Conservation and Subsistence in Small-Scale Societies

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ABSTRACT
Some have championed the view that small-scale societies are conservers or even creators of biodiversity. Others have argued that human populations have always modified their environments, often in ways that enhance short-term gains at the expense of environmental stability and biodiversity conservation. Recent ethnographic studies as well as theory from several disciplines allow a less polarized assessment. We review this body of data and theory, and assess various predictions regarding sustainable environmental utilization. The meaning of the term "conservation" is itself controversial; we propose that to qualify as conservation, any action or practice must both prevent or mitigate resource overharvesting or environmental damage, and be designed to do so. The conditions under which conservation will be adaptive are stringent, involving temporal discounting, economic demand, information feedback, and collective action. Theory thus predicts, and evidence suggests, that voluntary conservation is rare. However, sustainable use and management of resources and habitats by small-scale societies is widespread, and may often indirectly result in biodiversity preservation or even enhancement via creation of habitat mosaics.

INTRODUCTION
Beginning several decades ago, the idea that indigenous peoples and other small-scale societies were exemplary conservationists gained widespread currency in popular media as well as academic circles. This indigenous conservationism has often been attributed to a spiritual respect for, and a practical understanding of, the natural world (e.g., Vecsey 1980, Martinez 1996, Berkes 1999). Evidence offered in support of this characterization includes culturally expressed conservation ethics, animistic religious beliefs that conceptualize other species as social beings, the high levels of biodiversity found in the homelands of these peoples, and the impressive environmental knowledge they possess (Nelson 1982, Durning 1992, Posey 1992, Gadgil et al. 1993, Callicott 1994, Alcorn 1996, Bodley 1996).

While this view remains widely accepted, it is increasingly questioned in both popular (e.g., Diamond 1992, Redford 1991) and scholarly literatures. Much of the evidence cited by these critics is archaeological (Stahl 1996, Redman 1999) or ethnohistoric (Kay 1994, Krech 1999), but some is based on contemporary field studies by ethnographers or biologists (e.g., Stearman 1994, Alvard 1998b, FitzGibbon 1998). Specific examples of non-conserving behavior by small-scale societies include anthropogenic faunal extinctions and habitat degradation, as well as patterns of subsistence behavior that seem to conform to economic optimization rather than to resource or habitat conservation. In addition, some anthropologists have questioned the causal efficacy (Hames 1987, Low 1996), or even the indigenous existence (Bulmer 1982, Brightman 1987, Carrier 1987, Krech 1999), of conservation ethics.

This debate has at times become politically charged, since those working on behalf of indigenous rights sometimes view critiques of indigenous conservation as attacks on their efforts to defend local resource control by indigenous groups (Alcorn 1995, Posey 1998,
Sponsel 1992). Critics sometimes respond by defending indigenous land rights, while arguing that those rights will ultimately be undercut by naive or mistaken views on indigenous conservation (Hames 1991, Stearman 1994, Vickers 1994, Hill 1996). For these and other reasons, the literature on conservation in small-scale societies is often polarized into dichotomous viewpoints, with such peoples portrayed either as "guardians of the earth" (Durning 1992) living in harmony with pristine environments until an outside destructive force (agriculture, industrialization, capitalism) invades this eden, or as "primitive polluters" (Rambo 1985) with a record of environmental destruction stretching back millennia to the "Pleistocene overkill" (Martin 1973) with which the first peoples of America (and recently first Australia) are sometimes charged.

With the accumulation of considerable empirical evidence on the topic, plus the development of a coherent body of theory that can guide the collection and analysis of such evidence, the opportunity now exists to present a more balanced and dispassionate evaluation of indigenous conservation, moving beyond pejorative caricatures such as "the ecologically noble savage" (Redford 1991). In this spirit, Krech (1999) and Redman (1999) have recently reviewed the archaeological and historic/ethnohistoric evidence. Here we concentrate on contemporary field studies, viewed in light of relevant theory from a number of disciplines.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We begin with an outline of the ecological and evolutionary context in which environmental relations of small-scale societies take place, which include evolved features favoring dispersal abilities and colonization of new habitats, and what some have called "ecological engineering." We then summarize theory concerning environmental utilization and conservation from a number of disciplines, emphasizing such issues as sustainability, temporal discounting, collective action, and common property resource management. These contextual and theoretical sections provide the foundation for a review of the arguments and ethnographic evidence bearing on conservation in small-scale societies.

THE ECOLOGICAL AND EVOLUTIONARY CONTEXT

While this review is concerned with ethnographic (as opposed to archaeological or ethnohistoric) instances of conservation (or lack thereof), it is instructive to place this phenomenon in a deeper historical/evolutionary perspective. It is equally important to look beyond our species to a broader ecological context, and to consider briefly how contemporary ecologists view issues of environmental change and perturbation.

Ecology Out of Equilibrium

For much of this century, the study of ecological communities and ecosystems was dominated by a set of concepts and theories emphasizing orderly succession to equilibrium (otherwise known as "climax" or "maturity") (Smith 1984, Winterhalder 1994). Beginning in the 1970s, this equilibrium-centered paradigm was increasingly questioned by ecologists impressed by the pervasiveness of dynamic processes involving perturbations, disturbance, unpredictability, complex non-linear interactions, and the influence of history (or initial conditions) (Pickett & White 1985, DeAngelis & Waterhouse 1987, Botkin 1990, Perry & Amaranthus 1997). At present, the non-equilibrium or dynamic paradigm is clearly ascendant in academic ecology circles, if not always in environmental management and social science (Scoones 1999).

This revised conception of nature has important implications for conservation biology, and for our view of humans in nature (Botkin 1990, Worster 1995). First, since it is now generally accepted that "species diversity is generally enhanced by disturbances that occur at intermediate levels of frequency and intensity" (Perry & Amaranthus 1997:33, but cf. Hubbell et al. 1999), it seems quite likely that anthropogenic disturbances at such intermediate levels (such as swidden cultivation at low population densities, or controlled burning to encourage herbaceous plant growth) can have biodiversity-enhancing effects.

Second, if ecological communities are always in flux, it is not very clear what particular state or set of states anyone should attempt to conserve. As the fire ecologist Stephen J. Pyne (1999:2) has recently argued,
What advocates typically want restored is "natural" fire, but the historic landscape that supplies their vision of what restoration should produce was itself the outcome of thousands of years of culturally set burning. The charge to restore commits us to a state of permanent irony. We will never decide to what point in the past we should restore the land—and can never, in any event, actually get back there.

In fact, there is a double irony here, since habitats seen as "natural" may in fact be only temporary states on a dynamic continuum, and the very places often celebrated as pristine nature -- rich grasslands, for example, or a forest dominated by large, well-spaced trees -- may be particularly dependent on a history of anthropogenic disturbance (Anderson 1990, Gomez-Pompa & Kaus 1992).

