Spring 2019 |
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April 19, 2019 | |
Presenter: Genessa Eddy Title: "Conventionality of Math." |
Abstract: The numbers zero through nine are the basic symbols of our number system. You can make an infinite amount of unique numbers by just combining these ten symbols in different ways. Therefore, a finite amount of symbols can make up an infinite amount of complex numbers in our number system.
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April 12, 2019 | |
Presenter: Adam Thompson |
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March 29, 2019 | |
Presenter: Jeffrey Schade Title: "The Simplicity of the One." |
Abstract: The paper argues that we should take seriously Neo-Platonist assumptions such as the ontological primacy of mindful consciousness over matter, and the "Principle of Simplicity", which states that that which is simplest is that which is most perfect. This principle is consistent in many ways with Proclan metaphysics; however, the Proclan Rule creates problems for the Principle of Simplicity. These problems might be resolved by a conception of causation as "grounding by subsumption", as well as by making a distinction between perfect and imperfect on the one hand, and better and worse on the other. The paper then argues that Proclan metaphysics is consistent with an immaterial or non-corporeal conception of matter upon which form is imposed by Intellect, or Consciousness. |
March 29, 2019 | |
Presenter: Kevin Patton |
Abstract: Georgi Gardiner has argued that all modal conditions on knowledge ultimately get 'swamped' -- that is, they fail to provide any additional value to what knowledge is beyond what is already contributed by mere true belief. She offers three brief arguments in support of this thesis. Despite the force of her arguments, I argue that her thesis is too broad. I motivate this by attempting to explore a belief that is false, but almost true (i.e. the basis for the false belief was almost producing a true belief). These kinds of beliefs, though false, seem to be quite valuable. Why? Because the process that formed them almost got us to the truth. But wait, Gardiner will exclaim, that just proves that those modal conditions, even ones that almost provide true beliefs, are only valuable insofar as we care about truth! While it is true that they may be instrumental to truth, I claim that they are still quite valuable. There are a number of ways to motivate this position. Here is one example.
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March 1, 2019 | |
Presenter: Zach Wrublewski |
Abstract: Many philosophers are skeptical of the claim that the "ought" of rationality is normative in the sense that the requirements involved are necessarily accompanied by reasons to conform to them. Some believe that requirements of rationality are no more normative than the requirements of chess or the requirements of etiquette. Others, such as John Broome, accept that rationality is normative, but also hold that there are no good arguments to establish this conclusion. In The Normativity of Rationality, Benjamin Kiesewetter takes on the ambitious project of defending the normativity of rational requirements with an interesting, novel solution to the so-called "normativity problem." In short, Kiesewetter argues for a view that holds that reasons are evidence-relative facts, and that rational requirements are "non-structural" in the sense that they do not concern combinations of attitudes that an agent holds, but rather the reason(s) one has for (or against) holding particular attitudes. Crucially, Kiesewetter's project depends on the necessary link between the requirements of rationality and one's reasons, such that one always has a reason to do what rationality requires of her. To make this connection, Kiesewetter argues for a "backup view" of reasons.
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February 22, 2019 | |
Presenter: Andrew Christmas
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February 15, 2019 | |
Presenter: Zack Garrett Title: "Precisifications" |
Abstract: Semantic nihilism is the position that sentences containing vague components like "Winston is bald" are not truth-apt. The theory has been thought to be, at best, too revisionary, and, at worst, self-undermining. Since natural language is riddled with vagueness, only a small portion of sentences will count as truth-apt. Even the sentences used to express semantic nihilism will not be truth-apt since they contain vague words like "vague." These objections appear to be devastating to semantic nihilism, but David Braun and Theodore Sider, as well as John MacFarlane, have recently attempted to rehabilitate the theory.
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February 8, 2019 | |
Presenter: Trevor Adams |
Abstract: In David Lewis's paper Logic for Equivocators Lewis gave an example of something he called "fragmentation". Lewis was attempting to describe what is going on when someone holds two contradictory beliefs simultaneously and how. In that work, Lewis gave an example of how he himself once had contradictory beliefs, saying "I used to think that Nassau Street ran roughly east-west; that the railroad nearby ran roughly north-south; and that the two were roughly parallel" (p. 436). The problem for Lewis was that the different fragments of this triple would come into use and guide his behavior at different times but that, "the whole system of beliefs never manifested itself at once" (p. 436). But, "once the fragmentation was healed, straightaway my beliefs changed" (p. 436). This example has now become the classic example of a phenomenon called fragmentation. What I want to do in this paper is give some clarity to the fragmentation discussion and also defend the fragmentation thesis from objections. First, I will propose one interpretation of belief fragmentation. Next, I will state and explain Aaron Norby's objections from his paper Against Fragmentation, by giving some evidence of fragmentation from cognitive science. Lastly, I will consider another objection to fragmentation Norby offers and by showing how fragmentation is in fact a substantive thesis about belief. |
February 1, 2019 | |
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The Graduate Student Research Colloquium will not be held. Instead, we will have the Spring 2019 Faculty and Graduate Student Colloquium. Joey Dante will present. |
January 25, 2019 | |
Presenter: Mark Selzer Title: "Importing Reasons from Other Worlds: the Latent Capacity Interpretation of the Explanatory Constraint." |
Abstract: This is a heavily revised version of a paper I presented last semester. I've modified it to provide a stronger intuitive appeal for my explanation of motivating reasons, and I've also added some features that protect my view against several objections. The revisions required me to develop my account in three important directions. The view is now committed (or further committed) to moral rationalism and diachronicity and globalism about reasons. For those who are interested, below is a copy of my abstract from last time. In his influential article, "Internal and External Reasons" (1979), Bernard Williams argues for the Explanatory Constraint: EC: The fact that p is a normative reason for A to Φ only if A can Φ because p. There is a problem with EC: if 'can' means that there is some possible world where A can Φ because p, then almost anything would count as a normative reason for A to Φ. Therefore, a plausible interpretation of EC must avoid such a 'bare possibility' interpretation of 'can'.
AC: The fact that p is a normative reason for A to Φ only if A has an actual present capacity to Φ because p. First, I argue that AC is an unsatisfactory interpretation of EC because it conflicts with the normative reasons that the akratic or the person with a poorly developed character has. Second, to address these shortcomings, I argue for the Latent Capacity interpretation of 'can' in EC: LC: The fact that p is a normative reason for A to Φ only if A has a latent capacity to Φ because p. LC is an account that is not trivialized by a bare possibility interpretation of EC—yet, contra AC, LC remains in harmony with the normative reasons the akratic or the person with a poorly developed character has. |
January 18, 2019 | |
Presenter: Adam Thompson Title: "On Balance and Teaching Philosophy" |
Abstract: As with many things that lend meaning, support, and significance, balance in nearly any context where it is called for is difficult to realize let alone recognize or understand. This essay focuses on these difficulties as they pertain to the design and implementation in philosophy courses. It offers a strategy for finding the right distribution of content coverage and skill development. The strategy begins with the observation that developing an evaluative grasp of philosophical material is to understand a complex of, among other things, subtle distinctions, analyses, relations of support, and normative implicature as well as interrogative statements and declarative ones. Further, it is to understand elements like those through a dialogical narrative wrapped in difficult prose.
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