The argument:

1. If an agent A loves some person or thing x well, then A is disposed to pay special attention to x.
2. If A pays special attention to x, then A will be in a better epistemic position with regards to x.
3. Therefore, if A loves x well, then A will be in a better epistemic position with regards to x.

Premise 2 is not meant to capture anything special, it is meant to capture the simple idea that if I pay attention to something that you don't, I am in a better epistemic position with regards to that thing than you are.

- An epistemic position is a relation between an agent capable of knowledge and a potential object of knowledge.
  - One idea: for agent A1 to be in a better epistemic position with regards to x than A2, A1 must be related to x differently than A2 in such a way that A1 will be able to produce more reliable beliefs about x than A2.
  - I think I should explicitly just “know more about x” rather than commit myself to reliabilism.

- Motivating case for this idea: Bouncer at the Bar (p.4), Multiple uses of the term (thought left undefined) in Contextualism literature.
  - Anyone have recommendations on this?

In premise 1, love is meant to provide the disposition to pay this type of attention to the beloved that the job provides to the bouncer in my example.

- Thus, to defend Premise 1 I must do two things:
  - Goal 1: Show that loving something provides a disposition to pay attention to that thing and
  - Goal 2: Show that the attention paid isn't distorted by the bias we have toward the object of love to such an extent that our epistemic position is made worse with regards to the thing we love

Love’s Way of Seeing (Goal 1)

- Murdoch has this idea that love changes the way we see things.
Mother-in-law example (p.6)

Case supports the idea that love includes paying attention (and that it helps you gain more accurate beliefs).

- Jollimore has explicitly the view that love is a way of seeing.
- Admits of distortion however (p.7-8)
- Intuition I have: It would strike me as utterly bewildering that someone could claim to love someone and not at least have the disposition to pay attention to them and this sentiment is echoed in this passage from Jollimore (p.8).

Goal 2: Does love hurt or help or epistemic position?

- Jollimore takes a middle position (p.9)
- However, ultimately he illustrates well how love can be for the better epistemically.
- Paper reading example (p.9).
  - Loving Well (9-10).

Objections: Stroud and Keller

- The most serious objection is that these demands (i.e. norms) of friendship are at odds fundamentally with our epistemic norms. (p.9-10)
- Motivating Cases:
  - Rebeca and Eric (11-12)
  - Sam (12-13)

There objection doesn’t seem to apply to other types of love (13-15)

- Love of things.
- Familial
- Romantic
- At this stage I only have some motivating intuitions for how this fails, I think I need some good arguments. Would love feedback.

Stroud (different paper) offers a few different reason why we are biased in friendship in particular: 5 lines of argument (p. 16-22)

- Kalwall or Myself have a response to each.