**Human Dispersal and Ecosystem Engineering**

The belief that indigenous peoples are unchanging, "frozen in time," living in the same spot since time immemorial, is widespread in popular culture. Anthropologists have long critiqued the notion that small-scale societies consist of people "without history" (Wolf 1982). But the extension of this understanding to a recognition that such peoples are shapers of *environmental* history has been slower to come. Such recognition is now developing rapidly, and changing our views of human ecology, adaptation, and conservation (e.g., Sponsel 1992, Crumley 1994, Kirch & Hunt 1997, Russell 1997, Balée 1998).

To be sure, many indigenous peoples have deep roots in particular locales, and virtually all have strong attachments to homelands. But this does not necessarily mean that they have continuously occupied a single spot on the planet and made it home for hundreds of generations. A case in point is provided by the first peoples of North America. An examination of the distribution of Native North American languages (a proxy for cultural ancestry) clearly shows that indigenous Americans engaged in extensive population movements that postdate the peopling of the Americas, but antedate the European invasion (Goddard 1996). Patterns such as these suggest that waves of dispersal or repeated immigration can lead to a patchwork of languages and cultural-ecological diversity. But there are also many episodes of replacement of one population (or at least lifeway) by another revealed in the archaeological and historical records. As one example, the contemporary Inuit inhabitants of arctic Canada and Greenland are renowned for their ingenious adaptation to a challenging environment of low biological productivity (Damas 1984). Yet their immediate ancestors, the Thule peoples, arrived in the region (from North Alaska) only some six to nine centuries before Europeans first entered it. And the Thule colonization replaced the Dorset culture which had occupied the North American arctic for roughly two millennia -- a culture that in turn had replaced the pre-Dorset paleoeskimos who first colonized the high arctic (McGhee 1984).

The available evidence indicates that everywhere on the planet, some version of this colonization/ replacement scenario has played itself out at least once, if not repeatedly. Indeed, this basic pattern -- waves of colonization spurred by technological and social innovations or environmental fluctuations, and consequent replacement of one lifeway by a competitively superior interloper -- is now accepted by most specialists in modern human origins as the charter story of our species (Klein 2000).

Although there is little consensus on its causes, a plausible explanation for the evolution of this colonizing strategy in our lineage pinpoints ecological instability as a root cause (Potts 1997). The period in which *Homo* emerged (the Pleistocene, lasting from approximately 1.7 million to 10,000 years ago) was marked by greatest climatic instability of the last 65 million years, involving massive changes in sea-level, ice movements, climatic fluctuations, and resultant habitat displacements (e.g., growth and shrinkage of forests) (review in Potts 1997). Our hominid ancestors seem to have responded to such large-scale environmental instability by evolving capabilities that enhanced their ability to survive and reproduce under an increasingly wide variety of environmental conditions.
Put another way, one might say that our species has specialized in being an ecological generalist, consuming an amazing variety of foods, inhabiting an unprecedented range of habitats and climates, and developing a wide range of very flexible and opportunistic niches (Gamble 1994). We have developed these abilities not because they are intrinsically adaptive -- an anthropocentric view that leaves the evolution and persistence of myriad relatively specialized and unchanging species mysterious -- but because in our particular ecological context they conferred evolutionary advantage. In sum, ecological instability is the crucible from which our species emerged, and has been the matrix in which we have thrived on the whole.

**Ecological engineering** The secret of our species' readiness to colonize diverse habitats lies in the human ability to repeatedly and substantially alter our means of subsistence, in many cases literally remaking our habitats in the process. Even prior to agriculture, humans began altering ecosystems (e.g., through periodic burning) so as to capture a larger proportion of total biotic energy. This gambit has been so successful that it has produced astounding growth in the human population, and an unprecedented degree of ecological dominance. As an example of the latter, recent analyses estimate that between 40% and 50% of the total food energy flowing through the biosphere is channeled into human sustenance or other consumptive uses (Vitousek et al. 1997).

Although there are several means by which humans achieve ecological dominance, one involves diverse practices that have in common the physical reshaping of earthforms, waterways, plant and animal communities, and other aspects of ecological structure and function. Following the terminology of Jones et al. (1994), we refer to this suite of practices as *ecosystem engineering* a term used to describe the creation and maintenance of habitats by organisms (ibid.). Thus, beavers engineer wetlands, species of coral engineer atolls, and earthworms engineer aerated soils; note that there is no necessary implication that the effects of engineering be intended or designed per se, though clearly some aspects may be. Human ecosystem engineering on a significant scale has existed at least since our ancestors developed control of fire. The work of anthropologists, geographers, historians, and ecologists is increasingly revealing the extent to which small-scale societies, including pre-agricultural peoples, engage in habitat modification (Day 1953, Stewart 1956, Lewis 1982, Cronon 1983, Denevan 1992, Burney 1995, Fairhead & Leach 1996, Little 1996, Nabhan 1995, Russell 1997). The methods used in "domesticating" environments (Blackburn & Anderson 1993) range from intentional burning (e.g., to increase growth of plants used by people or as browse for deer and other game) to sowing, pruning, and even irrigation of wild food plants, and from construction of fish weirs and hunting blinds to monumental earthen mounds (e.g., Steward 1933, Lewis 1982, Roosevelt 1995, Anderson 1996, Pyne 1998). With the coming of agriculture, ecosystem engineering certainly added new techniques, including clearing of forested areas to make gardens, fields, and pastures; building irrigation systems, sometimes on a massive scale; terracing mountainsides (Evans & Winterhalder 2000); fertilizing, plowing, and various other forms of soil engineering; and of course the creation of new life forms via plant and animal breeding (review in Redman 1999).

