activities and lead
them to prayer?
During my time in the Gulf in 1991
and 1999, I have come to realize the importance of religion, family, and
culture, in that order, is to the people of the Middle East. A concept that often is underestimated in
importance when foreign policy is developed.
“In places like the United States and Europe, where secular nationalism,
rather than religion, has become the dominant paradigm in society, religion is
shunted to the periphery (Juergensmeyer, 1993).” These experiences have opened my eyes on the
importance of religion and nationalism in rest of the world, and from living
there nearly two years, I have a unique understanding of the Arab identity, how
he thinks and feels, what is important and why religion is the center of their
being. There is an Arabic expression
that I learned during my stay in the Gulf, paraphrasing it as its origins are
unknown but it centers on “first God and my family, then my clan, then my
nation, then the Gulf, then the Arab states, then the rest of the non-Arabic
Muslim world, and then those of the Holy Book[34].” Belief in God is paramount as the first five
groups listed are expected to be Islamic.
For
most Americans, this understanding is why we respond to “Islamic Resurgence”
naively. One would hope after the
Iranian Revolution that we could learn to tolerate those that are different
from the West, but it is my opinion based on the United States’ response to the
continued situation with Iran, the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq, Iraq and the
Palestinian/Israeli situation, that the lesson has not yet been learned. One
would think that through this knowledge and the lessons they have brought, the
United States would develop its foreign policy with a bit more cultural,
religious and political sensitivity.
At
the end of the day, the United States must protect its own citizens, interests
and borders. Yet, this could be costly if the rest of the Islamic countries,
such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Algeria, Indonesia, and the Philippines find
themselves in an Islamic revolution and continued conflict that manifest itself
in violent means, and terrorist activities.
These actions will result in a religious upheaval of the current
governmental systems that might have been prevented if the US had attempted to
resolve the issues identified by bin Laden early in the escalation phase. How many more innocent lives have to be lost
before the US realizes that their action might only be furthering the fight? Perhaps Samuel Huntington is correct, that
the next conflict will be a “clash of civilizations.” Are we ready?
It
seems as if we have painted a picture of bin Laden in the vernacular that fits
US foreign policy. Which as Mr. Richard
Cheney stated on CBS’s “Face the Nation” on national TV on 20 May 2001; “often
US politicians create foreign policy on conspiracy theories notions, and not on
facts or what is in the best interest of the United States (Personal Notes from
CBS interview.)” He went further by
indicating that often foreign policy is created to satisfy what the populace of
the United States wants to hear, not what is necessary best or rational. It appears that this is the current approach
of the policy makers and the judicial branch of the US, and yet, bin Laden
remains in the mountains of Afghanistan, protected by the people that believe
in his espoused ideology, and are not interested in a five million dollar
reward leading to his arrest or capture.
Perhaps it is time to change tactics.
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