In engineering ecosystems, especially agricultural ones, humans have often been primary agents of biological disturbance (Chapin et al. 1997, Noble & Dirzo 1997). As discussed above, evidence suggests that environmental perturbations of moderate intensity and frequency can often enhance biodiversity (Petrakis et al. 1989, Perry & Amaranthus 1997). In forest and savannah environments in particular, a history of anthropogenic disturbance (such as clearing of small patches of forest, low-intensity burning, soil modification, and moderate levels of predation) might have this effect. For example, a study of Mediterranean oak savannah woodlands (Pineda 1991) found that recurrent anthropogenic disturbance promoted spatial heterogeneity, and hence biodiversity, in this habitat. Similarly, Delcourt and Delcourt (1997) conclude that selective burning in southern Appalachia by Native Americans in pre-Columbian times created an "intermediate-scale disturbance regime that promoted a heterogeneous mosaic of different vegetation types" (1013), thus heightening the contrast across vegetational boundaries and increasing habitat (beta) diversity. Other well-
documented examples include the effects of pastoralist grazing and burning in East African savannah landscapes (Little 1996), the "forest islands" produced around villages in Guinea, West Africa (Fairhead & Leach 1996), the rich anthropogenic soils (terra preta do índio) produced by Amerindian swidden horticulturalists in Amazonia (Smith 1980, Hecht & Posey 1989, Balée 1993, McCann 1999), and the burning, pruning, and foraging by Miwok Indians which helped shape the mosaic habitat of Yosemite, crown jewel of American wilderness preservationists (Anderson 1993, Anderson & Nabhan 1991). While such moderate disturbances can be biodiversity-enhancing, introduction of periodic burning in areas where vegetation is not adapted to this disturbance may have more irreversible effects, including extinction of some plant species, and this has recently been suggested as the likely cause of a cascade of habitat changes and megafaunal extinctions during human colonization of Australia ca. 50,000 years ago (Miller et al. 1999). In any case, abundant evidence indicates that dense populations and intensive (particularly commercial) agricultural production tip the balance towards declining biodiversity (Chapin et al. 1997, Matson et al. 1997). In addition, intensification of agricultural production over the last several millennia has led to increasing human reliance on a few domesticated plant species (Matson et al. 1997). In many instances, this has led to further biodiversity reduction in agroecosystems, and concurrently to population growth and hence a positive feedback cycle: When this cycle of intensification and population growth has been gradual enough, the trajectory has been sustainable (Redman 1999:122ff). In cases of more rapid change (either demographic or environmental), there is sometimes a trade-off between production yield and sustainability (e.g., Humphries 1993). The resultant unstable dynamic in many regions is cause for current widespread concern (McMichael 1993, Cohen 1995, Swanson 1995, Redford & Mansour 1996). In sum, humans are colonizers, not homebodies; we are always pushing at the margins of our domain, expanding into new areas (even if occupied by other peoples) whenever changes in environment or mode of production allow. The characteristics supporting this colonizing strategy seem to have evolved in the context of very high levels of environmental instability during the Pleistocene. The strategy has been so successful that humans colonized virtually the entire terrestrial surface of the planet in a relatively short period, and now are reworking the biosphere on an unprecedented scale. Our success as a species is based on cultural innovation, competitive dispersal, and ecosystem engineering; but this success is now spelling doom for thousands, and perhaps millions, of more venerable but less adaptable species (Kerr & Currie 1995, Norgaard 1995, Reaka-Kudla et al. 1996, Vitousek et al. 1997). In this context, it becomes crucial to understand the forces that have shaped human-environment relations in small-scale societies, and in particular the conditions under which sustainable use and perhaps even deliberate conservation have been possible.

THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION

The primary role of theory in science is to guide the collection and evaluation of empirical knowledge. If our objective is to understand the existence and operation of environmental conservation, then a theory of this phenomenon should tell us the conditions under which it is likely to occur, the forms it is likely to take, and its environmental consequences. These theoretical predictions should be empirically testable, lest we become so enamored of our constructions that we fail to evaluate their actual explanatory power. In other words, an ideal theory would offer a coherent explanation for variation in the form and occurrence of environmental conservation that has been subject to rigorous empirical evaluation. We do not have such an ideal theory at present. However, some elements of it are beginning to take shape, often in parallel in diverse disciplines. We will outline here what we see as the most promising form of such a theory, synthesizing work done in microeconomics and decision theory, behavioral ecology, and political science.

What is "Conservation?"

To begin with, we need to agree on the meaning of the term conservation. As noted in the introduction, this is of more than semantic interest, since the ongoing and sometimes bitter
debate over the existence of indigenous conservation turns in part on different conceptions of what this term means. Many accounts of indigenous environmental relations implicitly or explicitly equate conservation with long-term coexistence of a people or culture with a suite of other species or an ecosystem. In other words, failure to overharvest or extirpate resident species, or to degrade habitat, are taken to be diagnostic of conservation. Sponsel et al. (1996:23) summarize this view succinctly when they take note of arguments that "many indigenes, like the Bora and Desana in Amazonia and the Mentawaians in Indonesia, are effective conservationists; their societies have used and managed the natural resources of their habitat in sustainable ways for centuries or even millennia."

But as many have pointed out, this view can be criticized for conflating conservation with sustainability (Hunn 1982, Bulmer 1982, Winterhalder 1983, Hames 1987, Alvard 1995, Smith 1983, 1995, Low 1996). In general, factors such as low human population density, low demand for a resource, or limited technology can be expected to contribute to many instances of sustainable, with any conservation being an incidental byproduct. To ascribe such sustainable use to conservation involves a causal misattribution, because one or more of the factors just mentioned is likely to be the actual cause(s), and labelling something "conservation" implies that it exists because it prevents the overexploitation or degradation that would otherwise occur. Such cases have been labelled "epiphenomenal conservation" (Hunn 1982), but might also be termed "coexistence" (for resident species) and "sustainable use" (for habitats).

With this issue in mind, Alvard (1995) proposed that practices must be "costly in the short term" to qualify as conservation. The essence of conservation, in this view, lies in restraining current resource harvests or land use (and thus lowering current benefits, which satisfies the cost criterion) in order to reap benefits in the future. However, the cost (or delayed benefit) criterion is not sufficient, since again it doesn't exclude other causes for a practice (Smith 1995). The costs due to harvest restraint might be borne in order to achieve goals other than conservation, such as allowing prey to congregate in large numbers (Ruttan 1998:48), or avoiding enemy attack (Hickerson 1965, Kay 1994). Neither does short-term cost appear necessary for conservation, since there might exist options that are no costlier than the alternatives, but are chosen because they yield conservation benefits (e.g., plowing in a contour fashion rather than downslope).

A second issue concerns effect: to qualify as conservation, a practice should have a measurable effect in limiting resource harvests or environmental degradation. The rationale for this criterion may seem self-evident, but is worth emphasizing because of the widespread tendency to cite the existence of beliefs about conservation, stewardship and reverence toward nature as evidence for effective conservation (Callicott 1994). The existence of such beliefs or ideologies is an interesting phenomenon worthy of ethnographic or philosophical investigation, but does not in itself constitute evidence for conservation practices or outcomes (Hames 1991). To be sure, ideology may be a proximate cause of conservation practices, and may be deployed in discourses surrounding environmental practices; our basic point is that if conservation refers to environmental actions, the effect of these actions should be demonstrated.

We conclude that to qualify as conservation, any action or practice should satisfy two criteria: it should (1) prevent or mitigate resource depletion, species extirpation, or habitat degradation, and (2) be designed to do so (Smith 1995, Alvard 1998a, Ruttan & Borgerhoff Mulder 1999). The first criterion, concerning effect, is conceptually straightforward but poses some practical difficulties with the operational definition of depletion or degradation not addressed in this article (see Meffe & Carroll 1997, Cocklin 1989). The design criterion is more conceptually challenging, as it raises issues regarding historical processes, causal versus functional explanation, agency, and the like. But it nevertheless seems essential if we are to understand the historical processes that have shaped human-environment relations. It also has practical significance, for if a record of coexistence or sustainable use is taken as sufficient evidence of practices and institutions supporting environmental conservation then
we will be unprepared for the emergence of resource depletion or environmental degradation when factors such as population density or marketing opportunities change (Low & Heinen 1993, Henrich 1997, Galaty 1999).

Our use of the phrase "designed" is meant to allow for several distinct processes to play a role in shaping conservation practices. One the one hand, it can include design based on conscious beliefs and preferences, and hence an intentional form of explanation (Elster 1983). But evolutionary processes, whether cultural or genetic, can also produce complex design, and our definition allows this. Thus, if it could be shown that a conservation practice had spread or was maintained in a population because its practitioners either were less likely to suffer extinction or more likely to prosper and spread (as compared to non-conservers), that would satisfy the design criterion. This would be the case even if the conscious reasons for carrying out the practice were not connected to conservation (but to propitiating spirits, for example). However, it is important to note that the conditions for this to occur seem quite restrictive, since conservation not only involves a time lag in reaping a benefit (Rogers 1991), but also often produces a collective good (see below) that may benefit non-conservers as much as conservers. That is probably why no one has been able to demonstrate the evolution of systems of conservation in non-human populations, despite past claims for such in terms of "group selection" (Wynne-Edwards 1965) or "prudent predation" (Slobodkin 1968). On the other hand, it is possible that cultural evolution is more favorable than genetic evolution to the spread of group-beneficial traits (Boyd & Richerson 1985, Soltis et al. 1995). In sum, a definition of conservation that incorporates the two criteria of effect and design is logically coherent and perhaps of practical value. It serves to distinguish deliberate conservation from sustainability due to other factors, and directs research towards measuring actual environmental effects in addition to beliefs or claimed effects. This definition also highlights some reasons that the debate over indigenous or pre-modern conservation has been so protracted and difficult to resolve. Some participants in this debate take sustainable use as the sole criterion for conservation while others take that to be an unintended byproduct of other factors (such as low population density); and some have seen statement of conservation beliefs or ethics as conclusive evidence of conservation, while others demand data on environmental effects. Our definition does pose some difficult empirical and conceptual challenges. In particular, it means that conservation is inherently much harder to verify empirically than depletion, for one must determine not only that coexistence or sustainable use occurs, but also that it is due to human actions designed to secure this end (as is the case for any valid claim involving adaptive functions of human behavior).

The Problem of Temporal Discounting
Conservation often involves taking a short-term loss in order to reap a long-term gain (Alvard 1995, Ruttan & Borgerhoff Mulder 1999). This trade-off between present and future raises the complex issue of temporal discounting, a crucial concern in determining if conservation is rational (Clark 1973) or adaptive (Rogers 1991, Alvard 1998a). There are two reasons for discounting future gains relative to present ones: delays increase the chance that the gain will fail to be realized at all (because environmental conditions change, or others make off with the resource, or the decision-maker dies); and delays reduce the opportunity to put a given gain to work in producing more gains. Such trade-offs are obvious in a commodified context, where immediate harvests mean that the gains can be invested at the going rate of return. Thus, one can predict that slow-growing resources (like whales and redwood trees) that have a reproductive rate below the prevailing rate of return on capital investment will more likely suffer unsustainable harvest rates (Clark 1973, Alvard 1998a).

Temporal discounting is likely to be present in subsistence economies as well, and may be a significant deterrent to conservation, since subsistence decisions always involve the two kinds of trade-offs mentioned above (Alvard 1998a). Indeed, both theory (Rogers 1994) and data on the foraging decisions of other species (Cuthill & Houston 1997, Kacelnik 1997) suggest it is an ubiquitous product of evolution. Despite this ubiquity, there are likely to be cultural and ecological sources of variation in temporal discount rates. Briefly, these might include the following:
1. Demographic growth rates: stable or declining population size reduces the value of present versus future investment in reproduction (Fisher 1958, Rogers 1994), and conversely for increasing population.


3. Resource renewal rate: as noted above, slowly-growing resources lower the gains that can be had in the future by conserving today.


5. Capital mobility: high mobility decreases the incentive to suffer short-term costs in order to realize long-term yields from conservation.

6. Control over future harvests: those who have little control over who will actually obtain the deferred harvest have less incentive to forego present harvests.

This last point leads directly to our next topic.

Conservation and Collective Action

The theory of collective action is a well-developed branch of political science and decision theory dealing with social choice (Hardin 1982). Collective action refers to any group of (two or more) individuals cooperating or coordinating their actions in order to produce some aggregate outcome. Based on the assumptions of methodological individualism and rational self-interest (Elster 1983), the logic of collective action is a logic of individual benefits and costs, not collective ones (Olson 1965).

A collective action problem arises whenever collective action is individually costly but collectively beneficial (or conversely). A common scenario in which a collective action problem can arise involves the attempt to provide or safeguard a collective good -- that is, any good or service that is available to all members of some collective (e.g., a village, an organization, a nation), but whose consumption by some reduces the benefit available to the remainder (Hardin 1982). A classic form of collective good is what economists and collective action theorists term a common-pool resource or CPR (Gordon 1954, Circacy-Wantrup & Bishop 1975, Ostrom 1990; see McCay, this volume).

Environmental conservation raises collective action problems because it usually requires individually costly actions that produce collective benefits, thereby providing the opportunity (and incentive) for free-riding. Garret Hardin’s (1968) famous essay on the “tragedy of the commons” involves just such a scenario, where individual herders are unwilling to pay the costs of conservation (limiting herd size) because the benefits of doing so are shared collectively. The logic of Hardin’s argument is sound, but some of the assumptions on which it is based can be challenged (Feeny et al. 1990, Ostrom et al. 1999). In particular, Hardin fails to recognize the distinction between situations involving open access (absence of property rights) and those of communal ownership (Feeny et al. 1990). This oversight is critical, because both theory and data indicate that resources involving open access are much more vulnerable to overharvesting than those with restricted access (Ostrom 1990, McKean 1992).

Anthropologists and others have documented dozens of systems of communal ownership and management of CPRs, many of them quite long-lived, and some providing considerable evidence of explicit and effective conservation practices (Ostrom 1990, Feeny et al. 1990, McCay this volume). Examples are found in communities all over the world, and range from pastures and forests to irrigation systems and fisheries. Various features of CPR management seem designed to solve key aspects of collective action problems: socially regulated access, management rules governing resource harvests, means of monitoring compliance to these rules, and sanctions to punish those who violate them. The ubiquity of monitoring and sanctions in successful CPR systems strongly supports the self-interest assumption of collective action
theory; these would be superfluous is such systems sprang from collectivist motivations or reflected culturally-specific rationalities (Froemming 1999).

If systems of CPR management are so effective at solving collective action problems involving resource utilization, and have been invented independently so many times, why is over-harvesting or environmental degradation a widespread and recurrent problem? First, most systems of CPR management depend on relatively informal means of monitoring and sanctioning free-riding and other violations of management rules. But these become ineffective as group size increases, a well-studied phenomenon in the literature on collective action (Olson 1965, Hardin 1982, Taylor 1987, Boyd & Richerson 1988). As population density and political centralization increases, communities may exceed the size homogeneity needed for endogenous systems of communal management (Singleton & Taylor 1992). Second, where they have managed to persist, small-scale CPR systems are vulnerable to competition from larger and more powerful political and economic systems.

The problem we face today is not so much a tragedy of the commons (though open-access systems do persist in important domains, such as the atmosphere and open-ocean fisheries) as it is the elimination of myriad small-scale systems of common property management involving socially-regulated access (Feeny et al. 1990). The twin juggernauts of centralized governments and expanding commercial interests -- often working in collusion -- can undermine local resource management and increase market-driven resource extraction at an accelerating rate world-wide. This dynamic has been well-studied in forests in parts of South and Southeast Asia (Gadgil & Guha 1992, Alcorn & Molnar 1996, Padoch & Peluso 1996). Managed for centuries by villages or other collectivities, some systems have suffered expropriation by colonial and postcolonial governments intent on extracting commercially-valuable resources or combating what they see as the dangers of deforestation due to local use. But such external control can destroy local incentives for communal management, leading to overexploitation by both outside commercial interests and local peoples (Why conserve what outsiders are going to take?). Once undermined in this way, it is hard to re-establish effective systems of CPR management, particularly given increased local demand for natural resources due to greater involvement in market economies, as well as population growth.

**Predicting Conservation**

We have defined conservation as practices that are designed to prevent or mitigate species depletion or habitat degradation. This definition implies a design process, either intentional or evolutionary. In turn, these involve processes of decision-making or adaptation by natural selection (of culture or genes) that, in conjunction with the theory summarized above, allow one to make a series of predictions about the conditions under which conservation is likely to occur (and conversely, the conditions under which it is likely to be absent or fail):

1. Controlled or exclusive access (stable land rights)
2. Distinct or confined resource populations (to which controlled access can apply)
3. Resource populations which are resilient or rapidly renewing (hence likely to respond to management controls)
4. Low discount rates, such that the value of sustained yield exceeds the value of immediate yield
5. Social parameters (e.g., small group size and stable membership) and institutions (monitoring and sanctioning) that counter free-riding

Conversely, the following set of conditions make deliberate and effective conservation much less likely to emerge or be stable:

6. High demand from external markets
7. Rapid population growth
8. Acute resource scarcity
9. Adequate substitutes for threatened resources
10. Acquisition of novel technology or migration into novel habitats
11. Ease in relocating production (expandable frontiers, mobile capital)

With these expectations in mind, we turn now to a survey of the ethnographic evidence.

**ETHNOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE**

The theoretical arguments discussed above provide some expectations regarding the conditions under which local systems of environmental conservation would arise and be maintained endogenously. They suggest that while these conditions are fairly stringent, a broader range of conditions might result in sustainable resource use. Because of the paucity of studies that provide comparable data, it is not currently possible to systematically examine the ethnographic record to determine the empirical match with theoretical predictions. Hence we present summaries of a variety of cases, organized into two categories: practices designed to conserve species or habitats, and cases of sustainable use (coexistence and non-degradation) but without evidence of conservation design. The cases discussed here are representative of the range of possibilities, but not necessarily of the actual frequency of outcomes in each category.

**Practices Designed To Conserve**

Following the arguments summarized earlier, we include cases in this category if the actors clearly state that the practices in question are intended to conserve, or if these practices exhibit design features that are costly or complex and unlikely to have arisen for purposes other than conservation. There are a variety of such practices reported in the ethnographic literature, and we have grouped them into several categories. In almost no case, however, are data sufficient to determine whether or not the criterion of conservation effect is met.

1. **Harvesting restraint that raises short-term production cost:** This is the type of resource utilization that most clearly meets the conservation design criterion. It has rarely been documented, however (with the obvious exception of husbanding of domesticated resources). Descriptions of Native American gatherers leaving smaller roots or corms (or portions thereof) behind during the gathering process (Anderson 1996) may qualify, though other reasons for the practice may apply, and there is insufficient data to decide the matter. Sometimes harvesting restraint is motivated by belief in supernatural sanctions. Thus, Kayapó honey-gatherers in the Brazilian Amazon leave a portion of honey, pollen, and broodcomb in the hive in order to placate the deity Bepkôrôrôti, which encourages bees to re-colonize the hive (Posey 1998). Though intent to conserve is absent in this case, Posey argues that design for conservation is present. But he also reports that honey-gatherers access the hive by cutting down a large tree; this surely accelerates the decay of a prime nesting site (a hollow trunk), and leaves the partially-destroyed hive accessible to ground-living predators, rendering the conservation effect of partial hive harvesting ambiguous at best. Another recent study discussing subsistence harvest restraint describes limitations placed on hunting of mountain goats by Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en Indians of the Pacific Northwest, involving group defense of hunting territories and regulation of hunting within each group by the local chief (Gottesfeld 1994:468). Since mountain goats are very localized and have low reproductive rates and dispersal ability, they are easily overhunted, and Gottesfeld argues that chiefly control on hunting was a necessary and effective form of conservation. While no quantitative data on either hunting practices or mountain goat biology are presented, Gottesfeld does mention a local myth that recounts wanton slaughter of mountain goats, followed by their revenge on human hunters. Though crucial evidence is lacking, the existence of territorial control and centralized sanctions, plus the lack of adequate substitutes for goat wool in the traditional economy, provides some plausibility to the conservation hypothesis. Here, existence of design elements mitigating the free-rider problem, plus the vulnerability of mountain goats to extirpation, serve to strengthen the case for the conservation. In contrast, most of the other arguments Gottesfeld makes for Gitksan and
Wet’suwet’en game conservation fail to meet the design criterion for conservation (see below).
Many claims of harvesting restraint as conservation commonly fail to provide any evidence beyond very loose assertions of a likely conservation effect. For example, Posey (1998) presents the observation that Kayapó avoid schools of minnows out of fear of the mythological 20-meter-long serpent mry-ka’ak to argue that they thereby preserve a basic component of the riverine food chain. Posey's point is that intention or awareness of conservation is not needed for it to occur; perhaps, but surely we need more evidence than is provided in this instance. While more detailed ecological study might confirm that such preservation is an effect of Kayapó beliefs about mry-ka’ak, there are many possible reasons why this belief exists. A cogent argument that conserving effects explain a practice requires close attention to design features and consideration of alternative hypotheses. But we find it hard to envision how a practice that sacrificed short-term gains to fishermen (assuming Kayapó would indeed be able to efficiently harvest minnows) in order to benefit an open-access common-pool resource (the riverine food chain) would arise and spread.

Even more problematic is Gottesfeld's (1994) interpretation of the bottleneck created by the labor demands of processing salmon for storage in the Northwest Coast Indian fishery as functioning to limit the harvest, and hence conserve salmon. While it is true that the processing constraints meant that many more fish could be harvested than could be preserved, there is no incentive to harvest more if the fish will only rot. Contrary to Gottesfeld, we argue that by developing means of preserving fish, Northwest Coast Indians increased rather than limited their harvest, being motivated to harvest enough fish to smoke and serve as a staple food for many months of the year (though there is no evidence that the increase was enough to deplete the salmon runs). Interestingly, Gottesfeld (1994:453) reports that when a Gitksan elder was asked about "traditional fish management and conservation practices," he answered that "all fish remains must be returned to the water. That was all that was necessary to renew the fish." This supports the inference that salmon conservation was neither practiced nor necessary in the indigenous fishery.

Inuit foragers one of us worked with described one conservation practice, avoiding the harvest of geese accompanied by goslings (Smith 1991:282), but no observations confirming or refuting this statement were made; Fienup-Riordan (1990) reports a contrary practice of harvesting flightless geese and goslings as a regular practice of Yup’ik Eskimos in western Alaska, and Burch (1994) cites a variety of non-conserving hunting practices of northern hunter-gatherers. Even simple statements that harvesting restraint occurs are rare in the ethnographic literature, occurring in only 5% of 122 cases in a recent cross-cultural study (Low 1996:359). Extensive observational data on various tropical subsistence hunters uniformly indicate that their subsistence decisions are designed to maximize foraging efficiency (harvest per unit hunting time), usually contradicting predictions based on game conservation (Hames 1987, Kay 1994, Vickers 1994, Alvard 1995, FitzGibbon 1998). For example, hunters preferentially pursue species that yield high returns, regardless of vulnerability to depletion; they readily harvest females and prime-aged individuals; they often respond to game declines by increasing hunting effort; and they allocate hunting effort to habitat "patches" in proportion to profitability rather than prey abundance or population resilience. Similar results have recently been described for an artisanal fishery in the Solomon Islands (Aswani 1998, 1999).

It is important to note that just as sustainable use doesn't necessarily indicate conservation, lack of conservation doesn't necessarily indicate resource depletion. Sustainable harvest levels are a frequent outcome of Winterhalder and Lu's (1997) simulation model of predator(hunter-gatherer)-prey population ecology, despite the fact that the model assumes human choices to be guided simply by optimal foraging goals. Various quantitative studies of subsistence foraging indicate that harvest of most prey populations seem to be at sustainable levels. For example, Hill (1983) tested the claim that the !Kung San were limiting their reproductive rate and foraging effort in order to avoid overharvesting the game supply (e.g., Harris 1979:81), and found that the !Kung harvest less than 1% of the biomass of local large...
herbivores, whereas the maximum sustainable yield of these species ranges from 10% to 20%. In this case as in others, the likely explanation for low harvest rates of animal prey is that the returns from hunting using indigenous technology are too low to motivate higher harvest rates.

Some direct evidence on this is beginning to accumulate. Using source-sink models and careful assays of both hunting pressure and game abundance, Hill and Ache Indian coworkers have recently shown that Ache harvest a very small and sustainable proportion of the standing stock of their nine major game species (Hill et al. 1997, 2000). Nevertheless, in the Ache case and others, detailed ethnographic evidence indicates that subsistence hunting by indigenous hunters can lead to localized depletion (Alvard 1994, Vickers 1991, Peres 2000) and even regional extirpation, as in Inuit hunting of musk oxen following introduction of rifles (Burch 1977, 1994). On balance the evidence on faunal impacts of small-scale societies indicates that conservation is absent, and depletion is sometimes a consequence.

Exceptions to this can occur in cases where hunters control access to hunting territories (Feit 1987), congruent with one of the predictions listed above. Evidence that subsistence hunting depresses prey population levels (e.g., Kay 1994, Peres 2000) does not prove that the net effect of human predation on biodiversity is negative, however. First, localized depletion will often be balanced by prey population growth nearby (Hill et al. 2000). Second, by serving as keystone predators (Paine 1966), humans might help prevent excessive ecological competition between prey species or (indirectly) other members of an ecological community (Simenstad et al. 1978).

2. Protection or propagation of resource species: Another form of conservation involves practices designed to protect or propagate resource species. A variety of such practices are described for Native American foragers, including irrigation of wild grasses, deliberate dispersal of wild plants used for food and medicine through broadcast or planting of seeds or in some cases transplanting, periodic burning to control outbreaks of plant diseases (reviews in Anderson 1996, Blackburn & Anderson 1993). It is interesting to note that all these examples involve plant resources, in contrast to the paucity of cases of harvest restraint or protection of fauna.

3. Avoidance of harmful habitat modification: As discussed above (and documented further below), habitat disturbance need not lead to environmental degradation or biodiversity loss, and in fact may enhance biodiversity. But clearly some types of habitats are more sensitive to the effects of modification than others. Hence avoidance or mitigation of such habitat change can be a form of conservation, as recognized in environmental legislation and regulations in many industrialized societies. Do small-scale societies show analogous controls on habitat modification clearly designed to conserve? If so, they appear to be rather understudied in the ethnographic literature. One possible example is found among several Indian societies in Northwest Amazonia, who avoid swidden clearing at river margins, thus preserving gallery forests that enhance aquatic productivity (Chenela 1989; Beckerman & Valentine 1996). While this is apparently undertaken in order to maintain fishing productivity, it is a plausible case of conservation involving short-term costs.

Another proposed example of indigenous habitat conservation involves various cases of sacred groves. While many of these cases occur among long-standing state societies, and thus lie outside the orbit of this article, Olafson (1995) has recently published an interesting discussion of sacred groves in the Philippines, and found that protection of groves was "a latent function of . . . religion, and thus a weak form of conservation" (Olafson 1995:29).

There was no indication that local protection was matched to overall forest preservation, but rather to "protection of themselves and their children from disease-causing environmental spirits," a relationship he terms "incidental conservation" (ibid.).

4. Restriction of human population growth to match resource base: While protection or enhancement of environmental resources is the obvious route to conservation, supply and demand can also be brought into line by reducing consumer demand, as advocates of contemporary population control frequently point out. Most claims of human population regulation to avoid resource exploitation that we have examined confuse epiphenomenal
effects with actual causes (see Bates & Lees 1979, Dewar 1984, and Smith & Smith 1994 for further discussion). But under special circumstances非常高 circumscribed populations, effective centralized or communal sanctions非常高 such control over population growth can be achieved. One of the few adequately documented cases is the Polynesian chiefdom of Tikopia. Tikopia exhibited clear cultural population controls involving celibacy, contraception, infanticide, abortion, and periodic forced emigration (Firth 1936, Borrie et al. 1957). This, coupled with intensive horticulture and arboriculture, as well as centralized (chiefly) controls on utilization of marine resources, limited consumption of resources to sustainable levels for many centuries (Kirch & Yen 1982, Kirch 1997).

Tikopian practices did not generally conserve native terrestrial species, however, and indeed initial occupation was followed by extensive deforestation, increasing soil erosion, extinction or extirpation of at least six bird species, and depletion of marine and terrestrial fauna (Kirch 1997:37). Eventually Tikopians converted to a sustainable production system emphasizing arboriculture, converting to such a thoroughly anthropogenic habitat that "virtually the entire land surface is cloaked in such orchard stands of economic trees...protecting and shading intensive undercanopy plantings" of yams and other cultigens (Kirch 1997:35). Thus, Tikopians did not conserve original biodiversity or specific resources so much as an entire highly-modified agroecosystem (as well as marine resources of the reef and lagoon, whose exploitation was limited by chiefly authority and sanctions).

Sustainable Use Without Conservation
We suggested earlier that small-scale societies have developed many practices designed to enhance livelihood for which habitat or biodiversity conservation is a byproduct非常高 in other words, these practices would be carried out whether or not they had conservation effects. As with conservation by design, it is convenient to group ethnographic examples of these into several categories.

1. Matching harvest to needs: Statements that people harvest no more than they need or can fully utilize are commonplace in the popular literature on indigenous conservation. Nelson (1983:200) quotes a Koyukon Indian woman as saying "People never kill animals for no reason, because they know there’s times when they’ll really need to kill anything they can find." This is a rational stance, and it may well have a moral dimension involving a social contract with immortal animal spirits (see below), but we question Nelson’s conclusion that this statement "sums up an important element of Koyukon interactions with nature非常高 the conservation ethic and its associated practices." Avoiding wanton destruction of unneeded prey is not the same as restraining harvest below current desires, and does not demonstrate design for conservation. After all, since harvesting additional resources generally requires effort, even with economies of scale, such avoidance will usually save time and effort. In turn, responding to acute shortages by intensifying hunting pressure非常高 "killing anything they can find"非常高 means that resource depletion is more likely to occur precisely when local prey populations are at a low ebb. Of course, harvest greater than demand might sometimes be very low cost or even unavoidable, as in bison cliff jumps where the vagaries of herd size make the number killed difficult to control (Wheat 1972).

Matching harvest levels to current needs, then, does not qualify as conservation, though it may have the effect of minimizing offtake. Full utilization of each item harvested will also have that effect, but again the conserving effect seems fortuitous. When resources are scarce, the marginal costs of harvesting them (due to increased search time) are higher, and the efficient response is then to invest increased labor in extracting more value per item harvested (Jones & Metcalfe 1988). Splitting bones to extract marrow, boiling them to extract grease, and the like are the commonly-observed responses. Conversely, when resources are abundant we can expect to see less frugal utilization; for example, during periods when caribou populations were high, Inuit sometimes killed a dozen or more animals per household each fall to obtain fresh skins for bedding and clothing, leaving the meat to rot (Kelsall 1968).

2. Regulating onset or duration of harvests: Controls governing timing of resource harvests, as well as who has rights to participate, are widespread in small-scale societies. They
are found, for example, in many nearshore marine fisheries, such as the trochus shell fishery in the Kei Islands of eastern Indonesia (Ruttan 1998). As Polunin (1984) argued about such systems in general, in the cases Ruttan studied the aim seems to be maximizing economic control by locals, rather than conserving resources per se, though the latter may be a byproduct. On the other hand, regulating the onset of a harvest may sometimes be designed to maximize returns on labor time (e.g., waiting until schools of fish have gathered in large numbers), and thus they may actually increase harvests rather than restrain them (Polunin 1984). A good example of this is provided by the communal bison hunt once practiced by Indian tribes of the North American Plains, such as the Cheyenne. Here, the onset of the summer tribal hunt was carefully regulated by specifically appointed "camp police," and anyone tempted to "jump the gun" (thus obtaining a large personal share, but scattering the herd before others could participate) was subject to severe sanctions such as public beatings, and destruction of their horses and hunting equipment (Hoebel 1978:581).

Limits on the duration of harvests are better candidates for conservation by design, but seem to be correspondingly rare in the ethnographic literature. The related practice of restraint in foraging effort following on the heels of successful harvests has frequently been nominated as a conservation practice. Thus, Beckerman & Valentine (1996) report that among the Arawakan and eastern Tukanoan peoples of northwestern Amazonia, it is commonly believed that one should "rest" for a few days after successful harvests in order to avoid supernatural sanctions for immoderation. They propose that this practice protects vulnerable stocks of fish and game, but provide no data on actual conservation effects, nor do they consider alternative hypotheses. For example, since the social context of foraging in these communities involves communal sharing of most of the catch, it is possible that foragers engage in "turn-taking" to avoiding excessive free-riding on their efforts.

3. Patch-switching to maximize overall return rates: Coexistence of hunter-gatherers and their prey, rather than extinction or extirpation, is commonly observed. Many have used this as evidence for conservation, but as suggested above this is not sufficient, since such coexistence could be due to other causes. One prominent alternative invokes the advantages of leaving a patch (i.e., resource concentration) before it is fully depleted because of the likelihood of obtaining higher foraging returns elsewhere (Winterhalder 1981, Smith 1983).

The model of foraging strategy known as the "marginal value theorem" (Charnov 1976), or MVT for short, makes a number of predictions concerning patch use, movement, and time allocation. The key one for present purposes is that a forager wishing to maximize harvest per unit time spent foraging should leave any given patch when the marginal return rate (the expected rate of harvest over the next small period of time) falls below what can be obtained by traveling on to another less-depleted patch. Thus, assuming that there are sufficient alternative patches, and that patch depletion follows a diminishing return curve, the MVT predicts that an efficient forager will generally leave a patch well before total exhaustion of resources has occurred.

One of us (Smith 1983) suggested this pattern of decision-making could account for the "rotation of hunting territories" described by Feit (1973) and others for Waswanipi Cree Indians. Feit (1987) has countered with more detailed evidence that he argues supports an active management (conservation) of moose, beaver, and possibly other resources by Waswanipi. Clearly, if hunters can be assured that managed hunting territories will not be "poached" by others, long-term management and short-term costly restraint in service of long-term sustainable yields could be in their interests. If such a system operates among Cree in recent decades, it certainly differs substantially from the much more mobile, opportunistic pattern of land use and hunting effort described in written accounts by Jesuit missionaries and explorers of the 17th and 18th centuries (Leacock 1954; Krench 1999:20ff).

Indeed, ethnohistoric evidence (Brightman 1987, 1993; Krench 1999) indicates that "today's conservation ethic and practices were largely absent among Northern Algonquians until certain historical conditions emerged in the wake of the arrival of European outsiders mainly interested in controlling Indians economically and spiritually" (Krench 1999:206). Instead, what prevailed was an animistic belief system which viewed animal prey as inexhaustible, but
success in capturing them as dependent on social reciprocity involving ritual forms of respect (e.g., in handling carcasses and caring for the bones of prey). Within this belief system, the way to ensure abundance of prey was to kill as many as possible and consume them respectfully, so that their reincarnated souls would animate future prey animals to yield themselves to hunters in greater and greater numbers. In some cases, hunters claimed that to refuse to kill animals that made themselves available to hunters was a form of disrespect that would lead to a decline in hunting success (Brightman 1993, Krich 1999). Fienup-Riordan (1990) has detailed a similar set of beliefs and practices among Yup’ik Eskimo thousands of miles to the west of the Algonquian area, although as in the Algonquian case, explicit conservation beliefs and practices have emerged as a result of Western influence (Zavaleta 1999).

While the MVT is usually applied to foraging contexts only, its essential logic can be applied to any system of production. Thus, pastoralists often move their herds to better grazing areas before the current area is completely depleted (Ruttan & Borgerhoff Mulder 1999 and commentators thereon). Such decisions are analogous to foragers’ decisions to leave a patch in order to pursue higher returns elsewhere, and follow MVT expectations. Similarly, swidden cultivators generally cease cultivating a given plot after one or a few years, which allows soil nutrients to recover and forest to regenerate in the fallow phase. Clearly, this practice prevents environmental degradation, but again this patch-switching appears to be designed to maximize production returns, rather than to conserve forests or soil. If patch-switching for efficiency reasons results in sustainable hunting, grazing, or swidden clearing, doesn’t it converge with conservation by design, making the distinction a sterile “academic” debate? We think not, since the predictions from the MVT or similar logic will diverge from those of conservation just when they matter most: when pressure on environmental resources is high. Thus, if for one reason or another (e.g., climate change, gradual overhunting, forager population growth, territorial restrictions by encroaching state systems) the per-capita abundance of prey should decline, foragers following MVT logic will stay longer in each patch (there being fewer enticing alternatives to draw them out), and increasing depletion can result (Broughton 1994, Vickers 1994). Similarly, during regional droughts efficient pastoralists will have little incentive to look for non-existent greener pastures, and overgrazing is more likely, though in most cases pastures recover quickly once rain returns (Galaty 1999). And a scarcity of uncleared forest, whether it results from internal population growth or external competition, can drive swidden cultivators to shorten fallow length to unsustainable levels, resulting in conversion of forest to grassland or other degraded habitats (Uhl et al. 1982, Richard 1996:284). In contrast, practices designed for conservation might be expected to prevent such scenarios from unfolding.

4. Anthropogenic practices that create habitat mosaics: While most anthropological discussion of conservation in small-scale societies has focused on the issue of restraints in resource harvests, a few researchers (primarily ethnobiologists and restoration ecologists) have taken a different approach. Drawing on the growing consensus among ecologists that moderate and repeated disturbance can enhance biodiversity at species, habitat, and landscape levels, these researchers have considered the ways in which small-scale and indigenous societies contribute to such disturbance regimes. As we noted earlier, recurrent controlled burning is one very widespread source of anthropogenic disturbance. Other sources have been described as well. For example, by felling large trees to collect honey, Kayapó create gaps that are colonized by many gap-dependent species. Posey (1998:105) notes that "...the felling of one large tree offers an immediate source of honey and provides a new ecological niche for useful plants that develop into a long-term hunting ground." Similarly, data reviewed by Little (1996) indicate that East African savanna habitats have been strongly shaped by subsistence practices of pastoralists and foragers over the last several millennia. In particular, the maintenance of grasslands through burning and stock grazing has prevented encroachment of bush, and thereby helped maintain high densities and diversity of wild ungulates as well.
One of the most carefully documented cases of anthropogenic biodiversity enhancement via creation of habitat mosaics involves Ka’apor swidden fallows (Balée 1993). In a comparison of fallows with primary forest, Balée shows that they differ significantly in tree composition, but have equal biodiversity. These findings strongly support the view that these anthropogenic forests have enhanced regional biodiversity. Interestingly, while fallows have a much higher proportion of significant food species than primary forest, Balée finds that Ka’apor do not actively produce this result; instead, most of the species in fallows are introduced or dispersed by animals attracted to clearings. He concludes from this and other evidence that "the Ka’apor agroforestry complex . . . appears to be incidental to developmental processes associated with semi-sedentary, egalitarian Amazonian societies." It is, simply, not a product of long term design, indigenous or otherwise" (p. 248).

CONCLUSIONS

We have defined conservation as practices that are designed to prevent or mitigate species depletion or habitat degradation. This definition implies a design process, either intentional or evolutionary. In turn, these processes invoke processes of decision-making or adaptation by natural selection (of culture or genes) that allow one to make a series of predictions about the conditions under which conservation is (or is not) likely to occur, as outlined above. While the state of the ethnographic record does not allow a systematic test of these predictions, the survey summarized in the previous section does seem congruent with most or all of them. In particular, deliberate conservation is rarely evident for animal prey, particularly large game whose very mobility prevents local control over access and hence diffuses any benefits from restraint. In contrast, most cases of deliberate conservation (ranging from harvest restraint to population enhancement) encountered in our survey of the literature apply to plant resources or habitats. Further, because conservation is likely to be habitat- or resource-specific, the presence or absence of conservation practices is not necessarily an indicator of the overall human impact on ecosystem processes and biodiversity.

Many will question a definition of conservation that requires evidence that it be intended or designed. But the alternative, labelling any actions that reduce harvest rates or environmental degradation as conservation, is problematic. First, it suggests a solution where there may be no problem, as in many cases where human environmental pressure is too mild or sporadic to cause irreversible biodiversity loss or habitat degradation; the evidence indicates that this is often the case in small-scale societies that are not engaged in commercial harvesting and that have low and stable populations. Second, without a design criterion for conservation, analyses are subject to the problems of functionalism that often plague social science (Elster 1983), including ecological anthropology (Smith & Winterhalder 1992). Any number of practices and beliefs may have the effect of reducing harvest rates or environmental impacts—going to church on Sundays, avoiding dangerous areas near enemy territory, or inventing a toggling harpoon that makes it more likely that a wounded seal will be captured rather than escape to die later. These effects are not why the practices are undertaken, however, and the environmental benefits in such cases are usually too diffuse to motivate individuals to undertake them for those reasons.

The dominant cultural meaning and practice of "conservation" at the present historical moment focuses on preservation of biodiversity (of species and higher levels) and ecosystem function. This approach to conservation is dependent on a set of political, economic, and intellectual realities with few parallels in human history. Conservation of biodiversity for its own sake, and preservation of wilderness for recreation or aesthetic admiration, are goals that may make sense to urbanized elites in industrial society (Guha 1989, 1997). But for subsistence-based societies, particularly small-scale ones, these appear to be alien concepts. Reviewing a large number of community-based conservation programs, Little (1994:350) concludes that "cases in which local communities in low-income regions manage their resource bases with the prime objective of conservation are rather than improved social and economic welfare are virtually non-existent." Instead, members of such societies are likely to pursue enhancement of the resources needed for livelihood, safeguarding of homelands.
from exploitation by outsiders, and allocation of subsistence effort to the most rewarding areas and resources currently available. These choices will often have the effect of conserving habitats and biodiversity, but they will not necessarily be designed to do so, and may at times have the opposite consequence.

There are serious political issues at stake in debates about indigenous conservation, property rights, and economic change. There is no doubt that "coercive conservation" (Peluso 1993, Hitchcock 1995, Zerner 1996, Neumann 1998) can be a major threat to indigenous rights. Our critical examination of the debate over indigenous conservation is not meant to provide any support for those who believe that conservation agendas trump human rights, or that environmental protection justifies political and economic disenfranchisement of small-scale societies. Indigenous rights to traditional homelands and resource utilization should not be predicated on environmental conservation (Stearman 1994). Conservation is not the criterion for property rights employed within modern states, so it is hypocritical as well as unjust to impose it upon already marginalized and often impoverished people.

A more restricted and realistic understanding of indigenous conservation is not only better social (and environmental) science, but may also offer benefits in the arena of environmental policy and politics. Overgeneralized or idealized expectations concerning the bases of environmental belief and practice in indigenous or small-scale societies can produce anger and mistrust when these are disappointed, as exemplified in Conklin & Graham's (1995) insightful discussion of shifting relations between Kayapó Indians and environmentalists (see also Stearman 1994). As we move towards a more nuanced and realistic view of human-environment relations in small-scale societies, the actual accomplishments of these peoples in constructing their livelihoods in a generally sustainable fashion, sometimes deliberately conserving or enhancing species and habitats, become even more remarkable and worthy of understanding and respect.

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